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The Scholarship of Learning Modern Languages 
and Cultures: Integrating Education, Research 
and Human Development 
We are not educated until we give meaning to our education  
±in some ways we are not educated until we can educate ourselves. 
(Dominicé, 2000: 80) 
 
 
The problem 
The development of personal epistemologies1 and their integration with 
social epistemologies is not a current priority in most institutions of 
higher education, which has negative consequences for knowledge 
itself (its generation and re-creation), for the individuals who see 
themselves restricted by limiting beliefs about learning and knowing, 
and for society at large for reproducing practices that favour alienation 
and fragmentation.  
While the transformative effect of learning is part of a social 
epistemology, it is important to attest of such a transformation in 
personal epistemologies. Both kinds are necessary for a critical form of 
OLIHZKLFKDFFRUGLQJWR%DUQHWW³KDVWREHconstrued and practised as a 
form of VRFLDODQGSHUVRQDOHSLVWHPRORJ\´(Barnett, 1997: 5).  
Personal epistemologies, however, are generally considered as 
being subsumed under social epistemologies, as if the experiential and 
perceptual transformations of the individual were no more than by-
                                               
1
 ,DPXVLQJ WKH WHUP³HSLVWHPRORJ\´ WRPHDQZKDW'DYLG3HUNLQVFDOOV ³HSLVWHPHV´
ZKLFK KH GHILQHV DV ³D system of ideas or way of understanding that allows us to 
establish knowledge´(Perkins, 2006: 42). 
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products of larger impersonal processes. However, a serious 
reconsideration of the role of education in personal epistemologies can 
offer multiple opportunities to investigate the experiential roots of 
knowledge and ways of knowing conducive to the development of 
specific fields of knowledge.  This would be beneficial for disciplines in 
general and for Modern Languages and Cultures in particular, in terms 
of gaining a phenomenological perspective on its underpinnings, and 
helping learners to enhance their autonomy and creativity.  
A profound revision of the meaning of knowledge as connected 
to the transformation of the individual and how he or she goes about 
knowing is a must in all academic fields but perhaps most  acutely in 
the Humanities, where subjectivity is such a consistent focus of study. 
GLYHQ WKH WHQGHQF\ WR GHILQH NQRZOHGJH LQ µREMHFWLYH¶ WHUPV (Gellner, 
1964), one of the most important problems in the study and research of 
the Humanities is the revision of the role of subjectivity both in the 
definition of its object and in its methods of study  
New forms of scholarship that construct flexible and generative 
objects and ways of knowing that bring learners, collectively and 
individually conceived, into being are necessary. We need forms of 
scholarship for which the human development of those who practise 
them is not indifferent.  
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The core idea 
By taking learning as the axis of scholarship, personal and social 
epistemologies have a common ground: experience and reflective 
action. I am not considering learning as a vehicle whose success is 
measured to the extent that a portion of the external world is 
appropriated, but as a qualitatively different way to see, understand and 
handle experience.  
A scholarship of learning is tightly bound to the experiential roots 
of objects of study that keep on changing in individual and collective 
histories. Therefore, a scholarship of learning is not a set of context-free 
VNLOOV EXW D FRPSOH[ SURFHVV RI WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ RI LWV SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶
identity and agency over themselves and their object of study. Such 
two-fold construction orientates a discipline no less than the ways of 
knowing, acting and being of those engaged in its investigation. 
I propose that the object of study of Modern Languages and 
Cultures should be literacy in the multilayered symbolic codes (some of 
which are tacit) that make intercultural interchanges intelligible and 
effective. The scope of this dissertation, however, is restricted to the 
investigation of deep learning in literacy.  
My thesis is that Modern Languages and Cultures should not be 
limited to objects of study, such as language, discourse, texts, films, etc. 
but has to include the processes of agentification of the learner and 
making sense of his or her experience in a foreign language and 
culture. I advocate the investigation of the experiential roots of language 
and culture in a scholarship of learning which seeks to integrate 
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research and education, on the one hand, and language and content, 
on the other.  Experience and learning are subjective-objective 
processes, and so I advise the epistemological revaluation of 
subjectivity.  I propose that subjectification (i.e. the construction of the 
subject) is not only relevant for human development and social well-
being, but is a source of knowledge in the Humanities. 
 
The argument 
Three general statements derive from the argument that a scholarship 
of learning languages and cultures is constructed and practised as a 
form of social and personal epistemology that transforms the agency 
and the identity of its practitioners:  
A. Learning is the most comprehensive form of communication: with 
the mediation of the world, we learn from and educate each other 
in ways of thinking, acting and being that construct 
intersubjectively validated worldviews without which not even 
disagreement would be possible. Different conceptions of 
learning account for surface or deep approaches to it and, 
consequently, underlie different representations of knowledge, 
knowing and knowers.  
B. Variability, generativeness, and being experiential-transformative 
are characteristics of deep learning. 
C. According to the previous characteristics of deep learning, the 
study of languages and cultures has to change its gravitational 
centre from its current impersonal and collective orientation 
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(which is distinctive of surface learning) to personal experience 
and the active construction of identities and agentive voices. 
Each one of the previous general statements is respectively 
broken down into three more specific ones, thus making nine steps for 
the argument and mirrored in the nine constitutive chapters of this 
dissertation: 
1. Disciplines have an educational genesis which is generally 
neglected. I am proposing that it is necessary to acknowledge this 
origin by investigating the meaning of deep understanding leading 
into educational practices that are integral to the way of conceiving 
of the disciplines themselves. The term I use for this investigation 
and practice of the disciplines is scholarship of learning. 
2. The concept of a scholarship of learning derives originally from the 
diversification of the notion of scholarship and then from the critical 
revision of its historical antecedent: the scholarship of teaching. I 
suggest that the scholarship of learning is the most comprehensive 
form of disciplinary construction because it is not limited to 
knowledge as a product but includes the processes of knowledge 
formation. 
3. The characteristics of deep (as opposed to surface) learning are the 
benchmark of good scholarship interconnected with sound 
educational practices. Therefore, the critical revision of a discipline 
needs to inquire into this double connection, asking: how do these 
basic assumptions posit learning and learners? What kind of 
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educational practices are necessary to improve the construction of 
this discipline?  
4. The contextual and self-induced variation of the aspects of 
experience considered by the learner is foundational for discernment 
and hence for deep learning.  
5.   Deep learning is heuristic and creative. 
6.   Through deep learning, individuals transform themselves. 
7. The cultural experience of language is the matrix of generativeness 
and self-transformation in language and culture.   
8. The ability to shift languages in narrated events and narrative actions 
scaffold literacy in a foreign language.  
9. The meaning of understanding in a discipline unites social and 
personal epistemologies. 
The plan 
The first three steps in the argument above correspond to Chapters 1 to 
3, which constitute Part One, an extended discussion of the notion of 
scholarship and its metamorphoses. With an introduction to the 
historical origin of the disciplines and their philosophical and political 
internal forces, Chapter 1¶Vaim is to lay the ground for the relevance of 
WKH QRWLRQ RI GLVFLSOLQH LQ WRGD\¶V ZRUOG DQG RI WKH FRQVWUXction of 
disciplinary knowledge. In Chapter 2, I discuss the role of learning as 
encompassing the foci of the currently acknowledged forms of 
scholarship. Chapter 3 constitutes a discussion of the characteristics of 
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deep learning and how they can inform and integrate scholarship with 
educational practices.  
Part Two is constituted by chapters 4 to 6 and it deals with 
current assumptions and practices of Modern Languages regarding 
three fundamental characteristics of deep learning: variability, 
generativeness and transformation. In Chapter 4, I discuss contextual 
and self-induced variability as foundational for discernment and hence 
for learning. I discuss the inadequacy of monolingually biased theories 
to study multilingual societies and the formation of plurilingual 
individuals.  
Generativeness is the main subject in Chapter 5, where I argue 
that deep learning implies inventing ways to generate, even if the 
language learner generates what has already been known and used, 
and in &KDSWHU,DUJXHWKDWWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIWKHODQJXDJHOHDUQHU¶V
identity is transformative to the extent that it is practice-and-experience 
based from the point of view of the participant. In this way, the identity 
of the learner goes from being an acquirer and consumer of a good or 
commodity (i.e. another language) to an agent of her or his own being 
and means of expression. The turning point to Part Three is to discuss 
the ways in which deep language learning necessarily affects the notion 
of culture and its investigation. 
Part Three, constituted by chapters 7 to 9, is a proposal to 
develop cultural studies of the person as an alternative to their current 
sociological-anthropological orientation. The main discussion of Chapter 
7 is the concept of cultural experience and its connection with creativity, 
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self-direction and, in the final analysis, with human development. The 
emic-etic approximations in social studies and the semasiology-
onomasiology distinction are auxiliaries to artLFXODWH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V
investigation of his or her cultural experience of the foreign language. 
In Chapter 8 I propose that literacy and literariness represent 
different perceptual and symbolic shifts (digital and analog) necessary 
for the deep learning of a language and that the ability to articulate 
narrated events and narrative actions scaffold literacy and an agentive 
voice in a foreign language. 
Finally, in Chapter 9 I gather the main elements of the previous 
chapters to argue that the meaning of understanding in a discipline 
unites social and personal epistemologies and, to the extent that most 
acts of knowledge constitute a common ground of the disciplines even if 
their products are dissimilar, the scholarship of learning constructs its 
field establishing crossdisciplinary connections with transdisciplinary 
perspectives. Though this is the final step of a theoretical discussion, it 
suggests the direction that a number of lines of empirical research could 
take. 
 
The general purpose of relating educational practices with the 
epistemological problems of a field (in this case, a constellation of fields 
under the banner of Modern Languages and Cultures) is to counteract 
the mystification of knowledge as if it were detached from the actual 
enactments of their practitioners, including students. In short, what I am 
suggesting is that learning constitutes the overlapping of personal and 
 14 
social epistemologies and that ignoring their necessary interplay is 
detrimental for knowledge itself and for human development. If higher 
education does not integrate social and personal epistemologies by 
having deep learning as its fundamental activity, disciplines will only 
exacerbate their current fissiparity for being driven by their objects of 
study and the cash value of their products. I am arguing that the 
representation and production of knowledge can change drastically 
when the socialising practices related to learning and understanding 
change. 
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PART ONE: SCHOLARSHIP AND ITS 
METAMORPHOSES 
 
Chapter 1 The educational genesis of the 
disciplines 
Overview 
This chapter constitutes a revision of the relationship between 
education and scholarship and between learning and knowledge. The 
terms applied to scholarly work done in Sciences and Humanities 
(notably the difference between research and scholarship) are 
discussed not primarily to associate a technical meaning to each one 
and stick to it, but to point out that these major areas represent different 
ways to construct knowledge and that in the Humanities, subjectivity is 
a constitutive part of their epistemology. I argue that the formation and 
transformation of the persons involved in the study of the Humanities 
needs to take the form of epistemologically principled socialising 
practices, of which education is the most important category.  
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1.1 Disciplines and disciplinarity 
Disciplines in general face two kinds of problems: to construct and 
refine their object of study, and to update their constitutive projects 
according to their relative importance. The first problem is philosophical 
and from it derives the position assumed by the discipline vis-à-vis 
society. The second one is political in that it delineates an internal 
geography of concepts as central or peripheral and their projection in 
socialised (and socialising) practices such as education, research 
grants, publications, learned societies, institutes, and the like. Their 
interaction allows a critical revision of an object of study taking as a 
platform its hierarchy of concepts and forms of socialisation and a 
critical revision of its socialising practices based on its object of study.  
Inter-related as they are, the above-mentioned components are 
not symmetrical in that political forces not infrequently override 
philosophical reasons both within and between disciplines. Such a 
situation applies to the meaning of knowledge and the ways of 
constructing it. The prestige and power of hypothetical deductive 
disciplines influenced the general meaning of knowledge and its 
socialising practices to such an extent that hermeneutic disciplines 
either attempted to adjust and follow the nomothetic disciplines' lead 
(Gadamer, 1989; Habermas, 1971a; Kramsch & Kramsch, 2000; 
Kreiswirth, 2000; Somers, 1994) or had to use alternative terms to 
describe what they do (Fokkema & Ibsch, 2000; Opie, 1999; 
Polkinghorne, 1988; Scott, 2004; Scholes, 2004). According to Scholes 
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(2004), the application of the term ³VFKRODUVKLS´ WR UHIHU WR scholarly 
work in the Humanities is PRUH DGHTXDWH WKDQ WKH WHUP ³UHVHDUFK´  
According to Scholes, 
Research can be done in a field of study in which there is a 
certain level of agreement about what the problems are and 
what methods can be used to solve them. A field of study 
becomes a science, as Thomas Kuhn has taught us, when 
just such a level of agreement is reached. And in those 
disciplines we recognize as sciences, this level of 
agreement is sufficient to enable new work to be judged 
with some accuracy with respect to its contribution to the 
field, and this is a qualitative judgment --a judgment about 
the quality of the work itself (Scholes, 2004: 120).  
However, when the object of study, the method and even the 
epistemic role of the learners are a matter of discussion, there is a 
completely different framework of the meaning of knowledge and 
learning: while research is progressive and involves the invention of 
techniques and products or the discovery of natural laws, scholarship is 
³more about recovery´ as understanding (Scholes, 2004: 120). 
Scholarship, moreover, has the double meaning of learning and 
learned, study and erudition. Such a semantic load is deeply ingrained 
in education, long before the disciplines acquired their current technical 
ring.  
The relationship between education and scholarship understood 
as the advancement of the disciplines can be analysed in order to trace 
the extent to which they are genetically linked. This is the path taken by 
Hoskin (1993): 
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>«] disciplinarity has an educational genesis. Education, far 
from being subordinate, is superordinate: an understanding 
of education and its power is the only way to understand the 
genesis of disciplinarity and [its] subsequent apparently 
inexorable growth. (Hoskin, 1993: 271) 
According to Hoskin, the educational origin of disciplinarity can 
be traced to three major changes in education in the XVIII century: 
written examinations, the numerical grading of these examinations, and 
writing (by, for, about) the students as a formative instrument and as a 
means of control.  Educational instruments, in his view, took over the 
shaping of how to conceive of learning and knowledge.  
Ways of conceiving of learning and its evaluation, in their 
diversity, open different philosophical and meta-cognitive reflections and 
transformations that actually re-shape the subject matter and the people 
who study it. Such is the case with grading which, according to Hoskin, 
is a concept entirely different from ranking (an educational practice used 
by the Jesuits in the Middle Ages). Whereas ranking establishes a 
comparative basis relating the performance of the students to each 
other, grading introduces an individual index of mastery in a field. 
Hoskin points out the common world view at the historical origin of 
scholarly grading and the measurement of IQ. Both of them are not only 
an evaluation of performance but of the performer as well in such a way 
that they became a new means to conceive of the self. Hoskin 
illustrates this point by showing how the new pedagogic arena produced 
a new way of constructing the self as critical-interpretive, as technical-
scientific, and as rational-economic in the three emerging disciplines of 
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philology, biology and political economy derived from the pre-modern 
study of general grammar, natural history and the analysis of wealth. 
According to him, beneath the surface of the transformation into 
knowledge discourses with modern academic significance lies an 
epistemic shift in ways of inquiry that required quantifiable constructs 
and a gradable progress of the learners. 
If, as Hoskin argues, writing, examining, and grading have been 
the three key educational practices shaping both the identity (Somers, 
1994) of the knower and disciplinary knowledge in the last two 
centuries, there is an open question regarding the future of the 
disciplines in a context in which constructing knowledge is increasingly 
self-conscious and in which it cannot be confined to neat divisions 
between distinctive fields and between the knowing and the knower. 
What kind of educational practices are going to articulate novel forms of 
knowledge and power?  
In order to attempt an answer to this question, I want to point out 
two disciplinarily-bound tendencies. On the one hand, there is the 
propensity to create distinct ontological zones leading to multiple 
specialisms and sub-specialisms.  On the other hand, the belief that 
new disciplinary forms and disciplinary findings are always more 
meaningful and true than those they displace induces a retrospective 
teleology that normalizes even the most disparate models and world 
views. Such proclivities constitute a basic contradiction at the heart of 
disciplines centred on products rather than on the experiences that 
generate such products. Experience, by contrast, is at the threshold of 
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inner and outer reality since it involves different degrees of shared 
perceptions and interpretations. It cannot be confined to a single 
disciplinary field, but it is a fundamental factor in all the disciplines to 
such an extent that experience can be considered an object of study 
that is necessary for the internal coherence of each discipline and for 
the external consistency between disciplines. However, the study of 
experience needs to acknowledge subjectivity in an interpretive 
discourse of truth or hermeneutic epistemology. Experience is historical 
in its social sources and in its personal actualisations; hence, it requires 
similarly history-sensitive methods of investigation such as narrative. 
I suggest that educational practices capable of articulating novel 
forms of knowledge and power which are not confined to neat divisions 
between distinctive fields and between the knowing and the knower 
have the following characteristics:  
(a) They recognise learning as an encompassing and historical 
process, stills from which2 are considered as knowledge 
under certain conditions which are eventually bound to 
change;  
(b) They investigate and facilitate the experiential roots 
generative of different objects of learning;  
(c) They have autonomy as their backbone both cognitively 
through the discovery and use of generators, and as 
fundamental for human development;  
                                               
2
 ,DPXVLQJWKHQRXQ³VWLOO´ZLWKWKHPHDQLQJRIDPRWLRQOHVVSLFWXUHWDNHQIURPDILOP
constituted by a rapid sequence of millions of them. 
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(d) They establish connections with the community at large and 
integrate personal and social aspects of human development;  
(e) They construct agency not as an exercise inflicted on 
powerless others but as the enhancement of autonomy; 
(f) They establish crossdisciplinary connections and 
transdisciplinary perspectives. 
Such educational practices require a deep revision of the 
relationship between education and scholarship and between learning 
and knowledge. Learning is more encompassing than knowing and, 
even though some pieces of knowledge are considered milestones, 
their value derives from their contribution to learning in the broadest 
sense. 
1.2 Education and the scholarship of learning 
Education has usually been marginalised as the training of abilities to 
produce objects and services but it has been doubly limited, firstly, in its 
aims to those involved in it in the role of students or teachers and, 
secondly, in its potential to contribute to the epistemological 
construction of the disciplines. Pedagogic considerations are not 
normally meant to challenge received knowledge, but to avert course-
management problems because learning is seen as the receiving end of 
teaching but scarcely as a source of research into the experiential 
foundations of a discipline.  
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Socialising practices that separate scholarship from education 
derive from an institutional epistemology3 that may be at cross purposes 
with the discipline itself. Particularly in the Humanities, where the 
interests are not only epistemological but ethical and aesthetic as well, 
the transformation and development of the identity and the agency 
(Holland, Lachiotte-Jr., Skinner, & Cain, 1998; Redman, 2005) of the 
practitioners (namely those who are being socialised and who are 
socialising others through disciplinary practices) should be part of our 
investigations.  
Because of a lack of connection with personal experience, 
theoretical assumptions of identity change and historicity seem 
disembodied and inapplicable, as if personal experience were not 
relevant to disciplinary discussion or as if such a discussion could not 
transform personal experience. However, the experiential validation in 
the construction of knowledge can offer a more socially consequential 
contribution than remaining in a kind of schizophrenia where the 
concrete person of the practitioner has literally no place in the rarefied 
atmosphere of pure theory.   
Making meaning out of experience mostly takes the form of 
narratives and narrative embodies both an object of knowledge and a 
way of knowing in the investigation of a culture-language. A distinctive 
feature of the type of narrative suggested here is that of being an 
aesthetic design and a heuristic instrument of cultural investigation.  
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 See 1.3.2 Institutional epistemology below 
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1.3 Learning as the foundation of scholarship 
Educational practices require understanding the construction of a 
disciplinary object of study and eliciting a similar understanding in the 
experience of others. Educational practices, in this broad sense, involve 
also taking a critical position about the relative importance of the 
currently constitutive projects of a discipline and their enactment in the 
classroom, syllabii and curricula. Accordingly, educators play multiple 
roles: investigator, self-investigator (of their own experience), critic and 
human developer to the extent that they are not merely providing 
information but eliciting experience and generativity from others. 
Educators, in this general sense, transform experience (theirs and 
RWKHUV¶to construct a discipline. 
In the Humanities we have to deal not only with objects and 
methods but also with subjective transformations which are relevant for 
the making of the discipline. I suggest that agentive enhancement is 
part and parcel of understanding culture and how to live in it. That is not 
only an ethical issue but also, in our case, an epistemological problem 
consisting in how to transform the knower (the learner) so he or she can 
construct what, only then, can become knowledge. 
The argument for learning as foundational of scholarship stems 
from the controversial relationship between teaching and research in 
tertiary education, a controversy which reached a form of reconciliation 
during the early- and mid- ¶V LQ WKH86$. At that time, the notion of 
scholarship became diverse and included, among other things, a 
scholarship of teaching, which in my opinion still falls short since 
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learning is more encompassing, complex and closer to general 
experience than teaching. 
1.3.1 Learning and research reconsidered 
Education should be understood as the investigation and induction of 
the experiential roots of ways of knowing. A scholarship of learning is 
constructed in practice, not in a top-down relationship between theory 
and its application to concrete conditions. The scholarly practice of 
learning a language, and the culture or cultures associated to it, 
involves a form of research constructed in action. Such an 
epistemological stance is possible when the meaning of practice, 
instead of being constrained to the application of known principles, 
becomes an enquiry or dialogic relation between action and reflection.  
A scholarship of learning languages uses action research and 
reflective practice in the construction of an identity, a voice and an 
agency in the target language and culture. As opposed to mere training 
LQ³FRPPXQLFDWLYHVNLOOV´WKHVFKRODUPDNHVRIODQJXDJHOHDUQLQJ(his or 
her own learning and that of others) an object of narrative enquiry into 
the construction of a self in another language and culture.   
An action-researcher investigates the ways in which the learner 
(who can be the action-researcher himself or herself) makes linguistic 
and cultural sense of situations of indeterminacy. In the case of not 
being able to make sense of them, the finding could be the 
conceptualisation of a new problem. According to Polanyi (1964: 120), 
to have a problem is to have made a discovery and, for John Dewey 
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(1938), the proper test of a round of inquiry LVQRWRQO\³+DYH,VROYHG
WKLVSUREOHP´EXW³'R,OLNHWKHQHZSUREOHPV,KDYHFUHDWHG"´ 
Whereas for the narrow version of scholarship, communication 
does not count as advancing the knowledge in a field, for a scholarship 
of learning languages and cultures communication is as essential as 
generativeness. A scholar of learning enquires into the ways in which 
learners (including him or herself) apprehend generative patterns and 
are capable of transforming them by projection and recombination in 
order to fulfil communicative, reflective and expressive goals. 
1.3.2 Institutional epistemology 
Abstraction and concretion are two poles of a continuum which are 
differently managed by the disciplines. In either direction, infinite 
regressions and incommensurability are possible and thus the need to 
keep one or the other relatively constant in order to apply a given 
approach. In the Arts and Humanities, the relative primacy of concretion 
or abstraction of its object of study has been a matter of debate in the 
ebb and flow of their history, and a restricted definition of scholarship 
along with the rigid split between research and teaching imposes an 
imbalance favouring abstraction, which needs to be contested if we 
intend to pursue more diverse and nuanced ways of knowing.  
Educational institutions have epistemologies that define what 
counts as legitimate knowledge (Schön, 1995: 32). Such theories, 
regardless of being consciously adopted or not by individuals, are built 
into institutional structures and practices. Introducing action research as 
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a way of knowing and generating knowledge implies an epistemological 
battle with the assumptions of technical rationality (Habermas, 1971a, 
1971b) ±a model long entrenched in institutions of higher education 
which exacerbates the gap between abstraction and concretion and 
then attempts to reduce it by means of the top-down application of 
general rules and the use of experimentation, as opposed to 
experience. Such a model significantly restricts the meaning of 
scholarship and academic work. 
A widely extended sense of what good academic work is tends to 
participate in two biases: the bias against practice and the bias against 
the local (Warnock, 1996).4 Critical theorists LQ :DUQRFN¶V view, 
analyse and interpret practice, but their goal is not to change practice, 
their own or that of others. The second bias is against the immediately 
concrete situation, which is personal and pedagogical. The co-
constructed nature of knowledge can make sense in their publications, 
though not necessarily in pedagogic practice, about which Warnock 
comments: 
I have seen brilliant critical theorists utterly baffled at 
questions about how they reflect their critical theory in their 
teaching. Usually, the problem seems to be not that the 
brilliant critical theorist feels that this is a hard question to 
answer, but rather that the question seems to be one of 
stunning irrelevance, as if one were to ask Tolstoy how he 
reflected the values of his novels in his relations with his 
wife. (Warnock, 1996: 27) 
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 This discussion is taken further in 7.3 The problem with Cultural Studies: issues of 
disciplinarity. 
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On the contrary, teaching or, as I argue, learning is deeply 
relevant for scholarship in the Humanities, a relation that needs ³a 
whole new genre´ that would make it possible to see such a discussion 
³as integral to the development oI NQRZOHGJH >«@ as central to 
professional life as writing about Renaissance poetry, Derrida, Hegel, or 
popular culture´(G. Levine, 2001: 12, 17). 
1.4 Main concerns of a Scholarship of Learning Modern 
Languages 
1.4.1 Disciplinary identity 
For some, it might seem strange to raise the problem of disciplinary 
identity in an age whose maxims are cross- , inter- and even anti- 
disciplinarity. However, all these notions can only make sense if there 
are disciplines in the first place and an intensive boundary work and 
field construction that may allow cross-fertilization. Moreover, the 
construction of a discipline does not necessarily imply acceptance of the 
inherited disciplinary context. 
Three concepts related to the status condition of disciplinarity 
need to be clarified: Socialising Practices, Boundary Work, and Field 
Construction. I adopt these terms from Messer-Davidow and colleagues 
(1993) but I have created working definitions, and how they can apply to 
the insights I present here.  
1. Socialising practices include activities that renew, 
disseminate, maintain, and project the discipline considered. 
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Learning and teaching are fundamental socialising practices 
because they set gate-keeping rules for membership of learned 
communities and support the authority of certain kinds of 
knowledge and ways of knowing. The status of the expert and his 
or her conceptual shadow, the layperson, are part of the world 
view supported or contested by socialising practices.  
2. Boundary work is a process of demarcation between 
disciplines in order to clarify and sharpen the object and mission 
that make up the identity of a discipline. The construction of a 
disciplinary identity involves the on-going revision of contrasts 
and oppositions with other disciplines whose objects and 
missions keep on transforming too. Work on the boundaries 
involves an on-going creation of limits between perspectives and 
methodologies that define different disciplines; it also involves 
maintenance of the boundaries, as when deepening the scope of 
previously agreed-upon delimited objects and methods of study. 
Moreover, work on the boundaries implies an investigation of 
their permeability and, thus, the possibilities of cross-fertilization 
with other disciplines in a more encompassing object and 
mission.   
3. Field construction refers to the ways of foregrounding 
concepts that become central and underplaying those considered 
as secondary in a certain period in the history of a discipline. A 
critique of a given disciplinary field construction would de-
familiarise this conceptual layout. 
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In a polemical paper on the practice of Modern Languages in the 
USA that had the impact of a manifesto, Dorothy James wrote: 
All over the country, institutions are looking at their 
programs, their departments, and their budgets and they 
are counting heads. They see the lower levels (large) taught 
by cheap labor and the upper levels (small) taught by 
expensive labor. In the best cases, they wait for retirements 
and do not rehire. In the worst cases, they declare fiscal 
emergency and retrench. Either way, the future closes down 
for our discipline, for our future undergraduates, and for our 
present graduate students. (D. James, 1997: 49)  
I have quoted her as illustration of the consequences that 
socialising practices, boundary work and field construction can have in 
WKH SUHVHQW DQG IXWXUHRI DGLVFLSOLQH $IWHU-DPHV¶V assessment, it is 
hard to tell whether the field construction (that is, the relative saliency 
and elaboration of concepts) in Modern Languages preceded the 
boundary work (namely, what is understood as pertaining to different 
divisions within the same discipline) or whether the boundary work 
developed according to socialising practices that favoured previously 
existing hierarchies.  
AVVXPLQJ -DPHV¶V DVVHVVPHQW LV FRUUHFW, the socialising 
practices of upper and lower division that separate lectures and 
seminars on content from language courses reinforce an anachronistic 
set of boundaries between content and language, knowledge and its 
communication. However, the investigation of language-mediated 
knowledge and knowledge-imbued language is fundamental for the field 
construction of Modern Languages and for socialising practices that 
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work for rather than against the construction of their own disciplinary 
field.  
James identifies as a key issue the notable absence of a 
principled vision about what we in foreign languages should be doing as 
part of the Humanities; a vision that could meld lower- and upper-
division teaching and could integrate foreign language instruction into 
the broader curriculum of Higher Education and thus maintain full-time 
positions for language teachers as part of the same educational 
process. The problem, then, has a wider scope: to define the mission of 
the Humanities and to discuss how Modern Languages can contribute 
to that mission. A substantial part of it is to educate not only its 
practitioners and practitioners-to-be, but the wider public as well about 
the intrinsic literariness in language and its experiential importance.  It is 
not by tailoring Modern Languages to the specific profile of its home 
university in the form of language modules that it will necessarily attain 
a more epistemologically solid ground, or a socially more consequential 
role. 
1.4.2 Principled socialising practices 
In the absence of a curricular vision, courses fill the gap, but a collection 
of courses rather than a curricular proposal constitutes a symptom that 
reinforces the lack of a specific epistemological quest and, 
consequently, the lack of a disciplinary identity, even if such an identity 
involves a deep revision of the very concept of what a discipline is. 
There is a need for principles that both (a) derive from and (b) lay the 
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foundation for the construction of the field. Furthermore, such a quest in 
the Humanities cannot be epistemological alone; it should also be 
aesthetic and ethical for encompassing not only products but also 
processes and participating agents. It should investigate not just what 
kind of knowledge to learn or teach but how socially to enact and 
produce such knowledge. In other words, what we need is 
epistemologically principled socialising practices. 
1.4.3 Human development 
Another concern is the fact that the Humanities have adopted some 
theories from psychology (mainly psychoanalysis) but not the practice of 
service equivalent to psychotherapy. Education and a number of 
therapies have elements in common because they derive from the 
same pursuit of human development. I believe that one of our problems 
in the Humanities is that education as a disciplinary focus is not an 
integral part of our investigation and that human development is not 
intended as the foundation of our educational practice.  
1.4.4 Foreignness 
Modern Languages combines philosophy, art, literature, philology, 
history, anthropology, sociology, political sciences, psychoanalysis and 
more, but even though some of these fields have been enriched by the 
influential work of individuals from within Modern Languages, they exist 
and thrive without Modern Languages as such. What do we have to say 
that is proper to our particular position as scholars of cultures whose 
languages are not local in the country where they are studied? There is 
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philological and paleographic research that deals with original 
documents dispersed in public and private libraries, for which the 
international cooperation of specialists is vital.  There are also 
interpretive investigations that benefit from the complementary efforts of 
scholars from all over the world. Outstanding as they are, I am not 
referring to either of them. 
What I am referring to is how to make the most of the privilege 
(Kramsch, 1997, 1998) of being non-natives of a culture and a 
language. Linguistic and cultural distance constitute a vantage point 
susceptible of phenomenographic investigation (Alsop & Tompsett, 
2004; Ference Marton, 1988; Webb, 1997) because foreignness is not 
in the object but iW LV UHODWLYH WR WKH WLPH DQG SODFH RI WKH HQTXLUHU¶V
experience. It is a subject-bound investigation that not only enquires 
into who the subject is and who she or he is becoming through 
intercultural experience but that actively contributes to transformation. 
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Chapter 2 From the scholarship of teaching to the 
scholarship of learning 
Overview 
 
2.1 Learning and different models of university 
One of the main fault lines that characterises contemporary higher 
education is the split between research and pedagogy (Napoli & 
Polezzi, 2000; Napoli, Polezzi, & King, 2001), but this has not been 
always the case. The Medieval university was typically oriented as a 
University of Teaching (Bowden & Marton, 2003), a model that 
continued during the nineteenth century , until a new paradigm saw the 
light: the University of Research, under the leadership of the University 
of Berlin, founded by Wilhelm von Humboldt in 1810. In the early 
twentieth century, there were two kinds of universities in the USA, the 
UK and countries following their lead: research universities (inspired by 
the German model) of higher education (Veblen, [1918] 1957) and 
teaching universities of lower education which were supposed to apply 
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what the former discovered and designed. More recently, both aspects 
vie in the University of Teaching and Research, the contemporary 
model to which Napoli and colleagues refer in their appraisal.  
Bowden and Marton (2003) argue for a substantially different 
model of university, characterized as the University of Learning. Instead 
of looking for the relationship between teaching and research, they 
investigate the nature of the relationship between social and individual 
forms of knowledge formation: 
In research, one is frequently moving in much wider circles 
in much narrower fields [but whereas the] object of learning 
is more constrained in research, the acts of learning are 
OHVV VR >«@ 7KH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI /HDUQLQJ LV DERXW ZLGHQLQJ
our ways of viewing the world, both individually and 
collectively. (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 10) 
Independently from Bowden and Marton¶V ZRUN , UHDFKHG WKH
conclusion that there are approaches to learning and educational 
practices that can bring about substantial keys for knowledge formation.  
According to Nicholls (2005), the notion of scholarship began to 
shrink following the emergence and embedding of the Humboldtian 
German model in twentieth-century universities. The question of what 
scholarship is and in what forms it manifests itself had as a point of 
reference the specialization of the sciences in a move that, according to 
the same author, resulted in more shallow learning over broader areas 
of knowledge (Nicholls, 2005: 10) and in stronger borderlines between 
nomothetic and hermeneutic disciplines.  
In order to reach a more comprehensive concept of what 
knowledge is and how to construct it, there have been a number of 
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efforts to locate (Snow, 1959) and then bridge the gap between 
nomothetic and hermeneutic fields (Fokkema & Ibsch, 2000; Miall, 
1998; G. Steen, 2003). The breaching of boundaries separating 
Sciences from Humanities constitutes a turning point in the history of 
ideas in order to look for objects of study more basic than the products 
already informed by disciplinary compartmentalisation in a way that 
allows for the diversification of modes of knowledge creation more 
appropriate to its objects of study, contexts of exchange and the 
historical transformation of the learner.  
In DQ HUD FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ ³LQWHOOHFWXDO IOX[´ WKH structural 
coherence offered by the disciplines has been said  to perpetuate 
anachronic forms of enquiry (Eley, 1996; Sosnoski, 1995)5. However, I 
consider out of place to abandon altogether the notion of disciplinarity 
because of its historical origins (Sosnoski, 1995: 57) and it is equally 
absurd to stigmatise it as what blocks the formation of new kinds of 
knowledge and distorts the relation of the knower to certain objects of 
knowledge (Sosnoski, 1995: 213). Instead, it is necessary to update the 
meaning of disciplinarity according to more comprehensive notions of 
knowledge formation and learning. 
A deep approach to learning is fundamental for the development 
of a scholarship of learning and whereas this is going to be discussed in 
the next chapter, I can advance here that through a deep approach, the 
OHDUQHUV¶KRUL]RQLVZLGHQHGLQDSHUFHSWLRQ-changing way of what they 
know and how they conceive of the unknown, either only for them as 
                                               
5
 Cited by Opie (1999) 
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individuals or for them and for the disciplinary community in extenso. By 
achieving the understanding that only deep learning6 can provide, the 
learner can think up how to enquire or probe into the unknown. This is 
the main reason to make a case for using the term learner in its 
broadest sense of anybody intellectually active, without confining its 
application to the beginning of an endless journey. If anything, there are 
expert learners who apply strategies to sharpen and maintain a 
EHJLQQHU¶Vmind despite their mastery in their field.  
The expert widens local or even global horizons at the collective 
learning level, but the personal experience of deep learning is 
unskippable if it is to be transformative. We define the scholarship of 
learning as the investigation of the formation of knowledge in a given 
field, the generative stances that orientate the use and search for 
information, the meaning of major breakthroughs for the understanding 
of ideas and how individual persons work through them and re-create 
them experientially.    
Every domain of knowledge should include in its scholarship 
epistemological investigations into the formation and re-creation of 
knowledge, in other words, investigations into learning the domain. 
Besides, I argue for a notion of scholarship that includes personal and 
social epistemologies in a way that instead of narrowing down the 
avenues of enquiry, allows for the creation of vaster areas of concern 
and more diversified sources of validation.   
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 See 3.0.2 Deep learning 
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2.2 Multiple forms of constructing the disciplines 
Two influential publications regarding the full range of scholarly activity 
ZHUH SXEOLVKHG LQ WKH VDPH \HDU (UQHVW %R\HU¶V (1990) Scholarship 
Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate, DQG(XJHQH5LFH¶V(1990) 
Rethinking What it Means to Be a Scholar. They distinguished four 
separate but overlapping dimensions of scholarship: discovery, 
integration, application, and teaching.  
%R\HU¶V  DQG 5LFH¶V  four kinds of scholarship had the merit of 
offering a more socially-distributed perspective of knowledge formation 
coQQHFWHGZLWK WKHXQLYHUVLW\¶VVXEVWDQWLYH IXQFWLRQVEXW WKHLU UHYLVLRQ
left unexamined the assumptions that justified such a separation. The 
agenda of the Carnegie Academy for the Scholarship of Teaching and 
Learning, CASTL, was to advance the profession of teaching assuming 
that was the condition to enhance learning. Praisworthy as it may be, 
this predetermined goal was in the way of investigating deep-seated 
notions of causality.   
According to Boyer, the scholarship of discovery focusses on 
traditional research but also on the creative work in the literary, visual, 
DQGSHUIRUPLQJDUWV ,WV OHDGLQJTXHVWLRQLV³:KDWGR ,NQRZDQGKRZ
GR , NQRZ LW"´ 7KLV LV D W\SLFDO TXHVWLRQ DVNHG E\ WKH OHDUQHU par 
excellence: the philosopher, and by an educator who wants to 
HQFRXUDJHWKHOHDUQHU¶VDXWRQRP\³:KDWGR\RXNQRZDQGKRZGR\RX
NQRZLW"´ 
The scholarship of integration makes connections within and 
between the disciplines, seeks to interpret, draw together and bring new 
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insight to bear on original research. ItVOHDGLQJTXHVWLRQLV³:KDWGRHV
WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ PHDQ"´ 7KH PHDQLQJ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ KRZHYHU LV LWVHOI
uncertain: it might go in infinite regress of abstraction or concretion to 
the point of an utter lack of meaning. Taking as a reference a concrete 
individual person, a common criticism against academic knowledge is 
that much of it remains peripheral to the personality of the learner in the 
sense that it is readily forgotten, and remains superficial to the extent 
that it does not become integrated with the LQGLYLGXDO¶V LQQHU QHHGV 
(Chickering, 1981: 8; Sanford & Adelson, 1962: 36). The problem 
EHFRPHV WKHQ KRZ WR ZLGHQ WKH OHDUQHU¶V DUHD RI FRQFHUQ VR LW FDQ
include matters he or she would not have considered before as 
relevant, and how to GLYHUVLI\WKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VLQQHUQHHGVWRWKHSRLQWRI
being affected by what he or she had not even heard of before. A 
scholarship of integration of the learner is concerned with the kind of 
learning that can bring about developmental changes in what is 
considered as meaningful by the learner and, by extension, by different 
disciplinary communities. $FFRUGLQJWR6DQIRUG³Zhat higher education 
needs most is a unified field theory of personality development in social 
systems´(Sanford, 1981: xxiv). 
The scholarship of application, according to Boyer, considers 
KRZWRDSSO\NQRZOHGJH,WVOHDGLQJTXHVWLRQLV³+RZFDQNQRZOHGJHEH
responsibly applied WRFRQVHTXHQWLDOSUREOHPV"´7KHVHQVHRIXUJHQF\
derived from the perceived importance of problems depends, again, on 
a kind of learning that successfully brings about structural changes in 
RUGHU WRH[SDQGDQGGLYHUVLI\DVHQVHRIZKDWFRXQWVDV³UHVSRQVLEOH´
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DQG ³LPSRUWDQW´, which involves the values and belief system of the 
learner (Perry, 1981).  
)LQDOO\DVFKRODUVKLSRIWHDFKLQJLQLWLDWHVWKHVWXGHQWVLQ%R\HU¶V
YLHZ³LQWRWKHEHVWYDOXHVRIWKHDFDGHP\HQJDJLQJWKHPLQQHZILHOGV
of study and enabling them to understand and participate more fully in 
WKH ODUJHU FXOWXUH´ (cited by Duffy & Sweeney, 2005). %R\HU¶V
description of the scholarship of teaching is suspicious of conservatism 
LI LW WDNHV IRU JUDQWHG ZKDW WKH ³EHVW YDOXHVRI WKH DFDGHP\´ DUH DQG
ZKDW WKH ³ODUJHU FXOWXUH´ LV VSHFLILFDOO\ LI VXFK D VFKRODUVKLS OHDYHV
those topics beyond critique.  
However, the leading question he relates to the scholarship of 
teaching is thought-provoking: ³In what ways does my teaching expand 
DQG WUDQVIRUP NQRZOHGJH"´ The main virtue of this question is that 
knowledge transformation and knowledge expansion are meant to guide 
VFKRODUVKLS 7KH EDVLF SUREOHP LQ %R\HU¶V VFKRODUVKLS RI WHDFKLQJ LV
that it is conceived of with the teacher, not the learner, as the 
protagonist. Granted, the teacher has to perform outstanding work to 
build up an educational platform in order to elicit and increase learner 
autonomy, but focussing on knowledge construction as an on-going 
process between and within learners rather than the teacher's 
performance makes a crucial difference. 
A scholarship of learning addresses %R\HU¶V four questions. In 
Languages and Cultures, the question 'What do I know and how do I 
know it?' involves, inter alia, investigations into the nature of language 
perception, as a code and as an expressive medium as well as the kind 
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of knowledges enacted in performing a language. In a language other 
than the mother tongue, one may ask about the critical learning 
experiences that enable the learner to make the leap from language as 
an abstract system to language as an embodied experience. The ways 
in which a foreign language reader/writer uses literariness as a heuristic 
way to acquire the language, to 'get a feeling' for it and use it creatively 
and imaginatively constitute questions relevant for a scholarship of 
discovery in Modern Languages and Cultures. 
A scholarship of learning also addresses the question 
corresponding to the scholarship of integration: 'what does the 
inIRUPDWLRQ PHDQ"¶ in order to make connections between knower, 
knowledge and ways of knowing. Instead of aiming at a method of 
knowing characterised by notions of objective knowledge detached from 
WKH VXEMHFW¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV VXFK D VFKRODUVKLS LQWHJUDWHs the 'what' 
with the 'who' and the 'how'. The meaning attained through this 
integrative mode is experiential and its theoretical and methodological 
support is in narrative enquiry (Bell, 2002; Clandinin & Connelly, 2000; 
Webster & Mertova, 2007) and phenomenography (Alsop & Tompsett, 
2004; Ference Marton, 1988).  
Narrative is a way to make sense of experience, and experience 
cannot be conceived of except as the encounter of subject and object 
through a dialogic process that transforms both. By using a narrative 
way of knowing (as opposed to knowing about narratives in a 
narratological sense) learners build up knowledge of a reflective quality 
in the experience of language and culture. Their knowledge is not 
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'objective' since it depends on themselves to make sense. But it is not 
'merely subjective' either since its validity and application can be 
agreed-upon intersubjectively. Phenomenography, on the other hand, 
aims at understanding the nature, structure and interrelationships 
between the individual perceptions of subjects when faced with 
common experiences. Though I am not presenting empirical 
investigations of my own, these approaches are instrumental for the 
discussion. 
The idea that learning is the foundation of research and that it is 
more encompassing and closer to general experience than teaching is 
confirmed by Nicholls (2005: 54)IRUZKRP³XQGHUVWDQGLQJOHDUQLQJDQG
the influence this may have on scholarship is a key aspect of any 
discussion relating tR WKH GLVFLSOLQHV´ %RZGHQ DQG 0DUWRQ DFWXDOO\
subsume teaching, research and service under learning: 
The point we are making is this: the university does not 
have three aims, it has one. Teaching, research and 
service are all supposed to yield learning: for the 
individuals (through knowledge being formed which is new 
to a particular person), for humanity (through knowledge 
being formed which is new in an absolute sense) and for 
communities (through knowledge being formed for specific 
purposes). (Bowden & Marton, 2003: viii) 
ErneVW %R\HU DQG (XJHQH 5LFH¶V diversification of scholarships 
became a screen in the way of realising that learning is the common 
JURXQGWKDWXQLILHVWKHVFKRODUV¶GLIIHUHQWUROHVZKLFK1LFKROOVGHVFULEHV
thus: 
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[To] make meaning of their work; increase their 
understanding of the whole system; identify key 
relationships within their disciplines; connect past with 
present and future; identify what is missing in the present 
and articulate alternative visions of our future; identify 
emergent practices and theories; and create connective 
wisdom in the field. (Nicholls, 2005: 13) 
Teaching, rather than being basic for the construction of a 
distinctive form of scholarship, is subsidiary of other, more fundamental 
issues, such as the evolution of discourses about teaching and learning, 
ways of knowing and disciplinary traditions. In fact, it is supplementary 
of a scholarship of learning when interpreted as knowledge construction 
rather than as knowledge acquisition or knowledge transmission. 
2.3 Current assumptions about teaching and research 
Learning aimed at deep understanding  implies a form of research 
intertwined with action that is epistemologically relevant, a combination 
that requires a major revision of current assumptions about teaching 
and research. 
In its simplest expression, learning has been treated as the 
product of teaching. The contents of teaching are usually seen as 
derived from previous research and teachers are also called 
³SUDFWLWLRQHUV´LQ WKHVHQVHRIDSSO\LQJDQGGLVVHPLQDWLQJZKDWRWKHUV
namely researchers, have found. According to Scott (2004), teaching 
and research are clearly being driven apart for a number of reasons: 
First, in a mass system there is nothing special about higher 
education (outside a small number of élite universities 
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perhaps); it is not really different from further education or, 
even, secondary education. Even if it were economically 
and logistically possible (which it isn't), every student does 
not need to be taught by an active researcher. 
Second, too tight an association between research and 
teaching tends to devalue teaching ±because it can't 
readily escape from the shadow of research, which 
confers all the academic prestige. 
Third, the other side of the coin, research is (or should be) a 
professional activity with its own career structures and 
resource patterns; otherwise research capacities will be 
shaped by teaching needs. 
Fourth, world-class research (and the Knowledge Society is a 
cut-throat environment in which only the fittest, or 
cleverest, survive) demands concentration; we need a 
critical mass of researchers with a strong research culture 
and infrastructure.  (Scott, 2004: electronic paper without 
page numbers) 
With the purpose of raising the status of teaching as compared 
with research, this separation has been maintained. However, for 
humanistic disciplines, which are closer to education for intrinsic and 
historical reasons, such a separation is counterproductive to the extent 
that the meanings of teaching and research are not deeply revised and 
updated. According to Scholes, ³VFKRODUVKLSLVOHDUQLQJLQWKHVHUYLFHRI
teaching and in the Humanities, we learn in order to teach´ (Scholes, 
2004: 123). In his opinion, even in publications and academic events 
such as congresses and public debates, humanists teach each other 
about what and how to teach.  
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Research and teaching share a common project that Scott 
 FDOOV ³NQRZOHGJH ZRUN´ ZKLFK UHTXLUHV IURP LWV SDUWLFLSDQWV D
dynamic non-linear change of roles: from producers to disseminators to 
consumers. In the context of the Humanities, such a multiplicity of roles 
is clearer than in science and technology, and the social distribution of 
knowledge of languages and cultures is necessarily wider, both in their 
sources and their use. The Mass Observation Archive Reference 
(based at the University of Sussex, UK) and corpora of spoken 
language such as the CANCODE (Cambridge and Nottingham Corpus 
of Discourse in English) constitute two examples of sources for the 
study of language and culture that extend beyond academic circles. In a 
dynamic model of knowledge work (Scott, 2004), knowledge 
construction is more socially distributed and the roles are hybrid and 
variable.  
Teaching transforms knowledge in a process grounded in subject 
content and what is known about learning (Rice, 1990). Intrinsic 
reasons for integrating teaching and research stem from a more 
nuanced and diverse conception of scholarship which encompasses 
knowledge gained through experience and action. Increasing 
specialisations must be reintegrated into the whole, not only within and 
between the disciplines, but also in the concrete experience of 
individuals. A scholarship of teaching, however, does not necessarily 
ensure such integration. Moreover, even if the requirements of visibility 
and viability (Shulman, 1998) are met in the investigation of scholarly 
relevant issues, it is important to discern the meaning of a problem in 
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teaching in order to appraise the extent to which teaching can be 
considered as research and hence become the foundation of a form of 
scholarship. Randy Bass (1999), who discusses current perceptions 
about the difference between teaching and research, writes:  
One telling measure of how differently teaching is regarded 
from traditional scholarship or research within the academy 
is what a difference it makes to have a "problem" in one 
versus the other. In scholarship and research, having a 
"problem" is at the heart of the investigative process; it is 
the compound of the generative questions around which all 
creative and productive activity revolves. But in one's 
teaching, a "problem" is something you don't want to have, 
and if you have one, you probably want to fix it. Asking a 
colleague about a problem in his or her research is an 
invitation; asking about a problem in one's teaching would 
probably seem like an accusation. Changing the status of 
the problem in teaching from terminal remediation to 
on-going investigation is precisely what the movement 
for a scholarship of teaching is all about. How might we 
make the problematization of teaching a matter of regular 
communal discourse? How might we think of teaching 
practice, and the evidence of student learning, as problems 
to be investigated, analyzed, represented, and debated? 
(Bass, 1999) [Electronic paper with no page numbers 
provided. Emphasis added] 
 
The way in which teaching can be the foundation of a form of 
scholarship has been interpreted differently in different places, which 
has involved divergent though potentially complementary directions: the 
creation of a solid platform of investigation of shareable and testable 
data and methodologies (mainly in the USA though with exceptions) 
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and focussed attention on the group interaction within a classroom 
(mainly in the European Union but, again, with exceptions). Whereas in 
the former visibility and viability are identified in terms of an observer, in 
the latter the investigator is a participant among others, and visibility 
and viability are bound to experience. These two divergent frameworks 
substantially affect the kind of problems identified as relevant to 
scholarship and the implementation of their investigation. Scholars of 
teaching, if they are teachers as well, systematically investigate 
questions related to student learning for the improvement of their own 
practice and for the advancement of their scholarship. However, in the 
REVHUYHU¶VDSSURDFKWKHinvestigation is about learning instead of using 
investigation as a means to learn (W. Carr & Kemmis, 1986) and 
making of learning as knowledge formation an investigation into the 
turning points of the discipline (Meyer, Land, & Baillie, 2010b). 
The ways in which learners experience the discipline and, 
consequently, how they can understand or misunderstand it are objects 
of research from a perspective where the meaning of understanding 
disciplinary objects cannot be taken for granted and must be a recurrent 
problem of investigation of the very construction of a discipline. In a 
scholarship whose purpose is investigation in the service of learning, 
every component of the course of study is intentional in relation to the 
problem of the meaning of understanding and the ways to achieve it. 
According to Bass (1999), most teachers know very little about 
how students come to know the material they teach, and the teacher in 
the role of researcher in this experiential framework has to add to her or 
 47 
his own expertise in an area, investigations about its construction in 
personal epistemologies. µ.QRZOHGJH¶ can be a deceptive term if what is 
at stake is not mere information but generative patterns that enable 
recombination and improvisation in performance, as is the case in the 
study of languages. 
Finding the resources on which one can draw in order to analyse 
the nature of deep learning in a specific discipline constitutes a 
substantial task in this methodological and epistemological approach. 
Though Bass calls it µscholarship of teaching¶, he investigates students 
DQGWHDFKHUVZKRUHIOHFWRQWKHLURZQDQGWKHRWKHUV¶OHDUQLQJ 
In this line of inquiry I want to learn more not only about my 
students' entering knowledge, but how their self-awareness 
of learning might help them develop a deeper 
understanding of certain disciplinary principles more quickly 
and meaningfully. [...] I wanted to know what they knew, 
and what they knew about what they knew, not what they 
were able to perform based on what they thought I wanted 
them to know. (Bass, 1999) [Electronic paper without page 
numbers] 
 
A scholarship of learning involves discovery, integration and 
application and the yardstick of excellent teaching is the extent to which 
it promotes deep learning.  A scholarship of learning enquires into the 
origin and development of the generative paradigms of the discipline 
both at the social and the experiential level in order to facilitate 
increasing autonomy to the learners. 
According to Charles Glassick, Mary Taylor Huber, and Gene 
Maeroff (1997), the scholarships of discovery, integration, application, 
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and teaching share common characteristics, which they identify as 
clarity of goals, adequate preparation, appropriate methods, significant 
results, effective presentations and reflective critique. The problem I find 
in these supposedly common characteristics is that they are post factum 
and, retrospectively, most of them do not do justice to the process 
which at some stages may be anything but clear, adequate and 
appropriate. Learning and understanding are not the same as reporting 
on what has been learned and understood. Learning can be messy, 
contradictory and it is not rare that it lurches in strange detours, blind 
alleys and U-turns ±far from the smooth and clear-cut process tacitly 
endorsed by standard curricula and most educational policies. A 
scholarship of teaching, then, is limited by two kinds of constraints: 
firstly, that it depends on learning in order to have an object about which 
to discuss; secondly, that the post-facto reports informed by the 
qualitative standards of the genre referred to by Glassick et al 
misrepresent the object on which, at least in principle, teaching hinges. 
2.4 Towards a scholarship of learning 
2.4.1 The transition from the scholarship of teaching 
In spite of the fact that some faculty, according to Nicholls (2005), find 
the term confusing and the vision it embodies vague, the scholarship of 
teaching has been a catalyst to reflect on the meaning of experience, 
practice, action and understanding. The message of Scholarship 
Reconsidered (Boyer, 1990) was that good teaching is a serious 
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intellectual work and should be rewarded. However, the advancement 
of teaching in ways that could be replicated and challenged by peer 
review  does not necessarily imply excellent teaching. And the contrary 
is also true: good teaching may be described as a successful attempt to 
achieve learning, but in order to make of teaching an object of scholarly 
VWXG\ LW QHHGV WR EH LQYHVWLJDWHG ³EH\RQG WKH PHUH SURFHVV RI ZKDW
happened and reflect on the reasons why learning has occurUHG´
(Nicholls, 2005: 36), even if that investigation does not ensure the 
replication and peer review of what was taught. Hence the scholarship 
of teaching becomes a scholarly enterprise by transforming itself into a 
scholarship of learning.  
Though the most serious problem of the scholarship of teaching 
is that it falls short from elaborating a platform to make pedagogical 
problems epistemologically relevant for the construction of the 
disciplines (Nicholls, 2005), it is in the direction of understanding that 
the scholarship of teaching has moved forward in suggesting that it 
means looking for the connections between the character of a discipline 
and teaching (Shulman, 1999). 
The scholarship of teaching has been torn between two opposing 
forces. On the one hand, by being accountable to institutional research 
RIILFHV WKDW ³DFW DV D NLQG RI FRPSDQ\ DXGLW VLWWLQJ RXWVLGH WKH
RUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VLQQHUZRUNLQJVEXWNHHSLQJWUDFNRILWV³HIIHFWLYHQHVV´DV
witnessed by graduation rates, student credit hours, faculty workloads, 
DQGVRIRUWK´(Hutchings & Shulman, 1999: HTML version without page 
numbers), teachers are in the obligation to submit policy-driven, self-
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justifying reports that do not necessarily enhance learning and teaching 
in higher education. 
The other force involves an uncompromising investigation of the 
character and depth of student learning that results (or does not) from 
the teaching practice, but accountability gets its way unless subsumed 
under it. That means that the evolution of a scholarship of teaching 
implies two things: (1) to give way to a scholarship of learning as more 
encompassing and epistemologically relevant to the disciplines, and (2) 
to allow teachers the freedom to reflect on how to promote deep 
learning, design optimal learning environments implemented by 
curricula, classroom and experiences that promote autonomous 
learning, as opposed to focus on ³HYLGHQFH-based research not 
QHFHVVDULO\ LQWHQGHG WR \LHOG QHZ NQRZOHGJH DQG XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´
(Nicholls, 2005: 35).  
Under these conditions, public reports WKDWGHVFULEH³some or all 
of the full act of teaching²vision, design, enactment, outcomes, and 
analysis² in a manner susceptible to critical review by the teacher's 
professional peers and amenable to productive employment in future 
work by members of that same community´ (Shulman, 1998: 6) are a 
form of sharing and building up in the service of other teachers and 
students as well. Public reports in this sense are not merely meant to 
SURYH WKH WHDFKHUV¶ ZRUWK WR WKH DXWKRULWLHV EXW WR GHVFULEH DQG
understand important phenomena more fully by attempting to answer 
complex questions such as how to recognise when a student begins to 
think with a concept rather than simply about it. Such epistemological 
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problems allow for more theory-building forms of inquiry and promote 
the development of new conceptual frameworks (Hutchings & Shulman, 
1999: 13). 
Learning undergirds knowledge, and ways of learning uphold 
different types of disciplines. The investigation of knowledge formation 
not limited to one form of intelligence (Bruner, 1985; Gadamer, 1975; 
Gardner, 1993a; Habermas, 1971a; Rorty, 1980) and its social and 
individual forms of learning is key for updating disciplines that rely not 
on falsifiability (Popper, 2002) but on narrative rationality (Fisher, 1994) 
and the attainment of wisdom (Holquist, 1995; Singer, 2004). 
Trivial interpretations of learning also trivialise the relationship 
between teaching and learning by focussing on teaching tips and 
techniques, important as they are. The core of the matter is the 
transformation of learning and its possible mediations, including 
teaching, but not restricted to it. This kind of scholarship is not limited to 
the demonstration of processes that are thought to lead to excellence 
EXW VXEVWDQWLDOO\ LQFOXGHV WKH UHIOHFWLRQ RQ RQH¶V RZQ DQG RWKHUV¶
learning and understanding of a discipline,  both individually (as its 
reconstruction/recreation) and collectively (as its epistemological 
history).  
Teaching has been minimised for being considered as a generic 
technique transferrable to any field and none in particular and its 
separation from actual knowledge construction has reduced it to build 
on fundamental cognitive capabilities (e.g. to distinguish between cause 
and effect or between the whole and its parts) that would be extremely 
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hard to teach in case the learner did not already count with them. The 
issue is not settled by deciding a priori that they are innate, but to find 
out whether they are teachable in case they have not been learned yet, 
even if it is unclear how exactly the learning took place. Teaching 
GHULYHV IURPDQH[SHUW OHDUQHU¶VYLHZRIZKDW LWPHDQV WRNQRZKLVRU
her field and who besides is in the vantage position of using it for 
bringing learning about in others. Questions about learning a discipline 
are embedded in the epistemological and ethical constitution of a 
discipline to the extent that it constructs both what to know (objects) and 
who the person who knows them is (subjects).  
In conclusion, the investigation of learning in its general 
conditions and implications is fundamental to construct both a shared 
body of knowledge in the disciplines and the construction of individual 
epistemologies. I argue that a scholarship centred in deep and 
autonomous learning is more robust to challenge constraints 
intrinsically embedded in teaching, restrictions deep-seated in 
institutions and the power behind some educational policies that use the 
ill-defined scholarship of teaching to gain control over the teachers 
rather than benefit the teaching profession (Nicholls, 2005).  
2.4.2 Dealing with uncertainty and complexity 
One of the main concerns of a scholarship of learning is the art of 
probing into the unknown and stepping into the uncertain and complex 
as part and parcel of real learning at the cognitive, metacognitive and 
the relational level: that is, the learning of an object of study, ways of 
 53 
learning, and how people (mis)understand each other ±which is the 
perspective professionally adopted by educators.  
Real learning, according to Leslie Schwartzman (2010: 40), 
initiates a rupture in knowing to encounter directly or indirectly the 
unknown, so educators need confidence and courage in order to share 
their knowledge and the gaps in their own understanding (Meyer, Land, 
& Baillie, 2010a: XVII). Curriculum design oriented by a scholarship of 
learning aims at eliciting better questions and/or more imaginative and 
effective metaphors from learners who use them to guide their own 
ways of seeing and acting. Whereas the evaluation of questions can be 
much harder and less predictable than the assessment of unequivocal 
answers (like the ones expected in the so-FDOOHGµREMHFWLYH¶WHVWVWKHVH
are usually associated to low-calibre questions and low-level cognitive 
skills, putting aside the issues of their virtually null contribution to 
DFFRPSOLVK OHDUQHU DXWRQRP\ DQG WKDW ³WKH PRUH REMHFWLYH DQ
examination, the more it fails to reveal the quality of good teaching and 
JRRGOHDUQLQJ´(Stenhouse, 1975: 95).  
%R\HU¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQE\FRQWUDVWLQFRUSRUDWHVWKHXQNQRZQDVD
separate feature of the scholarship of discovery. As Nicholls rightly 
SRLQWVRXW ³WKLVLQKLQGVLJKWSHUSHWXDWHV WKHGLYLGH WKDWKHZanted the 
academic community to abandon by suggesting that the scholarship of 
teaching is at the end of a continuum that begins with discovery or 
µUHVHDUFK¶´ (Nicholls, 2005: 40). On the contrary, scholars who 
investigate the experiential roots of the object of study in order to ally 
personal and collective epistemologies are constantly stepping in the 
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unknown and complex. Real learning (Clarke, 2005; Meyer et al., 
2010a; Schwartzman, 2010) HQWDLOV WKH H[SHULHQFH RI µLQGHWHUPLQDWH
]RQHV¶ (Schön, 1995: 28) whose investigation bridges individual and 
collective learning.  
According to Meyer, the role of an educator within a given 
GLVFLSOLQH LV WR ³DOLJQ WKH VWUXFWXUH RI VWXGHQWV¶ HYROYLQJ SHUVRnal 
FRQFHSWLRQV ZLWK WKDW RI WKH DJUHHGGLVFLSOLQDU\ FRQFHSWLRQ´ (Meyer et 
al., 2010a: XVIII). This means keeping the agreed disciplinary 
FRQFHSWLRQ DV WKH FRQVWDQW DQG VKDSLQJ WKH VWXGHQWV¶ DFFRUGLQJ WR LW
but to interpret such an alignment as a two-way journey has more 
KHXULVWLF SRZHU 6WXGHQWV¶ LQGHWHUPLQDWH ]RQHV RI FRPSOH[LW\ DQG
indeterminacy are worth investigating by educators and students 
themselves for it is only by being aware of their own epistemes that they 
FDQ ZRUN WKURXJK µEDVLF¶ FRQFHSWV DQG QRW DURXQG WKHP LQ RUGHU WR
attain real learning. 
If properly acknowledged, experienced uncertainty and 
FRPSOH[LW\ DUH RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR GHFRQVWUXFW WKH H[SHUW¶V QRWLRQV RI
µEDVLFV¶ VRPH RI ZKLFK DFFRUGLQJ WR Leah Shopkow (2010) may be 
threshold concepts, clusters of threshold concepts, or even disciplinary 
ways of knowing. Such opportunities are too often ignored in the rush to 
SHUIRUP³OHDUQLQJRXWFRPHV´ZLWKLQVDIHSDUDPHWHUV 
2.4.3 The turning point from teaching to learning 
Threshold concepts (Cousin, 2006a, 2007, 2010b; Ference Marton, 
2009; Meyer & Land, 2003, 2006; Meyer et al., 2010b) are useful to 
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reconsider educational practices whose backbone, instead of content 
cover, is a curriculum focussed on critical changes of understanding in 
the disciplines. However, in order to implement such a curriculum both 
macro- and micro- changes are necessary: a collaborative engagement 
at departmental or even institutional level (Shopkow, 2010), and to take 
learning far more seriously (Shulman, 1999). Paradoxically, these 
changes bring about the turning point from the scholarship of teaching 
to the scholarship of learning ±even though it is the educators who have 
to do an outstanding work to initiate it and keep it going. 
Randy Bass (1999) is the clearest example of this pivotal 
change. He made the point of making every course component 
intentional and, in so doing, he found himself asking questions about 
student learning he admits never having come across before. He 
realised then how little he knew about how students (mis)understood 
what he was teaching. His reflections, then, revolved around the 
processes of deep understanding and whether that equated mastery.  
He also realised the crucial difference of looking at his discipline 
WKURXJKGLIIHUHQWSHUVSHFWLYHVKLVRZQDQGKLVVWXGHQWV¶)URPKLVSRLQW
RIYLHZ³XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´ZDVHTXLYDOHQWDQGFRH[WHQVLYHZLWKPDVWHU\
%\ FRQWUDVW IURP KLV VWXGHQWV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH WKH LVVXH ZDV QRW
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ EXW ³SHUIRUPLQJ PDVWHU\´ +RZHYHU, by limiting 
WKHPVHOYHVWR³SHUIRUP´WKH\KDGDSUH-conceived end at which to aim 
instead of working through the alignment of their own episteme with that 
of the discipline.  
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Bass pointed out that seeing from his own perspective only was 
too limited if he wanted to understand the nature of learning in his 
discipline, besides the fact that the quality of his questions was rooted in 
both the nature of teaching itself and the culture of the academy. In the 
evolution of his own understanding of learning and teaching, he 
HPSKDVLVHG KLV GHVLUH IRU OHDUQLQJ PRUH DERXW KLV VWXGHQWV¶ HQWHULQJ
knowledge and the ways in which their self-awareness of learning help 
them develop a deeper understanding of certain disciplinary principles 
more meaningfully.  
The scholarship of teaching, as pointed out above, has been 
taken over by normative interests. Diana Laurillard (cited by Bass) says 
that the widely held presumption that teaching can be done right, or just 
FRPSHWHQWO\ KDV ³VWUDQJXODWHG WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI WHDFKLQJ DV DQ 
LQWHOOHFWXDO HQWHUSULVH DQG DQDO\WLF VXEMHFW´ (Bass, 1999: electronic 
paper without page numbers provided). This, I believe, is another 
reason to move on towards a scholarship of learning, its next logical 
step. 
2.4.4 The learning experience amid the disciplines 
Learning involves the knowledge formation history of individuals and 
collectivities in at least three different layers: cognitive (contents), 
metacognitive (learning itself) and relational (dialogic processes 
between and within learners that bring learning about). For a long time, 
learning was conceived of as limited to its contents, not including the 
generative patterns that inform, give meaning and virtually project the 
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contents beyond themselves to deal with new situations (that was 
supposed to happen not when learning, but in reaching an ideal 
GHVWLQDWLRQFDOOHG³PDVWHU\´7KHPHWDFRJQLWLYHOD\HUWKRXJKLVQRWDQ
addition but a substantial aspect because learning something entails 
what a learning experience is like and what a possible object of learning 
is. The other fundamental aspect is constituted by interpersonal and 
intrapersonal relations that bring about new ways of seeing and acting 
that keep learning going. 
Asking questions about learning in this broad sense are likely to 
be about the historical origin and social change in understandings of 
disciplinary objects, no less than their re-creation and re-enactment by 
individuals socialised in knowledge-related communities. The 
investigation of learning in any discipline is consequently multi- cross- 
and trans-disciplinary, a relatively late realisation that has yet to 
reconfigure outdated practices in education and knowledge construction 
that separate the acts and processes of knowing from knowledge itself 
(Bowden & Marton, 2003: ix) instead of making of every domain of 
knowledge a practice of learning (practice in the sense of reflection on 
the interaction between perception and action). I agree with Nicholls in 
WKDW ³IRUDFDGHPLFVZLWKLQGLVFLSOLQHV WREHFRPHSDUWQHUV LQDVKDUHG
common understanding of learning will require them to consider how 
their discipline is identified within a framework of learning, and how the 
DFDGHPLFFRPPXQLW\ UHVSRQGV WRDQGXQGHUVWDQGV LW´ (Nicholls, 2005: 
91). 
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According to Hutchings, institutional research in universities that 
take learning seriously should ask central questions such as:  
What are our students really learning? What do they 
understand deeply? What kinds of human beings are they 
becoming ²intellectually, morally, in terms of civic 
responsibility? How does our teaching affect that learning, 
and how might it do so more effectively? (Hutchings & 
Shulman, 1999: 15) 
Teachers as learners are dedicated to creating a common ground 
of intellectual commitment (Sockett, 2000), even if they are not experts 
LQ WKH OHDUQLQJ RI WKHLU RZQ ILHOG ([SHUWLVH RQ KRZ WR FRQQHFW RQH¶V
RZQDQGRWKHUV¶SHUVRQDOH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKHJHQHUDWLYHSDWWHUQVRID
discipline is practiced as an art by a few (Eisner, 1985, 1991; Read, 
1970; Rowe, 1996), and it is no wonder that DFDGHPLFVZKR³VHSDUDWH
out questions relating to subject knowledge, in which they are meant to 
be expert, from those relating to how the subject should be taught [are 
reluctant to unite them] in the interest of the students learning or from a 
learning perVSHFWLYHRIDFDGHPLFVWDIIWKHPVHOYHV´(Nicholls, 2005: 79) 
Experience interrogation is crucial for research on the learning 
parameters of the disciplines, but it requires a considerable change of 
mindset since cRPLQJRXWRIWKHVDIHW\RIRQH¶VRZQGLVFLSOLQHLQRUGHU
to explore its learning parameters involves risking time and resources 
for uncertain gains, which does not make sense in cost-effective 
enterprises and institutions that demand the development of research 
measurable in time-race terms of products and services.  
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Chapter 3 Characteristics of a scholarship of 
learning 
3.0 Learning, knowing and being 
The investigation of learning involves enquiries into how individuals 
experience and re-create a socially constructed object of study and their 
own identity and agency µ+RZ¶ we go about experiencing and 
understanding the world cannot be separated from 'what' we experience 
and understand DQG IURP µZKR¶ ZH EHFRPH ZKHQ ZH XQGHUVWDQG
because understanding is integrative and generative. It integrates 
intellect and emotions, imagination, knowledge and the ability to apply it 
in increasingly sophisticated ways (Booth, 2003: 6).  It generates its 
own objects no less than subjective aspects of the person who 
understands.  
Imagination for us is the creation of spaces between and within 
aspects previously perceived as welded, and a shift of roles and 
relationships that were originally assumed as fixed. Hence imaginative 
engagement is underlying changes in foci and roles, such as shifting 
back and forth the perspective of the observer and the participant in the 
making of the subject matter. Imagination is fundamental in the changes 
of perspective to focus on learning and on learning to learn --a 
metacognitive leap that allows for the development of learner 
autonomy. Moreover, imagination is essential to investigate the 
unknown by posing deep-probing questions.  
 60 
In learning for understanding, emotion and cognition are 
interwoven both in engaging the object of investigation and in the 
existential outlook of the learner: 
Along with the cognitive experience of doubt, may come 
the emotional experience of self-doubt: the unsettling 
IHHOLQJ WKDW DULVHV ZKHQ RQH TXHVWLRQV RQH¶V ZD\V RI
seeing, of being in, the world. (Timmermans, 2010: 10) 
Cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1962), disorientation (Mezirow, 
2000), or what the literature on threshold concepts has called 
³WURXEOHVRPHQHVV´ (Meyer & Land, 2003; Perkins, 2010) are instances 
of rupture that bring to the fore the existence of inadequacies in the 
SHUVRQ¶V IUDPH RI UHIHUHQFH DQG PHDQLQJ ZKLFK WKHUHE\ EHFRPH
explicit to him or her at least to a certain extent.  In order to understand 
something, we need to generate a conceptual space where it and its 
likes are subsumed under a more comprehensive notion. Hence 
OHDUQLQJLVLQWULQVLFDOO\JHQHUDWLYHDQLGHDFRQILUPHGE\9\JRWVN\³We 
propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone 
of proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal 
developmental processes´(Vygotsky, 1978: 90).  In order to understand 
something we need to generate a category that encompasses it, which 
leads to transformation and development. An unsettling feeling brought 
about by cognitive dissonance has the potential to trigger a 
transforming move in the individual but it is not enough. 
According to Schwartzman (2010: 34), reactions to rupture and 
explicitness can be followed by any of two possibilities: avoidance or 
reflection, and both types of responses are loaded with uncertainty and 
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anxiety. Of the two, only reflectiveness leads to transformative learning 
to the extent that the person re-orients herself or himself in the world 
according to different (or differently seen) principles and relationships.  
Since it is proposed that deep learning become the foundation of 
scholarship in a given discipline such as Languages and Cultures, it is 
necessary to clarify what deep learning means, starting with its 
opposite: surface learning. 
3.0.1 Surface learning  
A surface approach to learning involves completing tasks with minimum 
effort to meet prescribed requirements, drawing on low-level cognitive 
skills (Biggs & Tang, 2007). The classic signs of surface learning are, 
according to Rosie (2000), low motivation and doing the minimal effort 
to complete the imposed task, which allows for the possibility of 
defeating the learning purpose and yet performing the external signals 
of understanding.  Surface learners (and surface teachers for that 
matter) do not seem to make a difference between understanding and 
performing understanding (Bass, 1999).  
Learning can be visualised as a journey of thesis-antithesis-
synthesis (Rosie, 2000) in which surface learning approaches take one 
of two paths: 
The first [path] LVDQµDYRLGWKHURXWH¶DSSURDFKDQDWWHPSW
to project a synthesis from an initial thesis without 
engaging with possible antitheses. The second is a 
µVWD\LQJSXW¶ approach, or a strategy of remaining either at 
the level of thesis only or adopting a non-conceptual 
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antithesis as a means of resolving differences and 
tensiRQV$QµDYRLGWKHURXWH¶DSSURDFKLVIUHTXHQWO\IRXQG
ZKHQ VWXGHQWV µSDUURW¶ ZKDW WKH\ SHUFHLYH WR EH ZHOO- 
formed arguments without working through them. A 
µVWD\LQJ SXW¶ DSSURDFK LV FKDUDFWHUL]HG E\ VWXGHQWV
amassing detailed factual accounts, which lack a 
conceptual structure. (Rosie, 2000: 46) 
In either route, the surface learner can be rewarded with at least 
DSDVVEHFDXVHVXUIDFH OHDUQLQJJHQHUDOO\ ILWV WKH ³KLGGHQFXUULFXOXP´
of what students actually learn and experience based upon their 
perceptions of what is required (Margolis, 2001).  
3.0.2 Deep learning 
According to Rosie (2000: 46), deep learning is realised in synthesis. 
Not taking risks is characteristic of surface learners wishing to complete 
tasks as soon as possible and to score safe marks. But whereas Rosie 
SURSRVHV WR µHQDEOH¶ VWXGHQWV WR WDNH ULVNV E\ PDNLQJ WKHP ZRUN ZLWK
ideas that come from a discipline with which they are unfamiliar (Rosie, 
2000: 57), I suggest to encourage them to unfamilarise what they have 
been taking for granted and to think in cross-disciplinary lines of 
reflection. In this way, to the extent that they engage themselves 
imaginatively with the task, they will necessarily find themselves in 
unfamiliar grounds. +RZHYHU µGHIDPLOLDULVLQJ¶ LVDQ LOO-defined process, 
not a task attainable by following clearly delineated steps; it is a 
metaphor that requires higher-order cognitive skills and agency to 
emotionally invest in meaningful engagement in, and enjoyment of, 
learning.  
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I suggest that the critical difference between surface and deep 
approaches to language learning depends, respectively, on either 
focussing on products or on generative patterns. In surface approaches, 
learners take the communicative-expressive problem at face value and 
focus on the application of, for example, some vocabulary or 
grammatical pattern previously learned. By contrast, in deep 
approaches learners experiment with the combinatory and projective 
power of contents and forms and use what they have learned in order to 
direct (and generate) themselves as agents of their own learning. 
Deep approaches to learning enable us ³to see something in the 
world in a different way and the more fundamental, the less visible a 
OD\HU RI NQRZOHGJH LV´ (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 16). Language and 
culture, being what we see and the lenses through which we see are 
then the least likely of even been noticed. That is, unless some form of 
variation is raised up to our awareness. Variability within and between 
languages and cultures is fundamental to make us aware of their 
existence in such a way that pushes the borders of what we see and 
what we are now capable of seeing. Discernment is defined thus by 
Bowden and Marton: 
To discern an aspect is to differentiate among the various 
aspects and focus on the most relevant to the situation. 
:LWKRXWYDULDWLRQWKHUHLVQRGLVFHUQPHQW>«@/HDUQLQJLQ
terms of changes in or widening of our ways of seeing the 
world can be understood in terms of discernment, 
simultaneity and variation. Thanks to the variation, we 
experience and discern critical aspects of the situations or 
phenomena we have to handle and, to the extent that 
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these critical aspects are focused on simultaneously, a 
pattern emerges. Thanks to having experienced a varying 
past we become capable of handling a varying future. 
(Bowden & Marton, 2003: 8) 
As documented by Bowden and Marton, there is a functional 
relationship between the approach adopted by the learners and their 
learning outcomes (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 47). The OHDUQHUV¶
approaches depend on what they are trying to achieve, how they 
experience the learning situations and how they perceive their own role 
DVOHDUQHUV5DLVLQJWKHOHDUQHUV¶DZDUHQHVVRIZKDWDGHHSDSSURDFK
to learning involves is fundamental, no less than educating them to 
handle their own experience in order to perceive (and induce) variability 
WKDWFDQOHDGWRGLVFHUQPHQW7KHHGXFDWRU¶VJRDOLVRUVKRXOGEH WKDW
the learners aim at investigating how to enrich and diversify the ways in 
which they experience learning situations and to direct their own 
approach to, and engagement with, their object of learning.  
(GXFDWRUV QHHG WR HQTXLUH LQWR WKH ZD\V LQZKLFK WKH OHDUQHUV¶
epistemological beliefs about knowing and learning are a help or a 
hindrance to develop deep understanding. They need to investigate 
how their students experience and re-create the subject as they learn it, 
the connections in their ways of seeing and acting and how they are 
modified (or not) by teaching. Based on the principle of learning from 
each other, Bowden and Marton developed their concept of collective 
consciousness:  
We can talk about a collective consciousness, an 
awareness of others¶ ways of seeing things, as linking 
individual consciousnesses to each other. From this point of 
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view it is highly relevant for students to learn from each 
other, as it is for teachers to learn from other teachers. We 
become aware of our own way of seeing something as a 
way of seeing only through the contrast with other ways of 
seeing the same thing. (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 15) 
From what has been discussed so far, some basic characteristics 
of a scholarship of learning emerge: (1) internal and external sources of 
variability in terms of objects to focus on and ways of seeing them, (2) a 
generative perspective on the formation of knowledge and the knowers 
that are connected through practice; (3) transformative and (4) 
relational. About the latter, I will discuss establishing connections with 
other disciplines and with society at large to maintain a critical stance 
towards the field construction and the boundary work of a discipline 
from a cross- and trans-disciplinary perspective.7  
3.1 Variability 
3.1.1 Variation for discernment  
Bowden and Marton describe learning in terms of changes in 
capabilities for experiencing and being aware of the object of learning 
(Bowden & Marton, 2003: 23). It is not variation per se that matters for 
learning, but experienced variation and this can come about in two 
ways: as external variation by perceiving a varying environment, or as a 
self-JHQHUDWHG YDULDWLRQ ZKHQ ³ZH YDU\ RXU way of dealing with the 
                                               
7
 7KHRWKHU W\SHRIFRQQHFWLRQV MXVWGHVFULEHGE\%RZGHQDQG0DUWRQDV³FROOHFWLYH
FRQVFLRXVQHVV´ ZLOO EH GLVFXVVHG LQ 6.5.4 Learning language as a cooperative 
undertaking 
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HQYLURQPHQW´(Bowden & Marton, 2003: 50) by looking at it from various 
perspectives.  
Awareness is both focal and peripheral, and this is a potentially 
productive difference for the shuttling of perspectives brought about by 
shifts of attention: what is not focussed on but is nevertheless present 
tends to be taken for granted whereas the continually focussed object 
can unwittingly become attached to the same point of view: 
This play of awareness (between figure and ground and 
between central and peripheral) we call focal differentiation. 
The term refers to how figural or prominent something is in 
awareness. This play is absolutely necessary in order to 
experience reality as we do. Well, in order to experience 
reality at all. (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 37) 
   In languages, a prime source of variation is the physicality of 
speech and writing combined with metalinguistic awareness and 
metacognitive reflection. Content and form have complex and 
multilayered UHODWLRQVLQODQJXDJHDQGWKH\FDQEHµIRXQG¶QROHVVWKDQ
intentionally induced by the person. Visualising a form as a content (for 
H[DPSOH LQWHUSUHWLQJRUHQFRGLQJ WKHZRUG ³tree´PHDQLQJ ³D WUHH´ LV
different from visualising a content as a form (for example, interpreting 
or encoding a story meaning another story, as it is the case in 
parables). Visualising a form as a content and visualising a content as a 
form represent, respectively, digital and analog forms of symbolization 
(Lee, 1998) which have an extraordinary power to promote shifts of 
perspectives because they can build indefinitely on each other: digital 
symbolisation can give way to an analog elaboration which in turn can 
be digitally read and so on in cognitive, metacognitive and 
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metalinguistic perspectives. When students become aware that learning 
a language is connected with, but not identical to, learning through a 
language, and when they realise what both aspects reflect about 
languages, they are selectively focussing their attention on cognitive-
perceptual, metacognitive and metalinguistic aspects. 
Bowden and Marton apply to language learning their theory by 
asserting that we learn our mother tongue not despite but because of 
variation (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 33). Variability enables babies to 
discern language essential features from speech idiosyncratic aspects.  
Likewise, in learning foreign languages, discernment derives from 
having encountered and dealt with patterns of variation in different 
learning environments. Such encounters (involving experience, 
discernment and practice) are specific for the object or aim of learning 
and for the person who experiences, discerns and deals with them. 
Their specificity connects them with general learning principles, but 
cannot be contained by these in the application of broad instruction 
techniques or teaching methodologies, which justifies saying that this 
approach to scholarship is centred in learning as an open-ended 
process rather than in teaching pre-determined contents or procedures. 
)ROORZLQJ 0DUWRQ¶V WKHRU\ (Ference Marton & Booth, 1997; F. 
Marton, Dall'Alba, & Beaty, 1993), the process of learning as 
discernment of variation in a foreign language can be described thus: at 
WKH EHJLQQLQJ D SDUWLFXODU DVSHFW HQWHUV WKH ILHOG RI WKH OHDUQHU¶V
awareness in a non-focal position (say, for example, the rhythm of a 
conversation). At some point, the learner experiences variation in a 
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particular dimension of that aspect (for instance, the length of the 
stressed sounds) and he or she is focally aware until some form of 
pattern emerges that eventually becomes part of the background in the 
peripheral area of attention. Yet the fact that it has been differentiated 
ZLGHQVWKHOHDUQHU¶VKRUL]RQLQWHUPVRIZKDWDQGKRZWRORRNIRU7KH
experience makes some other aspects come to the fore while others 
still remain undiscerned until a new cycle starts again.    
3.1.2 Practice and experience 
To experience is not the same as passive reception. Our sensorial 
powers may be intact and the objects for us to see, hear or feel may be 
physically there. In some sense we can look at things, recognise them, 
even perform ritualised activities about them and yet we may not 
experience them.  For experience to take place, we need a continuous 
and complex interaction between two wholes: the object and the self. In 
both cases, the totality is not a given but has to be constructed and 
VLWXDWHG 6XFK µWRWDOLWLHV¶ DUH QHFHVVDULO\ VLWXDWHG LQ WKH FROOHFWLYH DQG
individual history, which means they change over time. The totality of 
the object is constructed by apperception and the totality of the self by 
practice, which implies striking a dynamic balance between seeing and 
acting, feeling and reflecting. Experience in this sense is aesthetic 
(Dewey, 1934) and it is part of a creative attitude (Fromm, 1959), even if 
its object is not a work of art and does not produce an object regarded 
as new by others. 
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Encounters with the unfamiliar reconfigure and expand our 
constructions of totality: since the properties of the event do not fit our 
existing schema, we create new meaning schemes to integrate them 
(Mezirow, 2000: 9). Like a climber escalating two walls facing each 
other, we construct the parts (their nature, their meaning and their 
combinatory power) by reference to the whole, and the whole by 
reference to the parts. Metaphorical thinking (which involves shifting 
from the meaning of a structure to the structure of a new meaning, 
generatively) is a major way to connect familiar with unfamiliar elements 
and totalities in our encounters with otherness.  
The construction of the self modifies the ways in which the 
person experiences the world. Bowden and Marton (2003) suggest that 
to experience something is to experience a meaning inextricably 
associated wLWKDVWUXFWXUH³VWUXFWXUHDQGPHDQLQJPXWXDOO\FRQVWLWXWH
HDFKRWKHU>«@QHLWKHUVWUXFWXUHQRUPHDQLQJFDQEHVDLGWRSUHFHGHRU
VXFFHHG WKH RWKHU´ (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 30, 31). Deep learning 
LPSOLHV D FKDQJH LQ SHRSOH¶V ZD\V RI H[SHULHQFLQJ EHFDXVH WKH
emergent meaning and structure re-orientates not just what is seen but 
the construction of the self in practice by affecting his or her ways of 
acting, seeing, feeling and reflecting. 
3.1.3 To see in order to act ±to act in order to see 
We do not respond to the environment as such but as we experience or 
see it and our experience accords with our way of handling or acting 
upon our environment and ourselves.  Actually, what we see and how 
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we act reinforce each other to the point of reaching a vicious circle 
when learning fails, that is, when actions do not allow for new ways of 
seeing. Otherwise, ways of seeing and ways of acting can build 
reciprocally with the intervention of a critical factor: reflectivity. 
Reflection on our ways of seeing and acting provides the leverage to 
change both in tandem. 
According to Bowden and Marton, effective seeing is embedded 
with action: ³Ze see effectively when we discern the aspects of the 
situation critical to our acts and take them into consideration, often all of 
WKHPDWWKHVDPHWLPH´(Bowden & Marton, 2003: 7). Learning not only 
does facilitate us to see and to act differently, but by learning we enable 
ourselves as agents in the world as we experience it. A deep approach 
to learning comprises seeing, acting and being in the world and the 
intriguing problem for educators and educational environments is how to 
put such a power in motion. The main factor I think is not making others 
do things, but inspiring and motivating them (by our own example?) to 
want to do, to want to know, to want to be in ways that lead to 
increasing flexibility and autonomy, which is fundamental for the 
learners to focus on the inner and outer aspects of their experience and 
to act on them. Autonomy involves a deep approach to learning paired 
with affective (emotional) and sensorial (aesthetic) engagement to stick 
to a sense of significance long enough and sometimes long before 
finding the evidence and the rational reasons that account for it. 
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3.2 Generativeness 
3.2.1 A focus on knowledge formation 
Learning, in one of its many definitions, takes place when ZH³ILJXUHRXW
how to use what we already know in order to go beyond what we 
FXUUHQWO\ WKLQN´ (Bruner, 1983: 183). Even though the processes of 
knowledge formation are not obvious in its products, the living language 
of a discipline (Gardner, 1993b) is generative for including not just the 
FRQWHQW WKH µOH[LV¶ EXW DOVR WKH µV\QWD[¶ RI ZKDW DQG KRZ WR ORRN IRU
how to combine and develop meaning with the content by means of 
ways of seeing (models, metaphors, paradigms) and relevant ways of 
acting (methodologies) to produce, and appreciate, new knowledge. A 
VLPLODU GLVWLQFWLRQ ZDV PDGH E\ 6FKZDE ZKR FDOOHG ³VXEVWDQWLYH
VWUXFWXUHV´ WKH ³FRQFHSWLRQV WKDW JXLGH HQTXLU\´ DQG ³V\QWDFWLF
VWUXFWXUHV´WKH³SDWKZD\VRIHQTXLU\´(Schwab, 1964: 25).  
Both at the collective level (as the epistemological history of a 
discipline) and at the individual level (as the phenomenography of 
learning experiences), questions about knowledge formation should be 
regarded as an integral part of the scholarship of that discipline. But as 
it has already been pointed out, the character of the knowledge 
encountered necessarily varies according to the approach taken to 
learning. For example, the instructional design-by-objectives model and 
the institutions that support it implicitly uphold the assumption that 
everything to be learned is a topic of mastery, not for speculation or 
reflection. A focus on knowledge formation requires a different way of 
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looking at scholarship and education to make both of them become part 
of the construction of the discipline.  
Refined schemes of individual intellectual development have a 
place in the scholarship of learning for they can be a reference to 
understand first and then facilitate the processes of knowledge 
formation. Questions about knowledge formation in different fields, their 
YDULDWLRQ DQG FRQVWDQW HOHPHQWV DUH ³D OHYHU IRU UDLVLQJ WKH TXDOLW\ RI
OHDUQLQJRQWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGWKHFROOHFWLYHOHYHOV´ (Bowden & Marton, 
2003: 18). Consequently, it implies as well a generative model of 
assessment (Cousin, 2010b) that can help educators move from 
traditional assessment regimes in which students perform 
understanding and yet retain fundamental misconceptions.  
The cognitive orientation of the scholarship of learning is to 
realise the higher stages of thought development according to holistic 
VFKHPHVRUPRGHOVWKDWOLNH:LOOLDP3HUU\¶VDFNQRZOHGJHDQLPSRUWDQW
relationship between cognitive processes and the ways in which values 
and belief systems are acquired (Perry, 1981: 13). He uses actual 
statements of students to show how they move from one stage to the 
next of intellectual and ethical development --from "dualism" and 
"multiplicity" through "relativism" to "evolving commitments." In the last 
position, number nine, of the last stage, that he calls Commitments in 
Relativism developed, students actually develop a narrative about the 
nature of knowledge and of themselves as learners.  
/LNHZLVH LQ .LWFKHQHUV PRGHO¶V ODVW VWDJH QXPEHU VHYHQ WKH
individual realises the interpretive though documented nature of 
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knowledge and that, in thHILQDODQDO\VLVNQRZOHGJHLVQRW³as much a 
puzzle solving as it is trying to get the narrative straight" (Kitchener, 
King, Wood, & Davison, 1989: 94-95), a narrative which may need to be 
reformulated in the light of new data or new perspectives, according to 
WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶VFDSDFLW\RI IUDPLQJDQGLGHQWLI\LQJTXHVWLRQV WKDWKDYH
bearing on the subject in hand. Arlin (1995) postulates problem finding 
as the final stage in her model of thought development. She suggests 
that wisdom is a function not of the answers one reaches but of the 
questions one poses. If Arlin is right, then most current practices of 
training students to answer questions posed by someone else are 
working at cross purposes with their cognitive development and the 
maturation of their system of values and beliefs. 
3.2.2 Generative practice 
Generativeness in language learning is the object of metacognitive 
investigation on how language learners gain an increasing access to 
elements of their cognitive repertory. Gardner illustrates this by noting 
WKDWZKHQOHDUQLQJWRUHDGKXPDQVDOVROHDUQWR³DSSUHFLDWHWKHQDWXUH
of the grapheme-phoneme mechanism that undergirds reading and can 
draw on this understanding to learn new languages, to devise their own 
artificial languages, and even to come to understand the operation of 
natural and artificial languages in thH VW\OH RI D &KRPVNLDQ OLQJXLVW´
(Gardner, 1993b: 37).  
By contrast, the main problem in language study limited to 
training in communicative skills is that learning is reduced to situations 
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of application and, by so doing, both communication and application are 
over-simplified as well. It is necessary to put both concepts in the light 
of practice to appreciate their value for knowledge formation in the 
study of languages and cultures.  
Practice is a recurring and self-transforming process of 
experience, reflection and action.  MacIntyre (1981) defines practice as: 
any coherent and complex form of socially established co-
operative activity through which goods internal to that activity 
are realised >«@ with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the goods and ends 
involved, are systematically extended... [B]rick-laying is not 
practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; 
farming is. So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and 
biology. (MacIntyre, 1981: 175) Cited by Nicholls (2005) 
A scholarship of learning is constructed in practice, not in a top-
down relationship between theory and its application to concrete 
conditions. The scholarly practice of learning a language involves a 
form of research constructed in action. Such an epistemological stance 
is possible when the meaning of practice, instead of being constrained 
to the application of known principles, becomes an enquiry or dialogic 
relation between action and reflection. Praxis and the Classic concept 
of phronesis or practical wisdom are akin to this meaning of inquiry, 
proposed by John Dewey (1938). Inquiry implies thought interwoven 
with action and it proceeds from doubt to the resolution of doubt, to the 
generation of doubt in situations that are indeterminate and confusing. 
The scholarship of learning is not limited to finding problems and issues 
that have no explanation as yet but it intends to model and facilitate in 
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others the identification of questions that have bearing on the subject in 
hand. It is more challenging to elicit from others high-quality, 
imaginative and daring questions than training them to answer 
VRPHRQHHOVH¶V  
Practice redefines the concepts of communication and 
application which, in the study of languages, are so commonly 
oversimplified. Whereas for the narrow version of scholarship, 
communication does not count as advancing the knowledge in a field, 
for a scholarship of learning languages and cultures, communication is 
as essential as generativeness. A scholar of learning enquires into the 
ways in which learners (including him or herself) apprehend generative 
patterns and are capable of transforming them by projection and 
recombination in order to fulfil communicative, reflective and expressive 
goals. 
Inspired by MacIntyre, I distinguish overlapping relationships 
between knowledge and practice that unfold in the process of learning 
for understanding languages and cultures: 
x Knowledge for practice: getting acquainted with the basics of 
language. 
x Knowledge about practice: learning language and culture in 
tandem ±one through the other. 
x Knowledge of practice: practice in its extended meaning of 
reflection that transforms action and awareness and, ultimately, 
modifies the being itself by transforming its agency and identity.  
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Practice is essential in understanding change and how to learn 
from deliberate attempts to transform what to see and how to see it. 
That applies to the academics when their incentive is to rediscover their 
discipline by seeking new intellectual perceptions. Academics as 
educators play multiple roles: investigators of their object of study and 
of their own experience, critics and human developers to the extent that 
they are eliciting experience and generativity from others. Educators, in 
this general sense, transform experience (their RZQ DQG RWKHUV¶
conducive to the construction of a discipline. 
Mezirow (2000), following Habermas (1984), defines 
communicative learning as understanding values, ideals, feelings, moral 
decisions, and determining the conditions under which assertions 
regarding concepts such as freedom and justice are considered as valid 
by an individual or by a community. Understanding to communicate and 
communicating in order to understand involve a critical stance toward 
the assertions themselves. Communicative learning, for Mezirow, 
³focuses on achieving coherence´(Mezirow, 2000: 8). Under this light, 
intercultural communication is not a matter of testing cultural 
VWHUHRW\SHVDVZRUNLQJK\SRWKHVHVEXW³VHDUFKLQJRIWHQ intuitively, for 
themes and metaphors by which to fit the unfamiliar into a meaning 
perspective, so that an interpretation in context EHFRPHV SRVVLEOH´
(Mezirow, 2000: 9). 
Communication is an application of what one has learned and in 
itself is a way to learn. Communication and application are forms of 
SUDFWLFHEHFDXVHLQRUGHUWRPDNHXVHRIZKDWZHOHDUQ³ZHPXVWKDYH
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learned something which transcends the situation in which the learning 
KDV WDNHQ SODFH´ (Bowden & Marton, 2003:27). When we are 
communicating, we apply something we have learned through 
simultaneous awareness of the new and the old but, as Bowden and 
Marton note, the meaning of the situation is constituted by both. 
Communication amounts to creating a new synthesis each time.  
 
3.3 Transformation 
The penultimate characteristic of a scholarship of learning that I will 
discuss is its focus on transformation in different aspects: the learning 
experience, the perspective taken by the learner, and the subjective 
VWDQFHRI WKH OHDUQHUV¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWKFKDQJHV LQ WKHLUXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of liminal concepts of the discipline. 
3.3.1 Transforming perspectives 
The actions that involve perspective transformation affect learning since 
they modify the lHDUQHU¶V H[SHULHQFH RI WKH REMHFW DQG WKH FRQWH[W RI
learning. 3HUVSHFWLYH WUDQIRUPDWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR 0H]LURZ LV ³the 
process of becoming critically aware of how and why our 
presuppositions have come to constrain the way we perceive, 
understand, and feel about our world; of reformulating these 
assumptions to permit a more inclusive, discriminating, permeable and 
integrative perspective; and of making decisions or otherwise acting on 
these new understandings´(Mezirow, 1990: 14).  
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Meaning perspectives can be changed through the critical 
DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH OHDUQHUV¶ FRJQLWLYH KDELWV RI H[SHFWDWLRQ (Roth, 
1990), and two of them are especially relevant for this discussion: the 
Global/Specific (G/S) habit for its importance to construct 
representations of language in context that are both comprehensive and 
functional, and   the Sameness/Difference (S/D) habit for its significance 
to build intercultural awareness.  
In the Global/Specific habit, the Global tendency attends to 
pattern, purpose, and connection, stressing on the superordinate, the 
organization of the parts in a system and on the purposes or goals of 
actions or plans. The Specific, by contrast, attends to the detail and the 
concreteness of the event. According to Roth (1990), it is a matter of 
individual preference focussing first on the global as an orientation to 
the specific or vice versa but, in order to attain good inter- and intra-
communication, the learner needs to control the shift between the two 
at useful points in the thought process. 
The Sameness/Difference (S/D) cognitive tendency 
characterises the preferred approach to understand a category or idea: 
the initial scanning can be either on what belongs within its boundaries 
(Sameness) or what does not (Difference). When focussing mainly on 
similarities, connections, and uniformities, the individual adopts a 
convergent mode of inter- and intra-personal communication, whereas 
by concentrating on boundaries, discrepancies, and exceptions, the 
individual moves in the opposite direction. Both tendencies, however, 
are necessary for understanding and learners need to be aware of their 
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complementarity and be able to purposefully shift between both in order 
to keep a poised stance that joins acceptance and critical distance.  
3.3.2 Ontological shifts and changes in understanding 
Changes in cognitive understanding accompany ontological shifts 
leading to shared perceptions and practices within a given community 
(Wenger, 1998). As Meyer has pointed out, we are what we know and 
we become what we learn (Meyer et al., 2010a: XXVIII). 
Meyer and Land call learning thresholds (Meyer & Land, 2003, 
2006; Meyer et al., 2010b) the ontological transformations necessarily 
occasioned by significant learning. According to them, such 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV ³PLJKW QRW EH VWULFWO\ FRQFHSWXDO EXW DUH PRUH
concerned with shifts of identity and subjectivity, with procedural 
knowledge, or the ways of thinking and practising customary to a given 
GLVFLSOLQDU\ RU SURIHVVLRQDO FRPPXQLW\´ (Meyer et al., 2010b: X-XI). 
Meyer, Land and Baillie characterise threshold concepts thus:  
[Threshold concepts] are transformative (occasioning a 
significant shift in the perception of a subject), integrative 
(exposing the previously hidden inter-relatedness of 
something) and likely to be, in varying degrees, irreversible 
(unlikely to be forgotten, or unlearned only through 
considerable effort), and frequently troublesome, for a 
variety of reasons. These learning thresholds are often the 
points at which students experience difficulty. The 
transformation may be sudden or it may be protracted over 
a considerable period of time, with the transition to 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RIWHQ LQYROYLQJ µWURXEOHVRPH NQRZOHGJH¶
Depending on discipline and context, knowledge might be 
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troublesome because it is ritualised, inert, conceptually 
difficult, alien or tacit, because it requires adopting an 
unfamiliar discourse, or perhaps because the learner 
UHPDLQVµGHIHQGHG¶DQGGRHVQRWZLVKWRFKDQJHRUOHWJRRI
their customary way of seeing things. (Meyer et al., 2010a: 
IX-X) [Added emphasis] 
 
It is suggested that a key aspect of scholarship in our field is 
liminality in the contact/contrast of languages and cultures. The 
appreciation of cultural and linguistic otherness implies adopting an 
unfamiliar discourse and the mobilisation of perspectives and cognitive 
expections, as documented by Cousin in Cultural Studies and Orsini-
Jones in  in the comprehension of a foreign linguistic system (Cousin, 
2006b; Orsini-Jones, 2010). As pointed out by Roth (1990), becoming 
aware of habits of expectation and taking action to change them is at 
the heart of transformative learning.   
3.4 Integrative connections 
The last characteristic of a scholarship of learning is that the identity of 
the discipline it makes advance is constructed in relation with other 
disciplines and the ways in which it can fulfill its mission with society at 
large. 
3.4.1 Connections with other disciplinary fields 
Practice involves action which transforms knowledge about something, 
awareness of the nature of knowledge itself DQGWKHNQRZHU¶VDJHQF\. 
Pedagogy is then a form of practical constructivism and practical 
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criticism rather than a mere technique or application of theory. The main 
problem of pedagogy is not how to teach, but how to understand and 
how to elicit such understanding in others, which is similar though not 
identical to communication. Pedagogy works with the tranformation of 
references to the world into objects of reflexion and knowing, and for 
that purpose it aims to ILQG VXFK REMHFWV¶ SODFH LQ H[SHULHQFH RU WR
educate experience in order to find such a place.  
The cyclical re-construction of the experiential connection of 
knowledge at all levels of socialisation in the discipline is central for 
learning and investigation, which is another aspect of learning. 
Pedagogy thus understood becomes cross-disciplinary (because it 
involves manifold disciplines) and trans-disciplinary (because it makes 
of the experiential roots of knowledge a vantage point for all the 
disciplines). 7KH WHUP ³WUDQVGLVFLSOLQDULW\´ PD\ EH EHWWHU XQGHUVWRRG LI
contrasted with multi- and inter- disciplinarity: interdisciplinarity 
concerns the transfer of methods from one discipline to the other, 
whereas multidisciplinarity involves different disciplinary approaches in 
the study of a research topic. Transdisciplinarity, by contrast, concerns 
that which is at once between the disciplines, across the disciplines, 
and beyond all discipline (Nicolescu, 1998a, 1998b; cited by Peters, 
1999).  
The International Center for Trandisciplinary Research was set up 
in Paris in 1987, and it is aimed at self-transformation, the unity of 
knowledge and the creation of a new art of living (Nicolescu, 1998b). 
The transdisciplinarity project, as conceived of by Nicolescu and his 
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colleagues, concerns the dynamics engendered by the action of several 
levels of reality at once that comprise learning to know, learning to do, 
learning to live together, and learning to live, the four constitutive pillars 
of a new kind of education (Delors & Mufti, 1996). Language and culture 
are basic to establish a transdisciplinary ground and hence it is not by 
chance that the Common European Framework of Reference (2001) 
had adopted similar principles for the learning, teaching and 
assessment of Modern Languages. 
When I was looking for a term to express the idea that education of 
experience is fundamental to gain access to pooled ways of perception 
and it constituted a commonground for the disciplines, I thought of 
transdisciplinarity ZLWKRXW EHLQJ DZDUH RI 1LFROHVFX¶V ZRUN 0\ RZQ
application of the term is centred in the learning experience that 
involves a two-way transformation: from experience to objects of 
discernment (which can be differently located in diverse disciplines) and 
the experiential re-creation and validation of those objects. As a general 
characteristic of the scholarship of learning, transdisciplinarity implies 
the search for connections between the disciplines in ways that can 
integrate specific objects of discernment with the experience of the 
learners. I provide some indicative examples of integrative connections 
between ours and other disciplines from both the nomothetic 
(experimental, positivistic) and the hermeneutic (interpretive) fields in 
Chapter 9.  
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3.4.2 Connections with the community at large 
,QDGGLWLRQWRDVNLQJ³How can we use our knowledge to solve problems 
RXWVLGH WKH XQLYHUVLW\"´ DQG ³How can the problems outside the 
academic niche renew RXU GLVFLSOLQDU\ SHUFHSWLRQV"´ a scholarship of 
learning in the Humanities, as much as or even more than other 
GLVFLSOLQDU\ ILHOGV DVNV ³+RZ FDQ ZH GHYHORS NQRZOHGJH IURP WKH
OD\SHUVRQ¶V H[SHULHQFH WKDW UHPDLQV PHDQLQJIXO IRU KHU RU KLP"´
According to Bowden and Marton, ³Serving the interests of µthe large 
community¶ can bring about learning not only in the individual, but also 
in the collective sense: genuinely new and fundamentally important 
knowledge might be produced´(Bowden & Marton, 2003: 10). 
Disciplines share social myths that accomplish roles well beyond 
their referential meaning. Such is the case with the iconic figure of the 
expert professional. According to Gadamer, 
The problem of our society is that the longing of the citizenry 
for orientation and normative patterns invests the expert with 
an exaggerated authority. Modern society expects him to 
provide a substitute for past moral and political orientations. 
(Gadamer, 1975: 313)  
The expert professional as a social phenomenon is verifiable by 
reason alone, whereas his or her role as a myth (Barthes, 1957) of 
social control is perceptible by narrative rationality (Fisher, 1994). The 
expert is someone expected to contribute with solutions to already 
acknowledged problems. The myth of the expert, by contrast, is the 
symptom of a larger problem: the cutback of different ways of 
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conceiving of and constructing knowledge as if there were an only valid 
and canonical expression thereof. 
In a somewhat reductionist but graphic way, we can distinguish 
between the solution-minded frame of technology, and the problem-
minded frame of the Humanities that wants to know whether a problem 
is a problem indeed and why. As different as they are, the socialising 
practices in the Humanities tend to mirror those of the solution-minded 
type, generating specialisations and expert professionals even if there 
is no agreement on what the problems are because their foundations 
are revisited and contested as history- and-speech mediated.  
The agreement on the identification of a problem is the first step 
to break it down into specific sub-problems and their respective tasks. 
Only then, can teams of specialists work simultaneously or 
consecutively on related tasks, working out knowledge as a puzzle. By 
contrast, when knowledge is seen as a social and historical construct 
subject to multiple interpretations, specialisations are paradoxically 
holistic.  
The race for specialisations in the Humanities needs be 
considered more critically; the main question is whether the socialising 
practices that they encourage can get in the way of the Humanities 
epistemological quest described as the screening effect of method over 
truth (Gadamer, 1989) in the study of language and culture ±the fabric 
itself of social and private life. Expert and professional assistance 
implies the mastery of something not readily available except within the 
area of the specialism. The problem is whether that is necessary for the 
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search for truth, or a restriction to reinforce a socialising practice 
subordinated to a controlling discourse.  
Professionalism, despite all its advantages and aura of efficiency, 
has become a myth in the Barthesian sense, whose main setback is 
that it promotes heteronomy. The question now is how people can learn 
not to give up their autonomy, authority and responsibility to the expert. 
Do they major in one of the Humanities? That could help, to the extent 
that the Humanities raise awareness about truth and power being 
mediated by speech and contexts of interpretation and indicate how 
things might be taken forward. However, according to Barnett (1997: 
20), the negativity of academic criticism is endemic though more 
common in the Humanities. Moreover, this disciplinary realm faces 
problems of their own that fight against the systematisation demanded 
by the myth of the expert: 
Those difficulties are both epistemological and ontological. 
Epistemologically, the humanities are a set of intellectual 
practices explicitly ±as part of their self-understanding² 
intended to handle multiple criteria of judgement. 
Ontologically, they are intended to bring about 
transformations in human being and in self-understanding. 
There is, therefore, a double diversity ±epistemologically 
and ontologically² written into their self-constitution that 
will estrange them from efforts at systematisation. (Barnett, 
2001: 32)  
There is, nevertheless, a tendency to systematisation in the 
Humanities (Derrida, 2001; Fokkema & Ibsch, 2000). What happens if 
those who want to be socialised in one of the Humanities become 
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disempowered and disempowering experts themselves? This is a 
problem level A, namely, the problem of how to correlate 
epistemological stances consistently with socialising practices in the 
education of the practitioners-to-be of a discipline.  
The social role of those practitioners previously formed in their 
discipline, their service to those who are not necessarily in the same 
discipline or even in no discipline at all is called here the level B of 
socialising practices. The social role of the Humanities is not fulfilled by 
producing critical thinkers, in the same way that the social function of 
Medicine is not to produce healthy physicians.  
It is proposed here that the social role of the Humanities, 
expressed by socialising practices level B, is searching for the 
experiential roots of different ways of knowing a diversity of cultural 
objects closely linked with language, and to communicate that 
knowledge to society at large in order to promote their generativeness 
and autonomy. From an experiential stance, a given field can gain in 
ecological validity by finding meaningful connections with common 
ground, layperson experience, and with other disciplinarily elaborated 
ways of knowing. The two levels of socialising practices, A and B, can 
begin to be articulated together by revising the meaning of expertise in 
the Humanities and how it differs from the myth of the expert in the 
knowledge society. The expert in the Humanities, I suggest, is a honed 
amateur.  
Socialising practices level A (related to the consistency between 
education and the construction of the discipline) that agree with 
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socialising practices level B include deliberate shifts of attention 
between observer-participant with a number of purposes, such as 
building up self-direction and autonomous rather than heteronomous 
references (like the authority of the iconic expert), and using personal 
experience as a source of knowledge which can be applied reflectively 
to transform itself. 
The expert and the professional thrive through fissiparity. By 
FRQWUDVW WKH³DPDWHXU´ WKHORYHU WKH ORYLQJRQHGLIIXVHVERXQGDULHV
unites what is separated and estranged. In order to join different 
grounds, the amateur has to leave her or his own parcel and to depart 
an already acknowledged clan, team or label. Rainer Maria Rilke (1930) 
illustrates this tendency saying that already for a number of years he 
has made the point of leaving at least one club or clan  every day but he 
realises that there are many more yet to quit. 
From another perspective, Edward Said considers that 
³DPDWHXULVP´ VKRXOG UHSODFH ³SURIHVVLRQDOLVP´ DV KDYLQJ FHQWUDO
political importance. His point is whether one approaches authority as a 
³VXSSOLFDQW´RUDVLWV³DPDWHXULVK´FRQVFLHQFH 
The amateur is someone who considers that to be a thinking 
and concerned member of a society one is entitled to raise 
moral issues at the heart of even the most technical and 
SURIHVVLRQDOL]HG DFWLYLW\ DV LW LQYROYHV RQH¶V FRXQWU\ LWV
power, its mode of interacting with its citizens, as well as with 
other societies. (Said, 1994: 61) 
Expertise in the Humanities involves a capacity to decentre in 
order to acknowledge multiple voices and perspectives. Awareness of 
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multiplicity, however, does not preclude unity. The amateur, the loving 
one, has ancient roots in the connection of love and knowledge 
(Nussbaum, 1990). 
6DLG¶V DPDWHXU WDONV EDFN WR DXWKRULW\ LQ KLV UROH RI SDUWLFLSDQW-
observer and critic of a professional hierarchy that pretends not to be a 
participant with overt and covert agendas, a participant that pretends to 
hold the mere role of a neutral arbiter (for example, the government) or 
of a detached observer (as with the discourse of scientific social 
FRQWURO 5LONH¶V DPDWHXU OHDYHV FOXEV DQG FODQV FRQWHVWLQJ their 
authority to provide what he considers as fake identities. Both coincide 
LQ WKHLU GHVLUH IRU DJHQF\ WKRXJK RQO\ 6DLG¶V DPDWHXU SRLQWV RXW WKH
heteroglossic condition of an agent, which is to join the perspective and 
the voice of the observer with that of the participant.  
Since they generate contrasting voices, the observer and the 
participant build up a dialogic relation: the observer expands the 
awareness of his own observation when he realises he is a participant 
in multiple narratives that make intelligible what he observes. Likewise, 
someone committed with choices in real time can transform his 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ E\ WKH REVHUYDWLRQ RI KLPVHOI DQG RWKHUV 7KH ³H[SHUW´
amateur in the Humanities is someone who has reached a horizon of 
observer-participant or participant-observer and who is able to shift the 
main role by building upon previous realisations. 
Knowledge of the humanities has long concealed the tension 
between the role of analyst and the fact of its being a member of one or 
more narratives that make human lives intelligible for participants and 
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observers. Amateurism, personal experience and practical knowledge 
are but different facets of the same radical difficulty: the one of being 
the participant of the process to be studied and understood. It is the 
problem of understanding in order to transform, and inevitably 
transforming in order to understand. When such a dialogic pair is 
deliberately developed, we have a different kind of investigation that 
has been given a variety of names in social sciences: participative 
investigation, action research, reflection in action. In spite of the fact 
that there are historical and ideological reasons to explain why the 
Humanities have been scarcely affected by this kind of investigation, it 
is important to find out in what way those approaches can benefit the 
practice of the Humanities.  
Studies of languages and cultures based on non-personal 
knowledge are certainly relevant to investigate social phenomena from 
the intended stance of an objective observer.  However, the practical 
(as related to praxis) and personal dimensions of experience address a 
different order of problems, notably those dealing with responsiveness 
(a finely tuned perception) and responsibility ±choices of value and 
action, such as taking control instead of passing it to the expert. 
 
Debunking the myth of the expert involves the re-semantization 
of its counterpart: the layman. The artist, the philosopher, the scientist, 
the inventor and even cartoonists and comedians need to keep what 
they know in check. They want to unlearn in order to be able to learn 
more, to see more. They want to dislodge the effect that every piece of 
information has on shaping or moulding perception. They want to have 
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at least glimpses of a fresh look at things, as if looking at them as a 
child, as a foreigner or as a layman. 
The layman, however, has been to a large extent the dumping 
site of everything people fight, from bigotry to sheepish acquiescence. 
The layman has overtones similar to those of the stranger and the 
foreigner, somebody not to trust (Kristeva, 1991). Nonetheless, it so 
happens that everybody is a layman for somebody else, in the same 
way that everybody is a foreigner in most of the world, sometimes even 
in their own hometown.  
The layman can be tolerated with the same patronising attitude 
dispensed to the feeble-minded, the illiterate and the ignorant. The 
layman, however, and the foreigner as well for that matter, can present 
disarmingly candid views. He can get away with questions and remarks 
that the insiders (those who know) cannot even think about. Does he 
have anything to teach the professional in the Humanities, for instance? 
As long as we keep the old view of practice as the application of 
theory, the technical control of something known out of sheer 
abstraction or by means of strictly controlled conditions, the layman 
would be hardly other than a strawman or a guinea pig. However, if we 
conceive of the layman as the common ground of every man and 
woman, as someone whose warp and weft is the dialogic relation 
between I and Me (McAdams, 1997), the layman can become both a 
refreshing departure point (as the layman in all of us) and a sobering 
interlocutor (as the actual laymen who surround us). So, back to the 
question whether the layperson can teach something to the professional 
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in the Humanities, there is a readily affirmative answer to the extent that 
we make a point of educating her or him in us and around us. 
The social role of the honed amateur in the Humanities is to 
conjoin scholarship and education. Our social role is eminently 
educative of the layman (in us) and of the laymen around us. Such a 
stance would ground our scholarship with reality checks asking 
questions from the point of view of a layman who intends to inhabit our 
FRQVWUXFWVDQGDVNVIRUH[DPSOH³ZKDWGRHVthat PHDQWROLYHE\"´%\
integrating scholarship with the experience of being a layman member 
of multiple narratives, recounted in more than one language, the 
amateur of the Humanities can lessen the increasingly rarefying 
process that the knowledge society forces upon educational institutions 
in order to mark off the expert as what the layman cannot do or know. 
Moreover, such a posture would re-organise the relationship between 
education as a socialising practice, and scholarship if education takes 
the form of action or participative research. Socialising practices do not 
have to be limited to following scholarship; they can actually lead it and 
modify its direction and reach.  
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PART TWO: DEEP LEARNING IN LANGUAGES 
AND CULTURES 
Chapter 4 Variability in Learning Languages and 
Cultures  
4.0 Learning and variation 
Learning implies seeing patterns in novel aspects or seeing familiar 
DVSHFWVLQDGLIIHUHQWZD\ZKLFKEULQJVWRWKHIRUH9\JRWVN\¶VLQVLJKWRQ
metacognitive and metalinguistic awareness:  
A foreign language facilitates mastering the higher forms 
of the native language. The child learns to see his 
language as one particular system among many, to view 
its phenomena under more general categories, and this 
leads to awareness of his linguistic operations. (Vygotsky, 
1986 [1934]: 196) 
This idea has been confirmed, inter alia, by Variation Theory (Ference 
Marton & Booth, 1997; F. Marton et al., 1993) and empirical research 
on metalinguistic awareness (Bialystok, 1999, 2001a, 2001b). Rather 
than variation per se ZKDW FRXQWV IURP WKH OHDUQHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH LV
experienced YDULDWLRQ DQG IURP WKH HGXFDWRU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH WR HQDEOH
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the learner to understand dimensions of variation (Bowden & Marton, 
2003: 46). The richness with which variation can be perceived is a 
function of how the learner handles (or learns how to handle) 
experience and action. Conversely, by learning to handle experience 
and action, the learner can induce changes in his or her own 
experienced variability. Then contextual and self-induced variations 
overlap experiencially in learning. I discuss contextual variation in this 
chapter and I reserve the latter for Chapter 5 because of the tight 
connection between self-induced variation and generativeness. 
4.1 Contextual variability: The monolingual bias of foreign 
language studies 
External or contextual sources of variation can be identified in language 
considered as an historical object which, according to Coseriu (1958), 
involves three dimensions of change: (1) diaphasic: different 
communicative settings illustrated, for example, by oral vs written 
language and their hybrids in a wide range of styles and registers, (2) 
diastratic: diverse uses according to different social groups constituted 
by age, sex, profession, etc. (3) diatopic: places and regions of the 
linguistic area where different dialects are spoken. Politically driven 
choices and an idealised construct of the native speaker (Leung, Harris, 
& Rampton, 1997; Rampton, 1990) have concelealed and 
underestimated such variations. 
As a synchronic system, an issue in modern linguistics has been 
WR NHHS WKH IRUPDO DQDO\VLV RI ODQJXDJH DZD\ IURP µH[WUD-OLQJXLVWLF¶
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considerations but the basic condition that a unit of any linguistic level 
must fulfill in order to achieve linguistic status is meaning (Benveniste, 
1971: 122) inextricably connected with human experience within a 
cultural and historical context that continually reinvents language.  
Synchrony and diachrony cannot separate except at an early 
stage of the analysis. At some point, they need each other to advance 
in their respective approaches but mainstream language theories and 
their related educational practices have emphasised language as an 
atemporal system in ways that have favoured a bias of invariability 
within and between languages.  
Essentialist notions of language and knowledge are the basis of 
a monolingual bias (Zarate, Levy, & Kramsch, 2011) in the study of 
Modern Languages (McBride, 2000; Seago, 2000) though foreign 
languages are supposed to be their primary principle of coherence 
(Evans, 1988, 1990). In this section I discuss reifying concepts of 
language, their related educational practices and their most important 
consequences: knowledge reification and the impact that essentialist 
notions of language and knowledge have in the relative equilibria 
between language-content and pedagogy-research. 
The attribution of substance, namely the transformation of even 
WKH PRVW DEVWUDFW RI FRQFHSWV LQWR µWKLQJV¶ VHHPV WR EH LQKHUHQW WR
language itself, a tendency which is clearer in some languages than in 
RWKHUV,Q+HEUHZIRUH[DPSOHWKHWHUPXVHGIRU³ZRUG´DQGIRU³WKLQJ´
is the same: davar, DQG WKH (QJOLVK HTXLYDOHQW IRU ³VSHDN´ can be 
WUDQVODWHG DV ³HQWKLQJ´ WR PDWHULDOLse (Bleich, 2001). Reification has 
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been a conceptual constraint in mainstream language studies and in 
language educational practices but, once acknowledged and made 
distinctive as objectification (which I discuss in literacy, Chapter 8), it 
can contribute to the construction of desirable futures of individuals and 
communities as well as a different kind of scholarship, one that engages 
the identity formation of the practitioners, meaning those who study, 
teach and research in the discipline.  
4.1.1 Reifying concepts and practices  
We can think of basically two ways of seeing the theory and practice of 
foreign language studies: either as centred in language as a self-
contained entity or in its quality of being foreign for somebody under 
certain circumstances. The first approach, namely the reification of an 
abstract linguistic system and the notions and practices that stem from 
it, has been the basis for the present conceptual and methodological 
profile of Modern Languages in most universities of the USA, the UK 
and countries following their lead: 
In its most commonplace and everyday uses, the term 
µODQJXDJH¶LVERWKDKLVWRULFDODQGDWKHRUHWLFDO,WLVDKLVWRULFDO
in that it presupposes that language is in some sense fixed 
and static [meaning] that it is a singular reality in positivistic 
WHUPV >«@ )URP D VWULFWO\ KLVWRULFDO SHUVSHFWLYH DQ\
language is thus something of a moving target. Codification, 
of course, can and does slow this process down, but it does 
QRWSUHYHQWLW>«@$Q\HIIRUWWRGHPDUFDWHWKHERXQGaries of 
a particular language [only] provides a snapshot of the 
ODQJXDJH DW D SDUWLFXODU WLPH DQG SODFH >«@ /DQJXDJH
varies, as we all know, not only over time, but also from 
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place to place, social class to social class, and individual to 
individual. (Reagan, 2004: 43-44) 
The study of foreign languages stressing the meaning in 
"language" is linked with the social-sciences approach and can be 
traced to the early twentieth century with Ferdinand de Saussure, who 
excludes individual or personal speech events from the science of 
language. Instead, the object of investigation of linguistics was the 
language system, a disembodied abstraction independent of concrete 
and time-bound acts of communication. For de Saussure (1931), the 
object of study of linguistics is the system of the language rather than 
speech. For Chomsky (1965), it is competence rather than 
performance. For both, it is the study of self-contained, ahistorical 
systems. 
Time plays a categorical role in the Saussurean distinction: 
langue (namely, the system of language) is synchronic, which involves 
a panoptic stance: a net where everything holds everything else ± un 
réseau où tout se tient (Bally, 1951: 128). Outside the system of 
language, and consequently outside the science of language and the 
field of linguistics, was parole or speech, which is diachronic. The 
division between language and speech does not imply the dismissal of 
concrete acts of communication as unworthy of study. Instead, by 
making this separation, de Saussure acknowledged the enormous 
complexity of parole which would require a set of historical rules very 
different from the ones in his own approach to langue.   
Linguistic homogeneity was a fiction as Lyons calls it (Lyons, 
1981: 26), but fiction has a broad meaning too frequently ignored, 
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derived from its Latin origin, fingere, meaning to shape, to fashion, to 
mould. Linguistic homogeneity is the hypothetical condition of a model 
of thinking about language as a network of relations where each sign is 
necessary to hold, and is to be held by, all the others. Whereas this 
shaping or moulding of ideas allowed a new era of reflection and 
analysis of far-reaching consequences, it also diverted the attention of 
the community of practitioners away from developing its shadow 
concept, namely a theoretical construct grounded in the concreteness 
of language (Merleau-Ponty, 1962), variability and linguistic change 
(Weinreich, Labov, & Herzog, 1968). Language variability was left on 
the fringes of linguistics until the second half of the 1950s (Orioles, 
2004) and, yet, it remained bound to representations for which 
monolingualism was the default case. From the nineteenth century, the 
idea that monolingualism represents the original condition of individuals 
and peoples was legitimised by the religion and the state (Lüdi, 2004). 
Linguistic homogeneity as a way to see the world becomes a means to 
theorise language itself. 
'H 6DXVVXUH¶V LGHDO PRGHO ODLG WKH IRXQGDWLRQV IRU WKH
hypothetical-deductive approach of modern linguistics whose object of 
investigation was the system rather than the actualisations of language. 
The development of linguistics as a science joined a general process of 
³VFLHQWLILFDWLRQ´8 in psychology and social studies during the twentieth 
century, and it had a powerful influence in the formalisation of the 
Humanities during the same period in what was NQRZQDVWKH³OLQJXLVWLF
                                               
8
 :LWK WKH WHUP³VFLHQWLILFDWLRQ´ , refer not to actual sciences, but to connotations of 
objectivity, prestige and power of anything thought to be associated with science.  
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WXUQ´ (Kramsch & Kramsch, 2000; Kreiswirth, 2000; Stanton, 1994), 
which associated language study with the social, the biological and the 
behavioural sciences. This move highlighted the system at the cost of 
downplaying meaning, but the split between language and content 
(which relied on the notion that meaning is extra-linguistic) insulated 
language study from larger epistemological, ethical and aesthetic 
debates (Kramsch & Kramsch, 2000: 568). 
4.1.2 The native speaker 
In socialising practices, the assumed homogeneity of linguistic systems 
involved highly reductive models of language and its users. Linguistic 
theories, including those prevalent in Second Language Acquisition 
research, have traditionally assumed monolingualism to be the 
unmarked case (Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000: 157) &KRPVN\¶V LGHDO
speaker-listener is a monolingual individual whose intuitions perfectly 
match the expectations of one homogeneous standard community: 
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal 
speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-
community, who knows its language perfectly and is 
unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as 
memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and 
interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his 
knowledge in actual performance.  (Chomsky, 1965: 3) 
Paradoxically, because of these and other restrictions, the notion 
of the native speaker is less reliable precisely where it is most used, 
namely in the theory and practice of learning foreign languages. The 
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native speaker is a construct deeply rooted in notions of ownership and 
linguistic legitimacy of a particular variety of the target language 
VHOHFWHGDVWKHQRUPIRUIRUHLJQHUVQROHVVWKDQIRURWKHU³QDWLYHV´WRR
in places like the UK where diatopic varieties of English are loaded with 
connotations of social prestige or the lack of it (Crowley, 2003; Trudgill, 
1974). 
Actual speakers display regional, occupational, generational, 
class-related, mood-related, gender-related ways of talking. However, 
WKHVHOHFWLRQRIZKRVHDFWXDOLVDWLRQVVWDQGIRU³QDWLYHVSHDNHUKRRG´DV
a model to teach is far from innocent: 
The only speech community traditionally recognized by 
foreign language departments has been the middle-class, 
ethnically dominant male citizenry of nation-states, as Mary-
Louise Pratt argues. The native speaker is in fact an 
imaginary construct ±a canonically literate monolingual 
middle-class member of a largely fictional national 
community whose citizens share a belief in a common 
history and a common destiny. (Kramsch, 1997: 363)  
In foreign language teaching there is a need of selection and 
modelling of speech samples. On the other hand, there is a 
commitment to authenticity. A compromise between both is the 
contextualization of the speaker and the use of corpora-based 
dictionaries alongside the more traditional ones is a step in the 
direction of de-reifying the native speaker and introducing ecologically 
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valid speech models9 with a more distinctive content of critical and 
cultural awareness.  
4.1.3 7RZDUGVµGH-UHLILFDWLRQ¶ 
In order to oppose the reification of language and its speakers, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the relevance of language history, diversity, 
change and experience. The historicity of the speaker in her or his 
speech and the historicity of the writer in her or his writing do not fit in 
the dominant model of linguistics. Historicity involves the way in which 
the experience of speaking or writing transforms the awareness of the 
speaker-writer and this awareness, in turn, shapes the action 
recursively. Action and agent are bound to time, experience and 
awareness, all of which are absent from the focus on the language 
system. 
Roy Harris (1998) made a sustained critique of the disciplinary 
boundaries of linguistics, which he called "segregational" for having 
profoundly misconstructed language by reification. By contrast, the 
outline of the field of integrational linguistics includes emergent 
grammars (N. C. Ellis, 1998; Gasser, 1990; Larsen-Freeman, 1997) 
and non-verbal devices under the umbrella concept of communication. 
For him and other integrationalists, language is a byproduct of 
communication which has an ontological status previous to languages 
and grammars. 
                                               
9
 Corpus linguistics in co-institutional efforts such as the Cambridge and Nottingham 
Corpus of Discourse in English (CANCODE) has contributed to the knowledge of 
spontaneous speech produced in a wide variety of situations and locations.  
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According to integrational lingustics, what makes some form of 
expression "language" is not that it conforms to the rules of a code but 
its function in integrating other human activities. Such integration is 
what makes communication possible, thus the integrationists oppose a 
sharp line separating language from other forms of communication. A 
sign has an integrational function in the particular circumstances where 
it takes place. Harris explicitly links the production of an integrational 
sign with agency and creativity: 
[W]hen voluntarily produced by human agency [the 
integrational sign] production is always a creative act on the 
part of one or more individuals acting in a certain situation. 
(Harris & Wolf, 1998: 2) 
Language reification is a consequence of remaining at the system 
level, which implies ignoring the personal experience of actual 
language users, let alone their creative agency. According to 
integrational linguistics, linguistic and non-linguistic resources coexist in 
language, an aspect I will mention again when I discuss literacy as 
objectification of language in Chapter 8. According to Harris,  
Whatever we recognize as a linguistic sign (by whatever 
criteria seem appropriate to the occasion) is always a non-
linguistic sign as well. The two are never mutually exclusive. 
Human beings do not inhabit a communicational space 
which is compartmentalized into language and non-
language, but an integrated space where all signs are 
interconnected. From an integrational perspective, one of 
the major shortcomings in modern linguistics has been its 
failure to recognize the integrated character of human 
communication and its consequent attempt to place 
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language, as an object of academic research, in a self-
contained category of its own. (Harris & Wolf, 1998: 2)  
Language no less than cultures are better conceptualized as 
collective and individual actions rather than entities. Likewise, identity 
and agency are not  essences but a series of acts and decisions taken 
by someone whose identity is defined through those same actions. 
Identity and agency, thus, are mutually realising and their existence is 
shaped historically along story lines from overlapping narratives.  
Actual persons do things with words, including their own 
subjectivities, and language is action that cannot be explained or 
defined on linguistic basis only, as Austin (1962) had originally 
attempted. From a poststructuralist point of view, the subject is 
produced in discourse (Bourdieu, 1991; Butler, 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 
1992; Pennycook, 2004), a position challenged by Barnett: 
The self constitutes itself through the discourses it 
HQFRXQWHUV >«@ ,I WKH VHOI LV WR EH PRUH WKDQ VLPSO\ D
collection of dominant discourses, if the self is to be a 
person, it has to be itself. The self has to be alive as a self, 
authentically and even passionately. (Barnett, 1997: 34) 
Subjects who perform concrete actions or fail to do so are said to 
reproduce discourse and the issue is not how heteronomous people 
speak, as if heteronomy or autonomy preexisted as a given category, 
but rather how to achieve agency and autonomy through, inter alia, 
speech acts. Sociolinguistics and postmodernism have symmetrical 
views in this respect: whereas sociolinguistics assumes that people talk 
the way they do because of who they are, the postmodernists suggest 
that people are who they are because of (among other things) the way 
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they talk (Cameron, 1997: 49). But setting aside the difficulty of who 
determines (and on what authority) who somebody is, the most 
important problem is to find out how people can re-design what they 
are becoming.  
However, the knowledge of being is generally emphasised at the 
expense of the practice of becoming. Between knowledge understood 
as what is, and opinion understood as what should be, there is a hiatus 
that leaves in the dark the evaluative root of descriptions, the self-
fulfilling actualising power of beliefs and opinions, and the shifts of 
transformation from one into the other. Moreover, those 
transformations are not natural events which simply occur as the cycle 
of water but they are made by human actions, mainly (though not only) 
performed with words. How to enlarge the extent to which identities 
reflectively re-write their ongoing performances is, I argue, a 
fundamental mission of language education.  
4.1.4 Linguistics and foreignness 
Reflection on foreign language learning reveals conceptual problems 
caused by language reification. Let us assume that every speech is 
ruled by a definite language. How do we locate the system that rules 
the speech of a second or foreign language learner? Selinker (1972) 
attempted to resolve this theoretical and empirical problem with the 
notion of interlanguage, which is an independent system of its own 
though related with a target and the first language. 
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,QWHUODQJXDJH RU PRUH JHQHUDOO\ WKH µLQGHSHQGHQW JUDPPDUV
DVVXPSWLRQ¶ (V. J. Cook, 1993) became the object of study in the 
theory of Second Language Acquisition in the 1960s, influenced by first 
language acqusition researchers who recognised the child as a 
speaker of a language of his or her own rather than as a defective 
speaker of adult language. According to Cook (1993), the independent 
grammars assumption was adapted to Second Language Acquisition 
by several people at roughly the same period under different terms, 
such as 'transitional idiosyncratic dialect' (Corder, 1971), 'approximative 
system' (Nemser, 1971), and 'interlanguage' (Selinker, 1972). It 
EHFDPH FOHDU WKDW RQO\ E\ WUHDWLQJ ODQJXDJH OHDUQHUV¶ ODQJXDJH DV D
phenomenon to be studied in its own right rather than as defective 
versions of the native speaker, was it possible to understand the 
acquisition of second languages. 
Selinker claimed that learners construct a series of 
interlanguages, namely mental grammars that are drawn upon in 
producing and comprehending sentences in the target language. He 
also claimed that learners revise these grammars in systematic and 
predictable ways as they pass along an interlanguage continuum, which 
involves both re-creation and re-structuring. Interlanguage is 
characterised by unique rules not to be found in either the mother 
tongue of the learner, or in the target language; such rules are created 
and made increasingly complex by the learners (R. Ellis, 1994b).  
The concept of interlanguage suggests that those speaking non-
interlinguistic forms do not follow their own rules and its ambivalence as 
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either an intermediate system related to the mother tongue as well as to 
the target language or as a state in its own right derives from reified 
representations that make language appear as a fixed system. 
However, not only language learners construct rules of their own, but 
native speakers do so as well because languages of culture are not 
homogeneous. According to Mario Wandruszka: 
Ce que nous définissons donc par «langue italienne» ou 
«langue allemande», langues de culture en somme, sont 
en réalité des formations complexes et multiformes, de 
véritables conglomérats de constantes et de variantes, des 
polysystèmes socioculturellement stratifiés. (Wandruszka, 
1998: 155) [Cited by Orioles, 2004] 
Languages conceived of as complex formations and the rules of 
thumb devised by native and non native speakers explain the vast 
differences in performance between and within language learners and 
monROLQJXDO VSHDNHUV ,V 1DERNRY¶V English an interlanguage?10 Are 
not interlanguages the restricted verbal loops used by most 
monolingual speakers? Why and how do interlanguages stop 
unfolding?  
As an attempt to move out of the dilemmas created by the 
concept of interlanguage, I suggest using the heuristic notion of 
generativity in combination with the concept of emergent grammars. 
According to Hopper (1988), the apparent grammatical structure is an 
emergent property shaped by discourse in an ongoing process. 
                                               
10
 I am using Nabokov as an example of a highly accomplished language learner 
since, by definition, a learner is not a native speaker and a native speaker is someone 
ZKRGLGQRW³OHDUQ´EXW³DFTXLUHG´KHURUKLVODQJXDJHDVDPRWKHUWRQJXH(Krashen, 
1984). 
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Grammar for him is simply the name for certain categories of observed 
repetitions in discourse, not a natural fixed structure of language but 
the sedimentation of frequently used forms into temporary pseudo-
systems.  
The concept of emergent grammars was helpful in acknowledging 
reified notions that make language appear as a self-contained object, 
independent of the subjects who use it, in a positivist epistemological 
stance that attempts to keep at bay any subject-dependent element. 
+RZHYHU ZKLOH ³VHGLPHQWDWLRQ´ HYRNHV D QDWXUDO SKHQRPHQRQ
generativity requires heuristic agency. The emergent grammars 
constructed by different speakers vary in generativity, which we define 
as the heuristic condition of self-directed discovery and recombination 
of meaning-forms. In this more general way, the relative differences 
between speakers derive from diverse degrees of generativity, a topic I 
discuss in Chapter 5.  
Chomsky (1982) has argued that the social phenomenon of 
language is different from the knowledge stored in an individual mind, 
which is grammar. According to him, pseudo-entities like Spanish, 
English or any other language are epiphenomena or derived notions: 
³WKHJUDPPDU LQDSHUVRQ¶VPLQGEUDLQ LV UHDO >ZKHUHDV@ WKH ODQJXDJH
ZKDWHYHUWKDWPD\EHLVQRW´ (Chomsky, 1982: 5). Then any claim of 
existence for a set of shared linguistic rules is grounded on unique 
though to a certain point mutually intelligible grammars ±shaped by 
generic textual practices (Tomasello, 2003).  
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Whereas beliefs in the unity and cleanliness of the national 
language (as prescribed by the motto of the Spanish Royal Academy, 
³/LPSLD ILMD \ GD HVSOHQGRU´) underlie linguistic policies upholding 
monolingual practices, awareness of linguistic, ethnic and heteroglossic 
diversity helps the language and culture learner to take a critical stance 
against ethnocentrism. The foreignness of a language highlights 
heterogeneity and translation as an interpretive way to understand one 
FXOWXUHLQDQRWKHUFXOWXUH¶V WHUPV7KLV WUDQVODWLRQDOPRYHRIVHHLQJ$
as B is not necessarily unidirectional, meaning that the strange and the 
foreign can be influential in understanding what had remained 
unexamined in the more familiar medium but while ethnocentrism can 
see B (the Other) in terms of A (the Ours), it fails to translate A in terms 
of B. 
Ethnocentrism was strongly encouraged by the identification 
between language and nation (Wright, 2000). Even within the same 
country, the so-called linguistic minorities (minor in power but not 
necessarily in number) were forced to adopt the official language in 
order to strengthen national identity, and politically dissonant voices 
were gagged or ignored. Linguistic, ethnic and heteroglossic diversity 
was a potential threat for the monolithic self-representations of modern 
states. The monolingual bias, therefore, was more than the product of 
reified concepts of language: it was an instrument of reification of 
peoples.  
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4.2 Language from a third place 
We need flexible models for which plurilingualism and multilingualism, 
rather than monolingualism, are the default case and which can guide 
our reflection in ways that facilitate looking for and discerning inter- and 
intra-lingual variations, rather than merely coming across them by 
chance. Plurilingual concepts and practices require a pluriculturalist 
stance to sustain them, and even the study of the local linguistic variety 
can benefit from a plurilingual and pluricultural approach that situates it 
in the cultural diversity and historical relativity that exist within a culture 
(Zarate et al., 2011: 414).  
4.2.1 Plurilingualism and bilingualism 
The study of bilingualism is an antecedent of the plurilingualist 
breakthrough to overcome essentialist notions of the monolingual bias. 
There is not yet a general agreement among the specialists about the 
exact definition of bilingualism (Bialystok, 2001a; Diebold & Hymes, 
1961; Kinginger, 2004) but for the most traditional view, bilingualism 
can only be the result of two languages acquired in childhood and/or a 
perfectly balanced command of two languages, which is a definition 
that makes of bilingualism a condition of being rather than a way of 
becoming. Most others define a bilingual person as someone who 
functions in two languages even if with different degrees of ease, which 
opens the possibility of investigating the conditions of acquisition and 
use of the different languages in order to explain their different kinds of 
equilibrium, and how learners reach them. 
 109 
The realisation that bilingual competence is not the addition of two 
monolingual competences (V. J. Cook, 1993; Lüdi, 2004), and that 
monolingual competence is modified when a second language is 
acquired (V. J. Cook, 2003) provided the stimulus for reflection about a 
more general frame of languages in society and in the mind than what 
was available via the concept of monolingualism. As with languages, an 
additive view of mono-FXOWXUHV LV IODZHG ³EHFRPLQJ LQWHUFXOWXUDO
LQYROYHVDFKDQJHLQRQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHFXOWXUHVLQWRZKLFKRQH
has been socialised >«@ WKHUH LV VRPH FKDQJH LQ FXOWXUDO LGHQWLW\´
(Byram, 2003: 50). Becoming intercultural and aware of the plurilingual 
common matrix between and within languages involves taking the 
perspective of a mediator. $V %\UDP QRWHV WKH EHVW PHGLDWRUV ³DUH
those who have an understanding of the relationship between their own 
language and language varieties and their own culture and cultures of 
GLIIHUHQWVRFLDOJURXSVLQWKHLUVRFLHW\´(Byram, 2003: 61). 
The educational aim in the study of languages is interculturality, 
rather than the addition of two or more cultures (Byram, 2003). 
Interculturality involves a liminal stance apposite to appreciate and 
explore differences rather than being quick to assimilate them into the 
familiar. It entails observational and experiential knowledge of being an 
REVHUYHU RI RQH¶V RZQ H[SHULHQFH DQG WR H[SHULHQFH WKH GHWDFKHG
position of an observer assumed by, for example, an ethnographer (M. 
Agar, 1994; M. H. Agar, 1996). Mediating cultures (Alred, Byram, & 
Fleming, 2003) keeps a flexible bond between knowledge and the 
perspective from which knowledge is constructed. 
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4.2.2 Multilingualism and Plurilingualism 
The idea that multilingualism (a term to describe societies or 
communities where different languages coexist) and plurilingualism 
(the fact that individuals can use more than one language) actually 
constitute the default case of human language faculty has been 
proposed to be the basis for any account of human language (Mauro, 
1977; Wandruszka, 1998)11. The plurilingual/multilingual perspective of 
language involves the system, the diachronic factors, and the 
perceptions of the speakers. 
According to Lüdi (2004), for a theory of language to be valid, it 
has to ³DFNnowledge the ways in which a plurilingual speaker/hearer 
H[SORLWV >«@ KLV RU KHU OLQJXLVWLF UHVRXUFHV IRU VRFLDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW
LQWHUDFWLRQV LQ GLIIHUHQW IRUPV RI PRQROLQJXDO DQG SOXULOLQJXDO VSHHFK´
(Lüdi, 2004: 125). However, the definition of a linguistic source is 
increasingly difficult now that it is shown to be inadequate to exclude 
what does not belong to the language system in the Saussurean 
sense, like verbal playfulness (G. Cook, 2000) and the opacity of 
language as an expressive medium (Kinginger, 2004), which is a 
UHDVRQ WR SUHIHU WKH QRWLRQ RI ³FRPPXQLFDWLYH UHVRXUFHV´ RU HYHQ
³H[SUHVVLYHUHVRXUFHV´(Coseriu, 1958) instead RI³OLQJXLVWLFUHVRXUFHV´ 
Language from a third place (as I am calling the plurillingual and 
multilingual perspective) implies an inter- and intra-lingual variation 
that, nevertheless, unifies the previous representation of languages as 
a collection of disconnected essentialized entities. Multilingualism and 
plurilingualism are conceptual tools that include individual and social 
                                               
11
 Cited by Orioles (2004). 
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exchange through different strata of semiosis between and within 
languages, and the subjective experience of otherness or foreignness. 
4.2.3 Multilingualism and plurilingualism in ML disciplinary scope 
Multilingualism, as a social phenomenon, can be studied either from 
the perspective of the observer (a sociolinguistic survey, for example) 
or from the perspective of the participant (for example, ethnographic 
action research). A multilingual approach to foreignness investigates 
socially-mediated norms of language diversity such as linguistic 
policies where different languages coexist and compete for foci of 
power and self-determination, which raises issues of linguistic diversity 
and its social implications such as language rights.  
Plurilingualism, on the other hand, is centred in the individual who 
gates in and out different languages and strata of semiosis between 
and within languages. It is a view of individually generated language 
which can be studied, on the one hand, from the perspective of the 
observer in the scientific research of how different linguistic codes are 
neurologically processed and how within the same mind an individual 
manages to switch from one code to the other and how he or she 
inhibits the distractors from one language in order to use the other (V. 
J. Cook, 2003; Fabbro, 2001). On the other hand, plurilingualism can 
be studied from the perspective of the participant, as reflective practice. 
Interestingly for Modern Languages within the Arts and Humanities 
disciplinary orientation, a plurilingual study from a participant's point of 
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view involves topics such as intercultural awareness raising and the 
construction of a voice and an identity in a different language. 
It is necessary to have a theory of language for which 
multilingualism and plurilingualism are the default case, a theory 
capable of encompassing any form of language learning at some level 
of abstraction that asserts a flexible non-terminating multicompetence 
(V. J. Cook, 1991, 1992, 1999, 2003) as opposed to the steady final 
state of native competence at which children almost always arrive in 
their first language through highly predictable stages. This way of 
conceiving of language, unbiased by monolingualism, makes of open-
ended performance its arena of knowledge formation, and accounts for 
the subjective changes experienced by the learner when shifting 
languages. From this theoretical approach, external sources of 
language variation (what to see) are not separated from internal ways of 
handling them (how to see) and the internal ways of handling variation 
constitute the basis of re-creation of the language (generativeness) 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 113 
Chapter 5 Language Learning and Generativeness 
5.0 Some definitions 
We define generativity, or generativeness, as the heuristic condition of 
self-directed discovery and recombination of meaning-forms. Learning 
to discern contextual variation is fundamental to discover patterns of 
variation that may coincide or not with those shared by the community, 
but further adjustments are possible by supplementary learning.  
Deep language learning implies generating rather than 
reproducing pre-given combinations and applications verbatim. 
*HQHUDWLYHQHVV GHSHQGV RQ WKH OHDUQHU¶V HYROYLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI
invariable and variable elements of the target language and their 
relationshiS $ OHDUQHU¶V JHQHUDWLYHQHVV LV QRW HQRXJK WR DWWDLQ WKH
standard norm, but it is essential for self-direction and self-
transformation into a more articulate and agentive language user.  
Having generativeness as a yardstick uncovers unrevised 
assumptions, two of the commonest are that language is more basic 
than content and that reception precedes production. However, 
language mediates and generates knowledge, which is evident if we 
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consider the disciplines as sophisticated kinds of literacy that produce 
documents and document-related social practices.  
Regarding the second unexamined belief, ³ZULWLQJ´XQGHUVWRRGDV
UHDFKLQJRXWIRUVHQVHSUHFHGHV³UHDGLQJ´DVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ,Q order to 
understand what we read and hear we need to generate schemas and 
connections, different levels of attention, retrospections and 
anticipations. When we read, we write covertly and when we listen we 
speak vicariously. Better listeners and readers generate more diverse, 
rich and complex top-bottom and bottom-up interpretations. 
People construct socially-mediated conditions of intelligibility to 
move beyond novelties to assimilate them. According to John Dewey 
(1934), we need to project in order to assimilate and even reception 
requires some form of projection (Kant, [1781]1998; Winnicott, [1971] 
2002). In Piaget¶V ZRUGV (1974), ³WR XQGHUVWDQG LV WR LQYHQW´ 6XFK D
principle has also been noticed in the acquisition of languages 
regarding the simultaneous processes of item learning for production 
and system learning for comprehension (Ringbom, 2006c).  
In the relatively new field of threshold concepts (Cousin, 2006a, 
2007, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Knights, 2007; Ference Marton, 2009; 
Meyer & Land, 2003, 2006; Meyer et al., 2010b), progression in the 
understanding of the disciplines can be considered as akin to crossing 
portals that open up new and previously inaccessible ways of thinking 
about the subject matter. According to Davies and Mangan (2010), a 
basic concept within a discipline can only be attained once a learner is 
able to use a superordinate threshold concept to organise their 
 115 
conceptual structure. , DUJXH WKDW OHDUQHUV GR QRW PHUHO\ ³XVH´ D
superordinate concept in order to uderstand, but generate it. 
Generativity makes understanding possible. In order to 
understand something new, we need to generate a ground onto which 
we can construct a set of possibilities that include not only the new item, 
but also the kind of items where that one can exist. Understanding 
operates by generating broader and more inclusive categories, as well 
as finer and more diversified subdivisions. In order to understand an 
item (for example, a system, a rule or a phenomenon), we generate 
patterns of consistency (semiotic simplification) where that item can fit 
in a more comprehensive genre, defined by Feldman (1994).as a 
mental model. Complementarily, we generate patterns of diversification 
for finer and more concrete details (semiotic stratification).  In both 
directions, consistency and diversification, we use resources in the 
whole range of experience. Thus, in order to make language intelligible 
we need to look at ways of knowing which are not exclusively linguistic, 
but more general as well as more concrete than the linguistic system.  
5.1 Self-induced variability 
Increasingly subtle dimensions of variation can be learned by reflection 
and experimentation on form and content as perceived both from the 
OHDUQHUV¶ PRUH IDPLOLDU ODQJXDJH DQG FXOWXUH DQG from developing 
target-language-UHIHUUHG FRQVWUXFWLRQV 9HUEDO H[SUHVVLRQ µIRUP¶ DQG
LGHDV FRQWHQW¶ DUH VHSDUDEOH WR D FHUWDLQ H[WHQW ZKLFK DOORZV IRU
further segmentation in the content/form of the content and the 
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content/form of the form, a terminology inspired by glossematics 
(Hjelmslev, 1961).  
The content of the content and the form of the form constitute, 
respectively, broad conceptual categories and wide-ranging formal 
structures of language universals, hypothesized as properties holding of 
all languages. According to Croft (2010), such universals can be found 
as patterns of variation instead of structures or concepts as such: 
³SDWWHUQVRIYDULDWLRQ reflect universal properties that we might call the 
QDWXUHRIODQJXDJH´(Croft, 2010b: 3). 
The distinction between content of the form and form of the 
content is bound to a Figure-Background relationship as perceived (and 
imposed) by the subject and his or her cultural community and context. 
Being subjective, however, does not invalidate it since the patterning of 
knowledge to generate new enquiries and hence new knowledge 
depends on an  intrinsic feature of human cognitive life (Sebeok & 
Danesi, 2000) that makes models (forms) to encode knowledge 
(content). Narrative, for example, is a metacode that patterns cultural 
NQRZOHGJHDQGKXPDQH[SHULHQFHRQWKHEDVLVRIZKLFK³WUDQVFXOWXUDO
messages about the nature of a shared reality can be trDQVPLWWHG´
(White, 1987: 2). Narrative is a language construction (a form of 
content) and content (human experience) in search for a form to make 
meaning.  
The content of the form and the form of the content are ways to 
discover, or even to induce, variation. By realising that a specific 
PHVVDJH µDVNV IRU¶ D FHUWDLQ IRUP WKDW HPEHGV LW (McLuhan, 2001 
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[1964]), and that conceptual or discursive formations always come with 
certain background (historical, institutional, and ideological, as well as 
theoretical) the learner develops a finer analysis and more control. In 
%LDO\VWRN¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ analysis accounts for language representation 
whereas control refers to selective attention (Bialystok, 1999, 2001b).  
5.2 Analog and digital forms of symbolization 
Languages can be studied as a network of symbols situated in social 
and intrapersonal exchange. A symbol is something that stands for 
something else, and the way in which one µreads¶ the symbol is Nelson 
*RRGPDQ¶V (1976) matter of discussion.   
Symbols, according to Goodman, can be read and/or produced in 
either one of two ways: digitally or analogically. Digital symbols are 
articulated by discrete, finite units. For example, the Spanish phoneme 
/a/ digitally represents the leWWHU PRUSKHPH ³D´ %HWZHHQ the letters 
³D´DQG ³H´ there are not gradual intermediate options. In reading, we 
disregard idiosyncratic differences of handwriting, font, size or spacing. 
:H DUH DEOH WR UHFRJQLVH WKH OHWWHU ³D´ XQOHVV WKH VDPH FKDUDFWHU is 
being used for /a/ and /d/.  
Similarly, we will disregard regional and individual variations in 
pronunciation, so we will ³KHDU´ /a/ if the context confirms our 
expectations even if the speaker actually says [o]. We recognise digital 
symbols rather than perceive the actually uttered sounds or scribbled 
signs. Analog symbols, by contrast, are not discrete or finite: they are 
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dense in the sense that they admit an indeterminate number of 
possibilities in their actualisations DQG³UHDGLQJV´.  
Analog and digital describe ways of symbolic reading that can be 
applicable both to analog and digital symbols because ³DOO V\PEROV
EHORQJ WR PDQ\ GLJLWDO DQG DQDORJXH VFKHPHV´ (Goodman & Elgin, 
1988: 30). The shift of ways of using them either digitally or analogically 
varies across and along the timeline, examples of which are the analog 
effects of digital properties12 DQG WKH SURFHVV RI PHWDSKRULF ³GHDWK´
when metaphors become clichés and then are used and perceived 
digitally as idioms. 
Critics know all too well that understanding a symbol is not an all-
or-nothing affair and that it has not a single, uniquely correct 
interpretation, but there is a strong tendency to assume digital 
PHDQLQJV LQ V\PEROV WKDW DUH FUXFLDO WR VXSSRUW RQH¶V RZQ
interpretation. In order to develop any form of comprehension we need 
to shift between both forms of symbolization, analog and digital, in a 
relation comparable to that between metaphor and definition, and 
between literality and literariness. At some point, in order to sharpen 
the ideas and shape an argument, we have to decide what symbols to 
read analogically and which ones to read digitally. Somebody else, in 
their own time, may take over and continue shifting readings and thus, 
revise previous interpretations.  
                                               
12
 Digital properties can be transformed into analog effects with a FKDQJHLQ³WRQH´(a 
paralinguistic feature) and by lexical choice)RULQVWDQFH³FOHYHU´LVGLJLWDOO\RSSRVHG
WR³GXPE´LQWKH86$EXWDQDORJLFDOO\DVVRFLDWHGWR³DVWXWH´LQFHUWDLQFRQWH[WVZLWKD
likely pejorative intention.  
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Nelson Goodman introduced the concept of repleteness to 
describe the function of what he called non-notational or analog 
symbols. In a natural language, particularly when it is foreign, the 
symbols appear as replete at the beginning when the distinctive 
features that mark a change in meaning are not yet clear for the 
learner: the production and recognition of sounds are difficult as the 
learner struggles to identify the same referents13 in different 
actualisations of dialects, idiolects or pronunciations with other foreign 
accents.  
Later on, symbols tend to reach a plateau of literality, in a 
phenomenon similar to what happens to the metaphoric competence of 
children in their first language. According to Silverman, Winner and 
Gardner (1976),  children in middle childhood (7 to 10 years of age) are 
blind (or deaf) to non-literal facets of symbolic reference. For them, a 
picture is no more than a record of the objective world and metaphors 
are not perceived as such, but in their literal meaning. The pre-
adolescent seems to resist crossing sensory categories in language. 
The 'literalness' of the school age child provides an insistent question: 
can the child's perspective be broadened, so that he or she can 
appreciate these figurative and stylistic nuances? (Gardner & Winner, 
1979; Silverman et al., 1976) In a similar way, most adult foreign 
language learners remain indefinitely in a plateau of digital 
                                               
13
 µ5HIHUHQFH¶ GRHV QRW PHDQ RQO\ GHQRWDWLRQ EXW LW LQFOXGHV H[HPSOification, 
expression and allusion (Goodman & Elgin, 1988: 135) 
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symbolization14 unless they do a deliberate self-generating process to 
increase their analogic competence.   
When learning a foreign language, the words or their referents, or 
both, are new15 and the novelty of representations is hence twofold in a 
foreign language. But our competence to understand new words or 
their referents does not depend only on the position and function of the 
word, utterance, etc. in the sentence or text, or in the meaning found in 
the dictionary (Goodman & Elgin, 1988: 119). Besides, and sometimes 
in spite of the dictionary, there is the meaning in context of use, but 
even that is not enough to understand novel representations: there 
QHHGV WR EH D PHDQLQJ IRU ³PH´ ZKHQ WKH OHDUQHU JHQHUDWHV D PRUH
encompassing form in order to assimilate a novel representation. This 
³PHDQLQJIRUPH´DVDQH[SHULHQWLDOJURXQGWRDVVLPLODWHDODQJXDJHLV
actualised by means of generators, which I explain below.  
5.3 0HDQLQJV³IRUPH´ 
Before introducing the antecedents and definition of the concept of 
generators, it is necessary to highlight the importance of finding a 
KHXULVWLFVRIPHDQLQJV³IRUPH´ZKLFKDUHFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKHSHUVRQDO
experience of the learner, that is to say, anybody intellectually active. 
                                               
14
 This is from my own observations as a HE EFL teacher of over 25 years. 
15
 ,Q *RRGPDQ¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ µZRUG¶ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LV a character, which is an 
equivalence class of inscriptions, utterances, or marks which are interchangeable with 
RQH DQRWKHU µ5HIHUHQW¶ LQ KLV WHUPLQRORJ\ LV D compliant which is an equivalence 
class of objects or ideas whose members are denoted, expressed or alluded to by 
some character. A compliant is what we are intended to understand when we 
encounter the character. A language is a set of characters and their associated 
compliance classes (Lee, 1998). 
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0HDQLQJV³IRUPH´LQYROYHWKHDVVLmilation of kernel metaphors of 
an art or a discipline to the point of creating with them. Creation, of 
course, is often re-discovery and re-creation. However, the experience 
RIFRQVWUXFWLQJPHDQLQJV³IRUPH´LVDEUHDNWKURXJKQRWRQO\LQWHUPV
of understanding something, but also in terms of self-perception, since 
part of the story that an individual keeps going during her or his lifetime, 
is a narrative of learning and of oneself as a learner. 
0HDQLQJV ³IRU PH´ DUH QRW WR EH XQGHUVWRRG DV VROLSVLVP RU
radical relativism since the socially constructed criteria of validity 
mediate personal reconstructions. Even with a minimum of digital 
information in terms of facts or procedures, it is possible to use 
symbols analogically to find, create, invent, etc. new syntheses. 
0HDQLQJV ³IRU PH´ KRZHYHU FDQ EH GLVFRYHUHG RU LQYHQWHG EXW QRW
taught:  
Learners cannot make use of metaphors that they are 
taught. There are cases where metaphors are available but 
QRW UHFRJQL]HG DV VXFK RU QRW DSSOLHG >«@. It remains 
unclear what motivates a learner to use a metaphor, or even 
consider the possibility that one might be relevant to 
understanding. (Carroll & Mack, 1985: 50) 
This phenomenon constitutes a fundamental reason that makes of 
learner autonomy a different path to achieve distinctive cognitive and 
experiential results, rather than a cheap alternative to get to tKHµVDPH¶
GHVWLQDWLRQ IROORZLQJ %HQVRQ¶V GLVFXVVLRQ (Benson, 2001) of the 
political motives behind the promotion of autonomy in increasingly 
crowded classrooms rather than investing more in education. 
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Deep learning and the creation of new syntheses using kernel 
metaphors of an art or discipline do not necessarily occur late in life, or 
RQFH WKH SHUVRQ LV VXSSRVHGO\ ³IXOO\´ LQIRUPHG LQ WHUPV RI \HDUV RI
education. Whereas information is certainly important, some basic 
beliefs underlying the rhetorics of information can deplete its 
connection with personal experience, such as assuming that 
knowledge is only object-bound and thus impersonal, which is 
translated into rhetorical practices regarding, for example, the use of 
personal pronouns (particularly, the avoidance of first person singular), 
the nominalization of verbs to convey abstraction rather than action, 
and the preference for the passive voice in academic writing, as 
discussed by ,YDQLþ,YDQLþ,YDQLþ	6LPSVRQ and Crème 
(Crème, 2000; Crème & Hunt, 2002; Crème & Lea, 2003).  
The long-term results of learner autonomy, which are both a 
condition and a result of meanings connected with personal 
experience, are epistemological and social. They are epistemological to 
the extent that they can have a positive impact on the construction of 
knowledge, and they are social for contributing to counterbalance the 
effects of anomie and alienation.  
5.4 Generators 
Generators are hypothetical aids to explain the role of invention in the 
learning of a language. They are dynamic clues of perception that 
unfold in the interaction between an agent and the object of his or her 
attention. Generators lead into verbal articulation in composition and 
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interpretation, as when trying to focus a sensed feeling (Gendlin, 1978) 
so as not to reduce it prematurely to formulaic language. Since their 
use and meaning depend on the concrete conditions of the person who 
is using them, they are situated heuristic guides that shape meaning 
and self-direction; hence they are tools of agency, self-control and 
change.  
Heuristics involves invention and recombination and the use of 
generators is heuristic, which implies that the guidance is not ready-
made and waiting to be found, but is worked out by the subject who, 
thus, is an agent in the mediation between the world and her or his own 
experience of it+HXULVWLFDOO\ILQGLQJRQH¶VZD\LQWRDQGWKURXJKDQHZ
language involves figuring out generators rather than rules. Rules 
simply state known procedures to get to already known or predictable 
products, whereas generators are like themes of improvisation: they 
loosely guide performances that may vastly differ both in quality and 
quantity. 
The heuristic value of generators as opposed to rules can be 
illustrated by comparing the ways to make sense of a non-figurative 
painting and a simple sentence written on a blackboard for the sake of, 
say, a Russian grammar lesson. There are rules of approximate 
spelling and pronunciation equivalence between the Cyrillic and the 
Latin alphabets; once known, learners should not have any problem to 
read the sentence aloud. Once the vocabulary is provided and the 
grammatical point is explained, the learners can make some simple 
replacements to practise the pattern and the mechanics of the 
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pronunciation and transcription in either or both of the alphabets. So 
far, all they have applied are rules and the hope is that they will apply 
them again in similar lessons. 
On the other hand, a non-figurative painting cannot be segmented 
in notational bits that could have equivalences of any kind. All and 
every single aspect of the canvas, even the choice of the frame and the 
background both in the picture and the gallery involve a potential 
change of effect, if not of meaning altogether (for example, the change 
from tragic to satiric). The symbolic space is replete with potential 
meaning and, in order to make sense of it, the viewer needs to 
VXVSHQG OLWHUDO FRPSDULVRQV ³LW ORRNV OLNH D GRJ´ DQG OHDUQ WR VHH
metaphorically, synesthetically, generatively. 
Now let us go back to the Russian language and imagine a 
foreigner who went for a short visit to the small island of Kizhi, in the 
northern half of Lake Onega. He misses the only boat back to 
Petrozavodsk, the nearest port on the mainland, and knows he can be 
fined for staying illegally overnight on the island, so he tries to figure 
RXWKRZQRWWREHQRWLFHGE\WKH³ZURQJ´SHRSOHDQGDWWKHVDPHWLPH
KRZ WR PDNH WKH PRVW RI KLV WLPH ZLWK WKH ³ULJKW´ SHRSOH He is not 
fluent in any language in common with the locals but he knows a bit of 
the Cyrillic alphabet and very basic Russian, so he needs to put 
together as much and as quickly as possible to seize an opportunity to 
remember. This scenario is also replete with meanings in the 
connections and recombinations of objects, people, language, actions, 
hints, intentions. There are no rules, and yet there can be mistakes. 
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Whereas rules are ways of representation a priori, generators are 
heuristic guidances that work not after or before the fact, but in 
conjunction with it. 
Language in context is as replete with meanings as non-notational 
symbolic systems, as exemplified by non-figurative or abstract art. The 
circumstance that most languages nowadays have some form of 
writing does not detract from the possibility that even the notation itself 
can be appreciated as non-notational, for example, traditional 
caligraphy in Arabic or Chinese, which is a form of graphic art. 
Making sense of non-notational symbolic systems is a highly 
complex, fast and whole, not in one-step-at a time process. It is a 
phenomenon of apprehension in the Kantian sense of being whole and 
immediate and it takes place mainly at a subconscious level though it is 
connected with conscious thinking in order to refine, expand and 
recreate it (Ehrenzweig, 1967). Learning is a necessity in order to 
master an art, but either there is more than learning in that mastering, 
or there is more to learning than normally acknowledged. The intriguing 
question is to what extent this difference is relevant for the learning of 
languages, which can be viewed both as notational and as non-
notational symbolic systems.  
Between the mid 80s and the late 90s, the difference between 
language learning and language acquisition was considered as 
fundamental (Krashen, 1982, 1984; Krashen & Terrell, 1983). 
According to this dichotomy, the mother language is acquired mainly 
through unconscious mechanisms intimately interwoven with the 
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cognitive development of the individual. On the other hand, learning a 
language was thought as limited to a conscious, strategic, and more 
often than not, imperfect process in comparison with the performance 
of those who acquired it rather than learned it.  Such a distinction was 
criticised (Gregg, 1984) by questioning the extent to which these two 
types of cognitive processes were mutually exclusive or, rather, they 
coexist and interact through life.  
The interaction of unconscious and conscious heuristic ways of 
acquisition available to foreign language learners is an open field of 
investigation. Since it can make strange detours and recombinations, 
heuristics does not fit easily within a rationalist version of cognition. In 
the late 70s, however, an influential collection of essays on the role of 
aesthetic perception in scientific thinking (Wechsler, 1978) showed the 
DHVWKHWLF URRWV LQ WKH FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQ RI WKHLU DXWKRUV¶ WKHRULHV DQG
models, as well as the post facto role of rational cognition within a 
broader and more sensorially oriented scope. Apparently, sensorial 
awareness, fantasy, imagination and feelings not only coexist with 
rational cognition, but they guide it heuristically. The objectification of 
language to reflect on its use, refine it and expand it is my definition of 
literacy, but the possibility of making of feelings and sensorial images 
heuristic aids to language objectification pushes aside preconceived 
ZD\V RI VHHLQJ WKH ³OLWHUDO´ PRGHV RI DFFHVV WKDW IRUHLJQ ODQJXDJH
learners use into a new language. 
Heuristic development directs attention to the genesis of the 
products of improvisations, and the appropriation of these products as 
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heuristics for the next stage of activity (Anandavardhana, 1974; Hogan, 
1996; Holland et al., 1998: 40). Improvisation involves the 
apprehension of generators to produce new entities and to transform 
subjectivities. Generators are not objects to be found but perceptual-
cognitive tools to be devised, hence their actualising role in the agency 
of the person. 
 In a foreign no less than in the first language, "the word is half 
someone else's, and becomes one's own only when the speaker 
populates it with his own semantic and expressive intention" (Bakhtin, 
1981: 293). How does one appropriate others' words for language 
learning?  Not merely by descriptions of the language interspersed with 
illustrations of those same descriptions, which has been the traditional 
dynamics in foreign language pedagogy. I am suggesting that such 
appropriation is possible by devising generators and by adopting 
generative stances like reading as a writer and listening as a speaker in 
which the foreign language learners construct not only a language but 
also an agentive voice, which situates them in relation with other 
speakers, native or not, of the target language.  
Generators represent an attempt to describe verbal 
generativeness as a set of descriptive categories that have two axes: 
one of consistency (semiotic simplification), and another of 
diversification (semiotic stratification).  
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5.4.1 Generators of consistency 
Understanding entails the generation of two kinds of patterns, as I have 
just mentioned: consistency and diversity, which enfold the item within 
a supraordinate concept, and open its specific actualisations in an 
array of variations. Consistency is led by a form of symbolization 
(digital or analog) and a set of dimensions of variation brought to the 
awareness of the individual: 
A certain way of experiencing something can [...] be 
understood in terms of the dimensions of variation that are 
discerned and are simultaneously focal in awareness, and 
in terms of the relationships between the different 
dimensions of variation. As the different ways of 
experiencing something are different ways of experiencing 
the same thing, the variation in ways of experiencing it can 
be described in terms of a set of dimensions of variation 
(Ference Marton & Booth, 1997: 108)  
Finer and more concrete details (semiotic stratification) in 
language include distinguishing changes of meaning conveyed by 
segmentation and substitution at increasingly complex and inclusive 
levels of linguistic analysis (Benveniste, 1971). More comprehensive 
and yet more concrete than linguistic categories, however, is what the 
speaker-writer wants to do in context. A single holophrase uttered by a 
EDE\ RU VRPHRQH¶V VLOHQFH WKDW ³VSHDNV YROXPHV´ RU WKH VWXGLRXV
inflections of the voice and the lexical choice in the specious speech of 
a politician meant to function as a screen of avoidance are instances of 
actions with language, with the commission or omission of words. 
Finally, more inclusive and complex, and yet even more concrete than 
the two previous categories, is poiesis ±WKH JHQHUDWLRQ RI ³ZRUOGV´
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where those linguistic and pragmatic meanings are, for instance, 
possible or necessary or desirable. Its higher degree of generality 
should be obvious, but its concreteness deserves further explanation: 
the corporality of speech and the actual features of the context can 
dramatically change a given perception of the world and the way it 
leads an enacted story. 
I have found confirmation of this approach to the analysis of 
language experience in a core premise of phenomenography: the 
assumption that different categories of description or ways of 
experiencing a phenomenon are logically related to one another, 
typically by way of hierarchically inclusive relationships: 
The qualitatively different ways of experiencing a particular 
phenomenon, as a rule, form a hierarchy. The hierarchical 
structure can be defined in terms of increasing complexity, 
in which the different ways of experiencing the 
phenomenon in question can be defined as subsets of the 
component parts and relationships within more inclusive or 
complex ways of seeing the phenomenon. The different 
ways of experiencing the phenomenon can even be seen 
as different layers of individual experiences. People as a 
rule are not consciously aware of layers of experience of 
earlier date, but we can assume that they are present as 
tacit components of more advanced ways of experiencing a 
phenomenon. (Ference Marton & Booth, 1997: 125) 
The language user discovers increasingly inclusive generators of 
which I distinguish semantic, pragmatic, and poetic. Discovery here is 
not far from invention since their generativeness is not a given but an 
DJHQW¶V construction in mediation with the world. Such content-forms 
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generate further content-forms with which they are related but to which 
they are not reducible. 
Semantic generators lead to syntactic constructions and word 
formation (Bouchard, 1995; Culicover & Jackendoff, 2006; Turner, 
1996; Zelle & Mooney, 1993). Their origin is deeply rooted in 
metaphoric thinking and human perception, including the perception of 
language physicality and how to make transparent its opaqueness, 
meaning how to find or invent rules of thumb to make it meaningful and 
µORJLFDO¶ The meaning of words and phrases, however, can be 
overridden by the pragmatic force behind verbal and non-verbal 
language, namely the actions intended. Pragmatic generators lead to 
further intended actions, many of them never happen except in the 
representation that the language users make of themselves and others, 
and thus in their own use of verbal and non-verbal language. Poetic 
generators, finally, produce possible worlds through change of 
perspectives brought about by shifts in imagined worlds and shifts of 
symbolic mode from analogue to digital and viceversa. 
Symbols are not only inter-related, but organised in hierarchical 
categories. Thus, when the dictionary meaning of an utterance is in 
contradiction with its pragmatic force as found in a speech situation, the 
latter has precedence over the former. For example, even if the word 
³QLFH´ KDV D SRVLWLYH PHDQLQJ LQ WKH GLFWLRQDU\ VDLG ZLWK FRQWHPSW LW
means the opposite.  Similarly, when the pragmatic meaning of an 
utterance is in contradiction with the meaning conveyed by a change of 
possible world, say in a work of fiction or in a different cultural context, 
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the latter takes precedence over the former. For example, whereas 
according to the dictionary an invitation is an offer that can be accepted 
or declined, offering something to eat or drink under certain conditions 
could be purely formulaic in culture A since the expected response is to 
decline. However, in culture B, declining is not an option. Somebody 
aware of the general pragmatic meaning may yet be at loss if unaware 
of the larger picture, namely the narrative within which the action is 
taking place.  
5.4.2 Generators of diversification 
5.4.2.1 Crosslinguistic Influence 
Using one language as a generator of analog forms and strategies of 
another involves language transfer, originally understood as the 
unidirectional influence from L1 (first language) to L2 (target language). 
The first studies on the role played by language transfer in SLA were 
based on the Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis (Lado, 1957) according 
to which a line-by-line analysiVRIDOHDUQHU¶V/DQGWKHWDUJHW/FRXOG
be used to predict the difficulty experienced by the learner to attain 
error-free production. It predicted that the more similar the two 
languages, the easier it was to learn L2 because of the habits already 
formed in L1. 
Over time, a variety of more complex and more conscious 
phenomena were suggested. The leading view changed from habit 
formation to strategy and reflection (Kellerman & Sharwood-Smith, 
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1986), according to which the learners¶ MXGJPHQWV VWUDWHJLHV DQG
decisions that guide crosslinguistic influence depend on how they 
organise their native language, how they perceive the distance 
between the first and the target language and, finally, their actual 
knowledge of the target language (Gass & Selinker, 2001: 104).  
Constraints on transfer incorporate linguistic, psycholinguistic, 
and pragmatic factors (R. Ellis, 1994a). Two types of psycholinguistic 
limitations are most relevant for this discussion: prototypicality and 
psychotypology, terms coined by Kellerman (1986), who defines the 
former as the extent to which a specific meaning of a word is 
FRQVLGHUHG³FRUH´RU ³EDVLF´LQUHODWLRQ WRRWKHUPHDQLQJVRI WKHVDPH
word, while he defines the latter as the perceptions that speakers have 
regarding the similarity and difference between languages.  
Through a series of studies, Kellerman concluded that learners 
have perceptions of their own language, treating some structures as 
potentially non-transferable and others as potentially transferable, and 
that these perceptions are constraints on what they actually transfer. 
The extent to which a meaning or use is seen as prototypical is tied to 
factors including frequency of usage, literalness, and concreteness. In 
other words, the more frequently used, the more literal and the more 
concrete (as opposed to abstract meaning), the stronger the tendency 
to perceive those meanings as general and thus transferable from the 
native language to the target language.  According to the same author, 
OHDUQHUV¶EHOLHIVDERXWWKHUHODWLYH WUDQVIHUDELOLW\RI WKHLU ODQJXDJHLQWR
another are fixed and thus, unchanged by age or education.  
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Previously acquired languages can be considered as a source of 
generators in the sense that they provide patterns of combination, word 
IRUPDWLRQVRXQGDQG ³FRPPXQLFDWLRQVWUDWHJLHV LQVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ´
(Faerch & Kasper, 1986: 53). Language transfer, however, is not 
necessarily unidirectional but L2 can be also a gateway into modifying 
L1 (V. J. Cook, 2003). Moreover, the learner can modify his or her 
perception of what is transferable from one language to the other by 
means of conceptual blending, and the development of metaphoric 
competence. 
5.4.2.2 Similarity 
Generators are based on variable relations of perception and logic, and 
similarity takes on both of them. Similarity introduces a complement of 
comparable difference or logical complement of coordination. Similarity 
relies on what features are culturally (and individually) seen as salient 
as well as the grounds for comparison that result in WKHOHDUQHU¶VMXGJLQJ
a relation as similar. 
Whereas cross-linguistic similarity guides the learner at the 
beginning, intralinguistic similarity becomes more important to the 
extent that the learner gains proficiency (Ringbom, 2006a: 100). 
Intralinguistic similarity can generate language at a specific level, say, 
lexical (as when forming words that may or may not already exist in the 
WDUJHWODQJXDJHIRUH[DPSOH³ZRUGVPLWK´WRPHDQ³DUWLVWU\ZLWKZRUGV´
and between levels (as when searching for a right fit between forms in 
sound, rhythm, meaning and pragmatic intention). Cross- and intra-
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linguistic kinds of similarity guide comprehension, learning, and 
production across a wide span of refinement and diversity of sources.  
5.4.2.3 Blending  
This is as well a conceptual and sensorial sub-category and its 
complement is termed here logical complement of integration. I have 
placed it here, in the category of semiotic stratification, because it 
produces diversity via integration. Plurilingual language play involves 
hybridizations or combinations of the languages available to the learner 
DQG LWPD\IXQFWLRQ³DVD WH[WXDO LQGLFDWLRQRIFKDQJHVLQOHDUQHUVHOI-
conceptualizations, changes that are mediated by foreign language 
VWXG\DQGXVH´ (Belz, 2002: 15). 
Blending involves the physical texture of language (its sound, its 
written form and its synaesthetic connotations) in order to generate in a 
way comparable to improvisations on visual or musical themes. It is so 
important for language acquisition, that a definition of linguistic 
resource must include verbal playfulness and the opacity of language 
as an expressive medium (G. Cook, 2000; Lantolf, 1997).  
The investigation of metaphoric competence, namely the 
capacity to understand metaphors analogically rather than digitally as if 
they were definitions, has shown that such a competence is not fixed 
but can be modified by blending different media. For example: in order 
WRFRQYH\WKHFRQFHSWRI³VW\OH´LQPXVLFYLVXDOPHGLDKDYHEHHQXVHG
(Silverman et al., 1976). In other words, by conceptual and sensorial 
blending it is possible to open a rigid core of literality (namely, a narrow 
way to see or to hear) up to figurative reception and production. 
 135 
Perceptual rigidity in, say, visual arts involves blindness to style and 
RQO\EHLQJDEOHWRSHUFHLYHWKHILJXUHGHSLFWHGIRUH[DPSOH³LWLVDSDLU
RI ERRWV´ EXW QRW WKH UHSOHWHQHVV RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ YDQ *RJK¶V  A 
Pair of Boots. In language, the equivalent is to look only through but not 
at language itself (Lanham, 1983), a perception which requires 
conceptual and sensorial blending and, consequently, a metaphoric 
type of reading.  
Metaphor and conceptual refinement lead to transferring 
patterns between and within languages. Once a pattern is established 
for a domain, it can be transferred by conceptual and sensorial 
blending to create similar patterns in another. By this process, an initial 
set of patterns can be built up that then can be either generalised and 
extended, or objectified and crunched in more concrete forms which, 
though more concrete, they can be also more universal than their 
antecedent (compare, for example, a haiku with its ordinary referents). 
5.4.2.4 Feeling  
A way to refer to the sensory basis of all thinking is feeling. 
Unfortunately, the term is usually opposed to rational thinking thus 
ignoring that cognition is a continuum that spans from perception to the 
most abstract ideas and that feelings can modify and be modified by 
thinking. The body and its co-related perceptions are binding factors of 
connected knowledge, which is, by definition (Berman, 1989), somatic 
and emotional. In the last analysis, knowledge needs to be connected 
to (and by) the agent who constructs it and who experiences it as 
"knowledge for me." 
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It is not yet understood how a learner arrives at a felt perspective 
that inheres in the expressively rich components of a foreign language. 
According to Kinginger (2004), emotional investment and a richly 
nuanced imagination can drive the study of a foreign language, no less 
than the desire for new ways to compose a life (Bateson, 1989). She 
elaborates on the connection between "the learner's dynamic agency 
and investment in learning, and emotions as discursive constructions 
shaped by the historic, cultural and social conventions of the time [...] 
where they are produced" (Kinginger, 2004: 160). Emotions16 are 
generative sources in that they supply heuristic guidance for action 
(Reddy, 2001) and for meaning making in interpretation (Miall & 
Dobson, 2001; D. S. Miall & D. Kuiken, 2001). Moreover, since cultural 
practices are associated with emotions in social and personal 
interaction, anxiety in cross-cultural encounters should be seen as a 
driving force to guide investigations on languages and cultures 
(Cormerai, 2000: 257) either as an observer or as a participant of such 
feelings.  
Feelings can be used to direct discursive constructions, as 
LOOXVWUDWHG E\ 1DQF\ +XVWRQ¶V UHIOHFWLRQV RQ KHU H[SHULHQFH DV DQ
English native speaker who writes and publishes in French (in 
Kinginger, 2004). When a second language is learned post-puberty or 
in adulthood, the two of them differ in their emotional impact on the 
individual, a difference of which it is possible to take advantage not only 
to investigate emotional representations in the target culture that would 
                                               
16
 The difference between feelings and emotions is not relevant here. 
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be difficult to perceive for an ordinary native speaker, but also (and 
most importantly for the approach being taken here) such a distance 
can be shaped for electing a new emotional life through a foreign 
language (Kinginger, 2004).  
Emotions generate cognitive-perceptual patterns that engage 
and organise a sense of self (M. D. Lewis & Granic, 2000), shaping 
people's personal perspectives as a matrix in which ideas about the self 
are embodied and negotiated (D. Miall & D. Kuiken, 2001).  A sense of 
self, however, cannot be organised in isolation but within the context of 
a narrative of life which, for language learners, is twofold: firstly, as 
narrated events and, secondly, as narrative actions that shape 
experience differently through as many languages as the learner uses. 
Therefore, life narrative is not only a guiding line to acquire a language, 
but a source of insight in the process of self-reinvention: 
The stories of language learners, particularly those whose 
literacy achievements demonstrate high levels of sensitivity 
to language, are in principle a reasonable source of insight 
on the role language plays in the process of continual self-
reinvention and improvisation required for composing a 
contemporary life (Bateson, 1989). [Cited by Kinginger, 
2004: 163] 
Foreign language learning is a source of reinvention of the self 
(Besemeres, 2002) not necessarily for being more expressive than 
one's own native tongue, but because it is foreign. In that respect, I 
agree with Celeste Kinginger in that "for any learner, self-expression in 
a foreign medium presents the possibility of imagining oneself anew" 
(Kinginger, 2004: 176). 
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Inasmuch as cognition involves not only an object, but learning 
how to know more and how to create more of it, feelings shape, cohere 
and sustain cognition, meta-cognition and action. Language learners 
are capable of being in charge of their own learning by means of 
narratives in which they negotiate their identities over time. In order to 
be linguistically and culturally comprehensible, such narratives need to 
adhere to canonical genres, including stylized forms of violation of those 
same canons.   
5.4.2.5 Genre 
Generators are forms of epistemic guidance, a role that approaches 
them to what in cognitive psychology is known as genre or mental 
model (Feldman, 1994: 117). The actualisation of a genre in the 
experience of the learner is a generator. Generators involve the self and 
transform the agents who devise them. They are poetic in the sense 
that their function is not primarily descriptive but productive and creative 
±a characteristic they share with genres from a cognitive perspective. 
According to Feldman, genres are cultural instruments with patterned 
coherence, generality and generativity that regularise understanding 
(Feldman, 1994 cited in Feldman & Kalmar, 1996: 107).  
The difference between the roles of the Observer and the 
Participant is an example of genres in the cognitive sense working as 
generators. These roles have characteristics that permit them to be 
classified as genres: their applications are vast and multilayered and, 
yet, it is generally clear when their respective set of rules are followed 
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or flaunted. As illustrations of the ways in which the role of Observer 
and the role of Participant can generate different actualisations of 
meaning, thinking and action, three examples (from 5.4.2.5.1 to 
5.4.2.5.3) can be cited: the methodological approach to investigation, 
the generation of texts and personae, and the different approaches 
taken by readers and writers depending on whether the "observer" or 
the "participant" stance is assumed. After the examples, I continue with 
the main discussion of the Observer and the Participant as generators. 
5.4.2.5.1 The Observer and the Participant as methodological 
approaches 
The Observer stance is embodied in the paradigm of the 
hypothetical-deductive methodology of investigation of nomothetic 
(experimental, positivist) forms of knowledge, while the Participant 
stands as the canon for the phenomenological approach (Maykut 
& Morehouse, 1994) and other hermeneutic forms to 
understanding subjective experience such as narrative, which has 
been identified as the epistemological "other" of nomothetic ways 
of knowing (Somers, 1994). Such a contrast implies that learners 
can use them as generative stances to investigate their experience 
from different perspectives in another language and culture. 
5.4.2.5.2 The Observer and the Participant as generative of 
different kinds of personae and texts 
The distinction between Observer and Participant as two different 
kinds of "selves" in the text generative process (Flower, 1994) is 
both compelling and liberating. Furthermore, the exploration of the 
 140 
relationship between these two "selves" by creating dialogues 
between them and  fictional characters out of the "self that writes" 
and the "self on the page"  (Crème & Hunt, 2002) constitute an 
heuristic device of leads to the language, which justifies their 
categorisation as generators. 
5.4.2.5.3 Readers' responses and writers' approaches 
Not only different readers' responses depend on the expectative 
generated by the genre they have in mind (Feldman, 1994). 
Writers, too, shape their emergent grammars to actually meet the 
genre they want to fulfil and through which they perceive 
themselves and others. It has been noted that ³genre patterns are 
cognitive models that are derived from exposure to texts that 
embody them but are then imposed on texts by readers who know 
them as an interpretive lens. They are in the text and in the mind" 
(Feldman & Kalmar, 1996: 107-108). The actualisation of genres, 
however, is not unequivocal and relies, among other constraints, 
on the re-symbolizations made by the speaker/writer (knowledge 
"for me") and the generators devised, not before or after the fact, 
but in action.  
The ability to alternate between the participant's and the 
observer's view in a foreign language situation allows to play and 
experience with different personae and voices, a process that involves 
the redesign of the self through the construction of an identity and an 
agency. The learner's appropriation can be more accurately described 
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as the generation of an emergent grammar, namely an idiolect which is 
to a certain extent intelligible in other emergent grammars devised by 
other speakers. The appropriation of a language occurs through re-
symbolization in the speaker's own terms. However, language re-
symbolization is always tested against the socially agreed conditions for 
communication to take place. 
5.4.2.6 Metaphors 
The ways in which the old generates the new have been widely 
discussed in language, the arts, science and technological inventions. 
Though the traditions derived from each one took very diverse paths, 
they seem to have a common ground: metaphor. According to Clair 
(2002), 
For two millennia the role of metaphor as an instrument of 
linguistic creativity was disparaged by philosophers and 
scientists. Recent work in the field of the cognitive sciences 
has demonstrated that metaphor is not only an intrinsic part 
of human creativity, but also that it plays a significant role in 
linguistic creativity and in linguistic change. (Clair, 2002: 1) 
Metaphor is a capacity identified with general perceptual and 
conceptual processes (Gardner & Winner, 1979: 123) and a pragmatic 
device for the representation and transformation of outer and inner 
reality. The pragmatic aspects of metaphor are clear in action situations, 
which are characterised by action that proceeds heuristically, by 
discovery and combination, rather than deductively derived from 
intentions (Reddy, 2001: 10). In action situations, agents transform their 
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experience in order to fit modes of understanding and, depending on the 
symbolic modality underlying such understandings, their associated 
actions will be different with potentially far-reaching consequences when 
KDYLQJ WKH SRZHU WR LPSRVH WKHLU ³UHDGLQJV´ WR RWKHUV DV GLJLWDO RU
analog.  
Metaphoric flexibility, a perceptual condition modifiable by 
learning (Silverman et al., 1976) is basic for perceiving crosslinguistic 
and intralinguistic similarities in order to generate increasingly complex 
emergent grammars of L2 (Deignan, 2005; Deignan, Gabrys, & Solska, 
1997). Metaphoric flexibility is generative DQG H[SDQVLYH ³:KDW HOVH
FDQ,GRZLWKWKLV"´ rather than a merely remedial strategy restricted to 
cope with the limitations of a XVHU¶VUHSHUWRLUHthat does not contain an 
item for the realisation of a particular goal.  
Transferability depends, inter alia, on the metaphoric flexibility of 
the speaker to spot and project patterns of similarity. By actively shifting 
between digital and analogue readings, a supposedly constant core of 
meaning (Kellerman & Sharwood-Smith, 1986) becomes a variable 
where literal and figurative, concrete and abstract coexist and 
reverberate in potential crosslinguistic and intralinguistic similarities.  
5.5 *HQHUDWRUV¶UROHLQ6/$ 
It was suggested above that in order to understand a rule, the learner 
has to generate another, more comprehensive principle which makes 
³URRP´ IRU DQG DOORZV WKH H[LVWHQFH RI WKH SUHYLRXV RQH /HDUQLQJ LV
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generative; it cannot be confined to reception without compromising 
comprehension.  
Comprehension and production are two different processes of 
representation which need to be accounted for by any theory of 
language acquisition (Ringbom, 2006c). The interaction between 
comprehension and production is particularly complex in the acquisition 
of a second or foreign language, where a distinction can be made 
between learning for comprehension and learning for production.  
Ringbom (2006) distinguishes four different types of learning and 
explains his peculiar labelling: 
1 Item learning for comprehension 
2a  Item learning for production 
2b  System learning for comprehension 
3 System learning for production 
The reason for labelling the stages (2a) and (2b) rather 
than (2) and (3) is that these two normally develop in 
parallel, not successively (Ringbom, 2006c: 98-99) [My 
emphasis]. 
5LQJERP¶V YLHZ RI WKH VLPXOWDQHLW\ RI LWHP OHDUQLQJ IRU
production and system learning for comprehension is confirmed by the 
lexical approach (M. Lewis, 1997) according to which language 
consists not of traditional grammar and vocabulary but of multi-word 
prefabricated chunks organised by collocational patterns. Language, 
for Lewis, consists of grammaticalised lexis ²not lexicalised grammar.  
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Ringbom (2006) acknowledges17 that the interaction between 
comprehension and production is more complex in SLA than in L1. 
+RZHYHU KLV H[SODQDWLRQ LV UHVWULFWHG WR WKH REVHUYHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ
without clarifying the reasons for an added complexity in the 
perspective of the learner (namely, the participant), for whom a main 
difficulty to coordinate and integrate comprehension and production 
consists in the various responses to her or his own production. Such 
responses are usually mediated by partial or false understandings, by 
inconsisWHQW UHDFWLRQV WR WKH OHDUQHU¶V ODFN RI DFFXUDF\ E\ IRVVLOLsed 
errors which, nevertheless, are ignored because the pragmatic force is 
successfully conveyed, etc. all of which make hard for learners to be 
aware of their own mistakes, let alone correct them.  
Learning for comprehension and learning for production do 
interact, but the way to explain the fact that people produce what they 
have never heard or read before is a matter of controversy. For 
5LQJERPIRUH[DPSOHWKHHOHPHQWVRIDQ³RGG´ZRUGRUSKUDse have to 
EHLQFOXGHGLQWKHOHDUQHU¶VSULRUNQRZOHGJHZKLFKLVDFDXWLRXVUHPDUN
FRQVLGHULQJ WKDW ³SULRU NQRZOHGJH´ PD\ PHDQ DOPRVW DQ\WKLQJ IURP
previous experiences of languages including but not limited to L1, to 
perceptual, logical and cultural patterns that can be projected to cross 
different domains. :KDW5LQJERP¶VYLHZLVPLVVLQJLVWKHQRvelty itself. 
For generativeness being acknowledged as fundamental in SLA, 
it is necessary to revise the meaning of learning and the meaning of 
creativity in language. To the first task, that can be dubbed after 
                                               
17
 ³,WLVHDVLHUWRJHWDIXOOSLFWXUHRIWKHOHDUQHU¶VRXWSXWDWYDULRXVVWDJHVLQWKH
acquisition of [the mother language].´(Ringbom, 2006b: 21) 
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3LDJHW¶V³WROHDUQLVWRLQYHQW´,KDYHGHGLFDWHGFKDSWHUVDQGRIWKLV
dissertation and, to the second undertaking, this chapter 5 in its 
entirety. However, a major problem that I envisage in the empirical 
investigation of linguistic creativity is that the creative process is not 
necessarily reflected in a novel product.  
The generators hypothesis highlights emergent patterns devised 
by the creative agency of the learner. Generators, hypothetical aids to 
think about generativeness and self-direction, are instruments of 
objectification as WKH\UDLVHRQHVHOI WRRQH¶Vown attention and action 
and so, in the last analysis, they are instruments for learning as 
personal transformation. ,Q+ROODQG¶VYLHZ ³hXPDQV¶FDSDFLW\ IRUVHOI-
objectification ±and, through objectification, for self-direction² plays 
into both their domination by social relations of power and their 
SRVVLELOLWLHV IRU SDUWLDO OLEHUDWLRQ IURP WKRVH IRUFHV´ (Holland et al., 
1998: 5)1H[WFKDSWHUH[SORUHVWKHODWWHUSDUWRI+ROODQG¶VVWDWHPHQWLQ
the transformative investigation of the language learner identity.  
 146 
Chapter 6 Transformative investigation of the 
language learner identity 
6.0 Agency and identity 
Lantolf and Pavlenko (2001: cited by Belz 2002) suggested that 
success in language learning is non-observer dependent; instead, it is 
intimately linked to individual notions of agency. Human agency has 
been defined DV³WKHUHDOL]HGFDSDFLW\RISHRSOHWRDFWXSRQWKHLUZRUOG
and not only to know about or give personal or intersubjective 
VLJQLILFDQFHWRLW´ (Inden, 1990: 23) and one of the great challenges of 
thinking and writing in historical, social and cultural terms is the trouble 
with making connections between the self and agency while doing 
justice to the socio-cultural formations and contexts within which writing 
and thinking take place. Yet, there is our human capacity for negotiating 
history firstly as participants and then as observers and post facto 
interpreters of large-scale no less than individual-scale events and 
actions.  
Through narrative, human or humanised action is interpreted as 
agency, constructed with stories of life in which the subjects recognise 
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and construct themselves. The narrative construction of agency in a 
foreign language requires a distinction between actions and events. The 
learner goes through events, but he or she is responsible for his or her 
actions. Most curricula, however, reduce the learning process to events 
in the form of tasks that the learner can navigate without necessarily 
assuming personal responsibility for her or his own construction of 
knowledge. Students can learn to defeat the learning point of the tasks 
they are asked to perform by not assuming an agentive role and thus 
reducing them to simple events.  
Language learning events can either remain as such or be taken 
further when the learners assume linguistic agency of their voice in the 
story-world of their own situation in a foreign language and culture. In 
order to assume such an agency, they need to distinguish between 
surrounding and inner events and transform them into actions taken 
with the language, reflect about them and re-shape them in practice 
through the language. The extent to which such actions are agential 
and not merely acquiescent depends on how clearly the difference 
between actions and events is perceived by the learners and how 
willing they are to make it even deeper and clearer.  
More than a mere mediator, identity expresses agency in the 
point of view of Václav Havel and Pauline Gagnon. For Havel (cited by 
Ermarth, 2001: 34), identity is an achievement: 
Identity is, above all, an accomplishment, a particular 
work, a particular act. Identity is not something separate 
from responsibility, but on the contrary, is its very 
expression. 
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For Gagnon (Bertaux & Kohli, 1984: 230; Gagnon, 1980, 1981), identity 
is the result of action:  
Culture is a collective praxis resulting from the actions of 
people who are dealing with continuity and change and 
trying to maintain or reinforce an identity at both the 
individual and the collective level. Identity is a process of 
symbolic appropriation of reality through which people 
move subjectively from passivity to activity. 
Figured worlds (Holland et al., 1998) is a concept that provides a 
means to conceptualise the heuristic formation of identity through social 
and historical activity. Figured worlds are socially organised and 
reproduce historical phenomena developed through the works of their 
participants. Such a concept is useful to situate cultural production as 
both a social and personal work since it accounts for the joint 
production of identities and discourses.   
It is necessary to have ³DVWURQJHUFRQFHSWLRQRI WKHFRKHUHQFH
of the self capable of sustaining a more active and autonomous sense 
RI DJHQF\´ (Armstrong, 2002: 44). Accordingly, a generative model of 
the process of becoming a self provides a theory of agency capable of 
accounting for both change and coherence required by the increasing 
complexity of social conditions. The coherence of the self does not 
derive from a fixed identity but from a heuristic process of becoming 
that requires self-direction and creativity. 
The complexity of the reconfiguration of an identity and an 
agency in a foreign language can be appreciated when compared to 
artificial languages associated with the rapidly growing field of 
 149 
Information Technology. Emerging grammars in IT go through reality-
checks quickly, so the learner can adjust equally fast. Though the 
emergence of an agentive self in natural languages is more gradual and 
subtle, an attentive observer and the individual himself or herself can 
identify important turning points conducive to an increased agency in 
the area. For example, the awareness of master narratives embedded 
in textual practices and the use of counter narratives that challenge 
their hegemony constitute a defining moment in the revision of the 
OHDUQHU¶VLGHQWLW\ 
Identity as a performance (Butler, 1997, 1999) accords agency 
the power of self-revision by means of self-reflection and self-criticism. 
Identity as performance makes a distinction between being-positioned 
DQGSRVLWLRQLQJRQHVHOIDVDQDJHQWRIRQH¶VRZQLGHQWLW\5HSHUWRLUHV
in this view, are constructed bottom-up as performances that can 
generate counter-narratives. 
6.1 From objectification to the re-design of subjectivities 
The identity of the speaker of a foreign language is multifarious in that 
he or she is simultaneously a language learner, a language user with 
different degrees of proficiency in a diversity of literacies in the target 
language (Beacco & Byram, 2007; J. Swaffar & Arens, 2005), a 
manager of her or his own foreigness and a person. :KHUHDVµLGHQWLW\¶
opens up overlapping and competing allegiances, the concept of 
person sets XSDQDJHQF\³WKHFRQFHSWXDODQGSUDFWLFDOJOXH´(Barnett, 
1997: 114) necessary to fight fragmentariness. A person learning to 
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design a voice in a foreign language that is expressive, culturally 
intelligible and communicatively effective is designing a persona ±a 
character whose practice is used as a mode of inquiry into another 
language and culture. 
The objectification of language scaffolds the objectification of the 
self. Objectification of the self, namely the separating distance between 
³,´DQG³PH´LVEDVLc to reflexion and, because of its instrumentality for 
key processes such as agency and the unfolding of an identity, it is a 
device of subjectification, namely a process of subjectivity formation.  
7KHSOD\RIV\PEROLFVSDFHVEHWZHHQ ³,´DQG ³PH´VHWVRII the 
construction of an identity and an agency, according to McAdams, for 
ZKRP ³the I may be viewed as the process of "selfing," of narrating 
experience to create a modern self whereas the Me may be viewed as 
the self that the I constructs´(1996: 295). Dörnyei (2010), drawing from 
Marcus and Nurius (1986), applies the concept of plastic possible 
selves to the Ideal L2 Self in order to research on motivation for 
OHDUQLQJ DQ / $FFRUGLQJ WR KLP ³the concept of the possible self 
represents an individual's ideas of what they might become, what they 
would like to become and what they are afraid of becoming. That is, 
possible selves are specific representations of one's self in future 
states, involving thoughts, images and senses, and are in many ways 
the manifestations of one's goals and aspiration´ (Dörnyei, 2010: 79). 
Possible selves take shape by self-objectification and self-direction.  
The process of subjectification through which the person 
constructs a second-language self includes the appropriation of RWKHUV¶ 
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voices, what Bakhtin calls 'ventriloquation' (1981: 362). This term 
describes the process of positioning oneself by juxtaposing and 
speaking through others' voices. Bakhtin uses it to describe how 
novelists bring out various "resonances" in VRPHERG\ HOVH¶V words. 
Similarly, the language learner assumes RWKHUV¶ YRLFHV LQ RUGHU WR
assimilate them and, yet, hybridise them both in the perspective of 
RWKHUV¶ DV REVHUYHUV DQG LQ WKH SHUVRQ¶V RZQ SHUVSHFWLYH WR ILQG RU
create subjective resonances in those originally strange voices.  
A new voice emerges along with a new self with two different 
though related facets. One of them has to do with prompting and 
scaffolding the new voice, whereas the other is how to objectify it by 
setting up a distance in order to reflect on it and mould it ±writing in a 
foreign language establishes such a distance. However, in formal 
educational contexts, the self conveyed in written texts is experienced 
³not as a fully agentive self, but as an impersonal self´(Hoffman, 1989: 
121 cited by Pavlenko and Lantolf 2000). It is by means of imaginative 
approaches to language objectification (including writing) that the 
learner can actually make a breakthrough to the oracy (Abbs, 1981: 
117) and the multiple sensorial layers of language. 
When Stuart +DOOSRLQWVRXWWKDW³LGHQWLWLHVDUHQHYHUXQLILHGDQG
in the late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured, never 
singular but multiple, constructed across different, often intersecting 
DQG DQWDJRQLVWLF GLVFRXUVHV SUDFWLFHV DQG SRVLWLRQV´ (Hall & Gay, 
1996: 4), he adopts the REVHUYHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH of an outsider, leaving 
in the air what is desirable now or in the future as performed by a 
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participant, namely as somebody whose decisions have actual 
consequences on him or herself and the world. The participant takes 
actions that, eventually, are going to shape her or his own subjectivity 
which in turn will lead to further actions.  
7KH REVHUYHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH KRZHYHU FDQ EH QXDQFHG E\
participation in order to attain what Bakhtin calls transgredience (1981: 
32-33), which is the ability to perceive interactional events from outside 
of the event itself and yet focus the attention on the resources and 
identities involved. According to Pavlenko and Lantolf (2000: 174), 
transgredience becomes a way of facilitating the process of crossing a 
border and achieving full and legitimate participation in a new language 
community.  
In short, the symbolic play between the participant and the 
observer opens up two distinctive though complementary perspectives 
in the construction and investigation of identity in a second-language 
self. 
6.2 Emic and etic 
In the linguistic-anthropological field, Kenneth Pike (1967) suggested 
WKDW WKHUH DUH WZR SHUVSHFWLYHV LQ WKH VWXG\ RI D VRFLHW\¶V Fultural 
V\VWHP VLPLODU WR WKRVH XVHG LQ WKH VWXG\ RI D ODQJXDJH¶V VRXQG
system: namely, etic (from phonetic or phonetics: the objective 
recording and analysis of the sounds) and emic (from phonemic or 
phonemics: the study of the subjective perceptions of changes of 
meaning related to sound). Because objective changes of sound do not 
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necessarily imply changes in meaning and viceversa, Pike concluded 
that phonetics had to be complemented by the SDUWLFLSDQW¶VVXEMHFWLYH
perception. According to Pike, the ultimate purpose of etic studies, 
which are performed from the point of view of the observer or outsider, 
was to attain emic understanding, namely DQLQVLGHU¶V perspective.  
The distinction between emics and etics is useful to differentiate 
the shifting perspectives that the same person can adopt and, if emic 
constructs are epistemologically independent indeed, then it is possible 
to dispense with consensus in accounts of first-person experience, 
where the insider and the outsider are the same person: insider of her 
or his own experience as the outsider of a language and culture. The 
role of participant is an epistemological stance, not its antagonist, a 
realisation that sometimes is forgone.  
6.3 Stages of a plurilingual emic investigation 
Emics and etics are helpful to give further depth to the study of 
multilingual societies and plurilingual individuals, where the emphasis 
has been mainly monolingual and the favoured perspective has been 
etic, namely adopting the stance of an objective observer who 
proposes an account or description and/or who criticises the objectivity 
RI VRPHERG\ HOVH¶V DFFRXQWV %\ FRQWUDVW WKH HPLF SHUVSHFWLYH
namely the participant¶Vperspective in the study of plurilingualism is a 
vast area in need of investigation, though important work has been 
made (Kramsch, 2006; Zarate et al., 2011: Chapter 2 Languages and 
the Self). 
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Plurilingualism from an emic perspective involves an 
epistemological stance that necessarily raises ethical issues of agency 
and the historicity of identity. Its focus is on understanding and 
transforming cultural and intercultural experience. These topics have 
been usually discussed, I argue, from the perspective of the observer, 
which is valid but incomplete. And the main difficulty is not the 
necessary incompleteness of any model, theory or description. Their 
inherent problem is that the only actualisation of agency is in the first 
person. Other than that, agency is reified as an epiphenomenon (in 
which case its sheer possibility is negated) or objectified as a matter of 
discussion (in which case its complexity is analysed but not actualised, 
not beyond the agency of the discussants).  
The need of actualisation of agency, I argue, is multiple: it is 
epistemological, because the perspective of the participant involves 
cognitive resources that can only be complemented but not replaced by 
the perspective of the observer; it is meta-cognitive because what is at 
stake is the agent who learns (a collective product of which is a shared 
body of knowledge) and who directs her or his own learning ±which 
makes ethical and social the next reasons to actualise agency: 
autonomy and emancipation. 
Coming to grips with complexity and subtlety in a foreign 
language provides analytic leverage for reflective investigation on the 
shift from one language to another. Grappling with a language other 
than the more familiar one slows down processes that normally happen 
too fast to be noticed. A foreign language sheds a particular light on 
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both the content of the form and the form of the content, usually taken 
for granted in the mother tongue.  
A foreign language is not the only possible route to investigate 
the gap that needs to be constructed between experience and 
knowledge as articulated in language. The learning of virtually any 
discipline achieves a similar effect, by finely honing its concepts and 
terminology to the unfolding of the content to which they refer. The 
practice of a verbal art does the same, in transforming the experience 
by changing the content of language form. However, the particular 
pathway opened by the study of a foreign language is unique in that 
both the form of the content and the content of the form are unfamiliar.  
I anticipate a possible objection by the reader: How long can a 
language remain foreign to the point of being useful for an investigation 
into foreignness? I suggest changing the question for this one: After 
years of use, how can one keep alive and generative the gap between 
form and content, how can one transfeU WKDW JHQHUDWLYHQHVV WR RQH¶V
more familiar languages? Though this will be discussed in the next 
chapter, I can advance now that the relaxation of rigid patterns of 
perception and cognition is a key procedure. 
Difficulties of using a foreign language are generally seen as 
shortcomings, to be suppressed or hidden. Hence the learner tends to 
stick to formulaic language rather than taking the risk of expressing 
(perhaps badly) what she or he has not read or heard before. In this 
way, the nuance and complexity of the expression is co-opted for the 
sake of convention. This view does not imply a eulogy to bad grammar, 
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but a truce: a suspension of the belief that what one wants to express 
has already been said, particularly when the aim is to articulate a 
sensed feeling (Gendlin, 1978) which implies that it is not yet clear 
what one wants to say in the first place.  
The drive for the invisibility of conformity can make the language 
learner settle too soon for an incomplete reception and the lack of 
articulation of what may not even have the opportunity to become 
ideas. Exploring rather than tolerating uncertainties and ambiguities 
constitutes the initial stage of an emic plurilingual enquiry, 
FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V DZDUHQHVV WKDW LW LV KHU RU KLV RZQ
experience as a learner-user of another language the matter of 
investigation.  
This initial stage has as a principle that learning illuminates the 
troublesomeness of knowledge (Perkins, 1999, 2006). In other words, 
not only is it difficult to learn some aspects of knowledge, but learning 
itself reveals them. Threshold concepts (Cousin, 2007, 2009; Meyer et 
al., 2010b; Schwartzman, 2010; Timmermans, 2010) constitute a 
common source of learning difficulties because they involve perceptual  
and often irreversible leaps, so those who eventually master them can 
easily forget what things looked like before and underestimate 
difficulties as merely pertaining to the shortcomings of the learners. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR 'DYLG 3HUNLQV¶ GHVFULSWLRQ RI WURXEOHVRPH
knowledge (Perkins, 1999: 6), a foreign language is characteristically 
WURXEOHVRPHLQWKDW³LWappears counter-intuitive, alien (emanating from 
another culture or discourse), or seemingly incoherent´(Meyer & Land, 
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2003: 7). Learning a foreign language can be inhibited by the 
SUHYDOHQFH RI D ³FRPPRQ VHQVH´ GHULYHG IURP WKH OHDUQHU¶V
understanding of his or her own more familiar tongue. Rather than 
rushing to eliminate this obstacle by means of rote learning, it is an 
opportunity of investigation into Otherness and Foreignness.  
The second stage of an emic plurilingual investigation consists 
in finding a gravitational centre for the content and the form the 
identified uncertainty may take in the foreign language. If it is not clear 
even in the more familiar language how to articulate it, the difficulty is 
ideal as material for investigation because the person is grappling then 
not with language as a channel, but as a poetic matrix in order to 
generate content-forms. ³PRHWLF´does not necessarily mean poetry, but 
poiesis RU³JHQHUDWLRQ´7KXVOHDUQHUVcan generate content-forms and 
further uncertainties of their own. It is important that learners keep 
some control of the degree of uncertainty they feel able to handle so 
they can find the motivation to push their own boundaries. 
The reflective practice of self-GLUHFWLRQ LQ WKH OHDUQHUV¶ RZQ
generative processes of consistency and complexity constitutes the 
third and last stage of a plurilingual emic investigation. Language 
learning understood as skill training reifies its object as a conduit, 
whereas language learning practised as an emic plurilingual 
investigation constitutes an instrument to enquire into processes of 
meaning-making, modes of representation and the opacity in both 
languages (the foreign and the more familiar): 
7DUJHWODQJXDJHLQVWUXFWLRQVKRXOGEHXVHG>«@WRVKDWWHU
rather than foster, the illusion of the easy transparency of 
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language, and to encourage a positive approach to the 
complexity and the often confusing opaqueness of 
intercultural communication. (Napoli & Polezzi, 2000: 110)  
From an emic plurilingual perspective, intercultural competence 
involves a liminal component consisting in the awareness of 
boundaries as areas of contact and cross-fertilization. It is an 
awareness of the plasticity of boundaries, which can either be defined 
and sharpened, or merged within a more comprehensive entity which, 
again, will be delimited by fuzzy boundaries (but see Evans, 2001). 
This liminal component is between and within languages and cultures, 
including but not limited to, national and linguistic identities. 
6.4 Persona design 
Above, in section 6.1, persona was defined as a designed character 
whose practice is used as a mode of inquiry into another language and 
culture. The following aspects of the design of a persona involve the 
formation of linguistic and cultural agency.  
6.4.1 Grammaticalisation of linguistic agency 
Linguistic agency involves the use of the target language in two 
symbolic ways: digital and analog. Digital meanings are discrete and 
aim at disambiguation, while analog meanings thrive on polysemia. The 
learner makes cross-references between them and projects the 
possibilities from one symbolic way into the other in order to create 
continuity within transformation; by inducing ³YDULDWLRQ WKURXJK WKH
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experimHQWDOLQYHQWLRQRIQHZIRUPVRILQGLYLGXDODQGFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\´
(Armstrong, 2002: 50), he or she designs approximations to a culturally 
intelligible self in another language. 
Metaphor has been considered a major generative device of 
entities and experiences (Deignan, 2005; Deignan et al., 1997; R. Ellis, 
2001; G. J. Steen, 2007). Cognitive linguists, who argue that metaphor 
is fundamental to create new constructions, new meanings, new 
categories, and new semantic domains, have called 
µJUDPPDWLFDOLsDWLRQ¶ WKH SURFHVV LQ ZKLFK QHZ JUDPPDWLFDO LWHPV RU
constructions are developed from the variation inherent in the 
verbalisation of experience  (Croft, 2010a)  and the cognitive  processes 
of metaphor18, metonymy, and other major tropes (Clair, 2002; Croft, 
2010a, 2010b; Turner, 1996) characteristic of the analog symbolic way 
of using the language. 
If metaphoric activity is identified with general cognitive-perceptual 
processes, then grammaticalisation can be influenced by aesthetic 
education. To my knowledge, there is not yet empirical research to 
prove this inference but Howard Gardner and his colleagues of Project 
=HUR¶V 0HWDSKRU *URXS EDVHG LQ WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI +DUYDUG showed 
that competence in understanding and producing verbal metaphors can 
be improved with aesthetic education. In their investigations on the 
development of sensitivity to artistic symbols (Silverman et al., 1976), 
they found that school-aged children could overcome their resistance to 
crossing sensory categories in language by learning to perceive non-
                                               
18
 However, Romero and Soria (2005) argue that the notion of grammatical metaphor 
is metaphorically constructed from an outdated notion of metaphor.  
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literal facets of symbolic reference in the arts, a phenomenon that links 
with one of the learning principles described by Gee (2003) ³WKH 
SULQFLSOHRIPXOWLPRGDOLW\´different modalities to construct meaning). 
Gee distinguished 36 principles of learning in good video games, 
some of which are relevant to our discussion on grammaticalisation 
conducive to the formation of linguistic agency.  ³The principle of multi-
PRGDOLW\´ implies that meaning and knowledge are built up, besides 
ZRUGV¶ referential value, through the various modalities of the physicality 
of speech and its symbolic representation (images, texts, symbols, 
interactions, abstract design, sound, synaesthetic associations, and so 
forth). Alongside the multiplicity of the source there is the multiplicity of 
the construction of meaning designed by the learners: according to ³the 
multiple routes learning SULQFLSOH´ (multiple ways to make progress or 
move ahead), learners rely on their own strengths and styles of problem 
solving and develop their autonomy to make choices as they explore 
alternative contents and forms. I will characterise succintly three more 
RI*HH¶V OHDUQLQJprinciples before moving on with the construction of 
linguistic agency based on the analog use of language. 
³7KH VLWXDWHG OHDUQLQJ SULQFLSOH´ (whatever generality meaning 
comes to have is discovered bottom up via embodied experiences) 
facilitates language understanding since it involves multiple modalities 
to make sense, which leads WR ³WKH Text principle´ texts are not 
understood purely verbally but are understood in terms of embodied 
experiences). )LQDOO\³WKHLntertextual principle´VD\VWKDW understanding 
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a group of texts as a family (genre) of texts is a large part of what helps 
the learner to make sense of such texts. 
 
The analog symbolic use of language integrates the five just 
described principles. Metaphoric meaning is more pragmatic than 
verbal because it depends on experience of the world where the 
material dimension of language19 is inserted ³WKH7H[WSULQFLSOH´ For 
either understanding or producing metaphors, the learner develops 
sensibility to diverse sources of qualitative change (³WKH SULQFLSOH RI
multi-PRGDOLW\´), particularly those variations that defamiliarise 
conventionally understood referents or conventional experiences. To 
the extent that  such variations are embodied experiences, learners 
make connections according to their cognitive styles and strengths (³WKH
PXOWLSOHURXWHVSULQFLSOH´) to find out how the target language works in 
similar or similarly seen instances (the ³LQWHUWH[WXDO OHDUQLQJSULQFLSOH´) 
and how their designed persona fits in the target culture (³WKHsituated 
PHDQLQJOHDUQLQJSULQFLSOH´).     
Miall and Kuiken carried out an empirical investigation on 
responses to literary texts, according to which literariness is not 
attributable to the text alone, but it includes also a response to 
foregrounded features and the consequent modification of personal 
meanings (Miall & Kuiken, 1999: 122-123). It is suggested that for the 
development of metaphoric receptive and productive competences in a 
foreign language, the learner needs to experience with the use of 
                                               
19
 See 8.3 Language materiality 
 162 
foregrounding, and that literariness sets off cycles of new learning, 
automatisation, undoing automatisation, and new reorganised 
automatisation D SURFHVV *HH  FDOOV ³WKH RQJRLQJ OHDUQLQJ
princLSOH´ Learners need to shift between symbolic modalities and  
cross sensory categories in language use in order to develop their 
linguistic agency in the production and comprehension of the target 
language 
6.4.2 Cultural agency and the self-inventing subject 
Agency mediates two contrasting directions: from world to subject, and 
from subject to world. According to Bamberg (2005), the former 
perspective corresponds to a "subject position" determined by dominant 
discourses or master narratives. In the latter, by contrast, the subject 
creates and invents him or herself.  
Formal education tends to mirror these two perspectives, with 
predominance of the world-to-subject direction under various banners. 
Accordingly, the subject's actions are usually seen as pre-determined 
products (the so-FDOOHG³OHDUQLQJSURGXFWV´ that are to be assessed by 
given benchmarks. Autonomy, though a fairly common term, has been 
too often misunderstood as ways to make the learner attain 
predetermined outcomes and standards by relying on his or her own 
means. More scarce are educational approaches centred on a kind of 
learner who is agentively engaged in making sense of the world, 
notably by means of narrative self-constructions.  
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Self-stories document, commemorate and define transitions 
(Rossiter, 1999) attested in the development of a voice and an agency 
in a foreign language. Development itself is narrative and historical, with 
both a collective and an individual scope. According to Mark Freeman 
(2001), development is necessarily interpretive and moral in that the 
very idea of progressive movement implies some conception of where it 
ought to be heading, and it is both retrospective and prospective in that 
it is a process of reconstructing or rewriting ends, a position shared by 
Patrick Boylan (Boylan, 2002, 2003a, 2003b), a foreign language 
HGXFDWRUZKROLWHUDOO\XUJHVKLVVWXGHQWV WR³UH-ZULWH WKHPVHOYHV´LQD
new language, focussing on becomings rather than on their past.  
Self-stories of language learning events and actions encourage 
adult learners to draw autobiographical connections, to reflect on 
alternative forms of interpretation of events and to consider different 
options to articulate the telling in the target language. Autobiographical 
learning has profoundly empowering implications for adult learning as a 
re-storying process in which a connection is established between ³the 
DXWKRUVKLSRIRQH¶VVWRU\DQGFODLPLQJDXWKRULW\IRURQH¶VOLIH´ (Rossiter, 
1999: 69). Similarly, cKLOGUHQ¶V DXWRELRJUDSKLHV RI OHDUQLQJ WR ZULWH
(Scheuer, Cruz, Pozo, & Neira, 2006) facilitate as well a developmental 
shift from a focus on isolated products to the integration of procedural 
and representational changes. 
Both the meaning and the way to mean it can be strange for the 
foreign language learner. Since change stimulates the storying process 
and it is through narrative that people renegotiate meaning when 
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dealing with what is out of the ordinary (Bruner, 1991), self-narratives of 
language and culture learning are worth-considering for intercultural 
and cross-cultural studies.  
The three different aspects of language learning pointed out by 
Halliday: learning the language, through the language, and about the 
language (Halliday, 1987, 1993) are set in motion by self narratives, 
where the learner performer is the agent in the construction of her or his 
own identity and agency in communicative situations within the 
framework of multiple social and cultural narratives.  
Learners construct their own linguistic agency by marking the 
different perspectives they assume as relating to situations and to other 
speakers. Thus they look for linguistic and cultural information they 
need in order to make choices to position them and others in the story-
world, as suggested by the spatial metaphor positioning (Bamberg, 
2005; Harré & Langenhove, 1999) where notions of self and identity are 
in place in relationship with others.  
6.5 Guidelines of language learning actions 
Cinematography made clear that a narrative world can be created by 
spatial juxtapositions no less than by following a temporally woven 
plotline. More recently, the viewer can enter, explore and take a 
protagonic role in interactive on-going stories. Films and interactive 
stories have shown an RSHQWHPSRUDORUVSDWLDORUGHULQJDQGµPXOWLSOH
active co-WHOOHUV¶ (Ochs & Capps, 2001). Actors and actresses who 
change roles from one film to another and who choose a character by 
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which to live contributed to transform the nature of the bonding between 
identity and performance. No longer is identity viewed as anything 
essential, but rather as constantly changing and constantly rebuilt in 
new interactions.  
Video games add up to that flux and plasticity the condition of 
requiring from their users to become characters, thus making of 
narrative a form of participation, which involves questions of coherence, 
performance and immersion that, according to Kraus (2005), concern 
identity theory. In order to play, the user has to learn the rules and take 
up a new identity and, in order to learn, the user has to play, to 
participate and to be immersed in the narrative. Video games bond 
learning and identity:  
In taking on a projective identity, the player projects his or her 
own hopes, values, and fears onto the virtual character that he 
or she is co-creating with the video game's designers.  Doing 
this allows the player to imagine a new identity born at the 
intersection of the player's real-world identities and the virtual 
identity of the character he or she is playing in the game. In turn, 
this projective identity helps speak to, and possibly transform, 
the player's hopes, values, and fears. (Gee, 2003: 199-200) 
According to Gee, the power of video games resides in the tight 
connection between learning and identity. Such a connection is vital 
within and without educational institutions but the obvious question is 
the procedence of such identities in terms of attached assumptions and 
their ensuing actions. Canonical works in diverse fields used to provide 
them but now their guiding role does not pass unquestioned. 
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 Canonical works of literature have been under fire coming from 
the right and the left regarding their ideological load, and have been 
accused of not offering reliable communicative language models 
(Aimone et al., 1997; Belcher & Hirvela, 2000; Carter, Walker, & 
Brumfit, 1989; Lindemann, 1993). Besides the wonder and delight in 
language itself that literary works may offer, a notion of canonical work 
that emphasises its emancipatory potential (Greene, 1990, 2004; 
Sartre, 1962) can answer the question regarding the procedence of 
elements set to play in the connection of learning and identity. In this 
OLQHRIWKRXJKWLV*HH¶VSURSRVDO 
A work is canonical if it allows people to imagine, and seek, in 
however small a way, to implement newer and better selves and 
VRFLDO ZRUOGV >«@ &DQRQLFLW\ LQ WKLV YLHZ LV FKDOOHQJLQJ DQG
transformative but schools have, by and large, tamed the canon. 
They have made it into the stuff of tests, multiple-choice 
answers, and standardized responses. Everyone now, finally, 
has access to the canon at a time when schools have rendered 
it toothless. (Gee, 2003: 203, 204) 
The enquiry into the expressive and emancipatory use of a foreign 
language shares with the arts the interest in the materiality of the 
medium and the plasticity of identities, re-designed in their expression. 
The following illustrations of learning actions have in common  (a) 
³WKH LQVLGHU SULQFLSOH´ *HH  DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK WKH OHDUQHU
assumes himself or herself as a participant who produces and who is 
able to customise his or her own learning experience, (b) the ways in 
which meaning is embodied interactively and in the materiality of 
language, (c) the reliance on the human capacity to recognise and 
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develop patterns, and (d) the ability to use and modify codes in order to 
realise intentions.  
6.5.1 Taking up multiple roles 
A playful approach allows the learner to shift ways of relating to others, 
from one voice, role and identity to another. POD\IXOQHVVLVµVHULRXV¶LQ
the sense that it involves resources that include logic and reason but is 
not limited to them, and to the extent that being creative through 
playing gives the person a sense of meaning and authenticity 
(Winnicott, [1971] 2002). Language learners are encouraged to 
experientially situate and fictionalise meanings in the target language. 
To fictionalise roles, voices and identities the learner creates a persona 
to fulfill a communicative and/or an expressive intent. In the process of 
designing a new voice and identity, the learner explores experience by 
imagining scenarios and possible stories.  
Fiction as a means of enquiry has been used in academic writing 
by Phyllis Crème and Celia Hunt (2002) and by Richard Winter et al 
(1999) in social research. The possibility WKDW ³SHRSOH FDQ XVH DUWLVWLF
means for expressing their understandings of their own actions and 
that, in so doing, they explore their lives and widen access to advanced 
FRPSUHKHQVLRQ´ :LQWHU D  is explicit in Schön´s proposal 
(1995) of an epistemology of practice as a way of looking at problem-
setting and intuitive artistry that presents these activities as suceptible 
to a kind of rigor that falls outside the boundaries of technical rationality 
(Habermas, 1971a).  
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In our case, language is the communicative resource and the 
expressive medium, the object of learning and the scaffold to learn. For 
such a complex undertaking, learners have to draw on the full range of 
their cultural experience20 of language materiality21.  
6.5.2 Taking up multiple readings and multiple writings 
Specific genres assume and call up in the reader and the writer different 
ways of knowing. However, there are widespread constraints to 
recognise more than one or very few forms of articulating knowledge. 
That is the difficulty that Pope (1995) sees in the use of the academic 
HVVD\ZLWKDOPRVWWRWDOH[FOXVLRQRIRWKHUJHQUHVDSUDFWLFHWKDW³GRHV
not do justice either to the ways of knowing of contemporary academic 
WKLQNLQJQRUWRVWXGHQWV
RZQUHVRXUFHV´(Crème & Hunt, 2002: 163). 
Similar objections can be opposed to the limited use of language 
possibilities and of WKH OHDUQHUV¶ RZQ FDSDELOLWLHV LQ ODQJXDJH OHDUQLQJ
restricted to appear as skill training. In order to counterbalance this 
WHQGHQF\ WR RYHUVLPSOLI\ WKH ODQJXDJH DQG WKH OHDUQHUV¶ FDSDELOLWLHV
critical and creative approximations to language learning can be 
emphasised. Critical and creative strategies originally suggested for 
literature students (Pope, 1995) can be adapted to language learning, 
for example, by responding synthetically to a text with another text that 
enacts what the reader learned from the previous one in terms of 
generative patterns. 
                                               
20
 ³CuOWXUDOH[SHULHQFH´LVDKLJKO\FRGHGWHUPLQWURGXFHGE\:LQQLFRWW(1967) that is 
discussed in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
21
 See 8.3 Language materiality 
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In paraphrasing a text, the meaning can be rendered (and its 
pragmatic implications transformed) by imitation, parody, adaptation, 
hybridisation, and collage. Take paraphrasing by parody, for example. 
For a foreign language learner, that involves a number of implicit 
cultural assumptions regarding ridicule and humour, and the 
enactments they can take in verbal and non verbal ways. 
Fiction is a form of enquiry into language, the world that language 
performatively creates, and oneself. As mentioned above, Crème and 
Hunt (2002) have used fiction as well as imagery and metaphor in order 
to explore the relationship between students and their academic topics, 
their perception of themselves as writers and their relationship with the 
eventual reader or assessor of their writing. Such guidelines can be 
adapted to language learning under the condition of distinguishing and 
yet interweaving their evolving comprehension of the task and the 
strategies involved, on the one hand, and the actual linguistic and 
pragmatic resources they need to perform it, on the other. 
6.5.3 Learning journals 
In order to facilitate the distinction between the comprehension of a 
communicative/expressive task and the resources needed to perform it, 
the use of learning journals is suggested. The kind of learning attested 
in these journals involves recursive processes of reflection on goals and 
means, their implementation and assessment, the revision of the goals 
and means previously considered and the awareness of something new 
for the individual. Specifically relevant to language learning is that these 
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journals are intented to scaffold  the construction of a persona along 
with a voice and an agency linguistically performed. The latter form of 
learning implies the actual use of a language in which the learner may 
not yet be proficient, hence the verbalisation of the previous learnings 
DUH PRVW OLNHO\ H[SUHVVHG LQ WKH OHDUQHU¶V QDWLYH WRQJXH /HDUQLQJ
journals articulate then referential knowledge (learning events), 
performative knowledge (learning actions in the target language) and 
meta-cognitive and meta-linguistic reflections to connect the two of 
WKHP ,Q WKLV ZD\ ZULWLQJEHFRPHV ³D SURFHVV DQG D WRRO IRU OHDUQLQJ
UDWKHU WKDQ D SURGXFW DQG RFFDVLRQDO GHPRQVWUDWLRQ RI NQRZOHGJH´
(Crème & Hunt, 2002: 99).  
Writing about the target language enables learners to construct a 
map to understand another language and the culture or cultures 
associated to it, while writing in the target language is the performative 
construction of further learning. According to Crème and Hunt, writing 
OHDUQLQJ MRXUQDOV LV ³a two-stage process whereby students reflect on 
both the situatedness of their own knowledge and their position vis-a-vis 
its production´&UqPH	+XQW7KHNQRZOHGJHWRZKLFKWKH\
refer is primarily constative and secondarily performative, while the 
knowledge language learners construct is performative and, 
subsidiarily, constative.  In both cases, however, learning journals 
encourage cognitive and meta-cognitive reflections and, specifically in 
language learning, meta-linguistic and cross-cultural considerations. 
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6.5.4 Learning language as a cooperative undertaking 
Approaching stories as the study of how interactants accomplish the 
telling of a narrative brings out the relevance of situatedness and 
interactional embeddedness for the structure and the content of the 
story itself (Bamberg, 2003: 1). A performative approximation to the 
study of language emphasises the cooperation among the participants 
in the process of constructing meaning.  
Revisions of the social construction of knowledge and its 
interaction with educational practices (Barnett & Hallam, 1999; Scott, 
2004) object to the separation of knowledge from the language that 
articulates it and from the pedagogical practices that pass it on. Such a 
criticism is all the more justified in the study of language as a subject 
matter: according to Bleich (2001), the study of language use must 
include its social materiality in a way that he calls pedagogy of 
exchange, where students are not only allowed but encouraged to 
imitate and monitor WKHLUFODVVPDWHV¶ ODQJXDJHDQGPDNH LW WKHLURZQ
The curriculum, in this perspective, becomes a means of enquiry into 
language use and the ways people interact in class is a substantial part 
of it.  
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PART THREE: CULTURAL STUDIES OF THE 
PERSON 
Chapter 7 The cultural experience of language 
7.0 Otherness and Foreignness: two threshold concepts 
Cousin (2006b) argues that Otherness is a troublesome concept whose 
grasp is necessary to understand issues of difference, representation 
and identity in the context of Communication, Culture and Media 
Studies (CCM). Because of its characteristics (perception-changing 
and pivotal to move forward in the understanding of a discipline), he 
suggests that Otherness is a threshold concept. Besides Otherness, it 
is necessary another concept to account for the design of a 
communicative and expressive voice and the development of an 
agentive identity in a foreign language. Whereas Otherness is essential 
to understand the diversity of identities that populate the self (Kristeva, 
1991), Foreignness is fundamental WR DFWXDOLVH RQH¶V LGHQWLW\ DQG
agentivity in a foreign language. 
The investigative stance adopted in Cultural Studies (e.g. During, 
1999; Hill, 1995; Phipps, 1998; J. Williams, 1995) is etic multilingual, 
which means that the learners are mainly observers of the heteroglossic 
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condition of society. By contrast, in adopting an emic plurilingual stance, 
the learner is encouraged to investigate her or his own heteroglossic 
condition, enhanced with the use of another language. While the 
discussion of culture and identity is mainly theoretical from an etic 
position (the Observer's), knowledge is not only a matter of abstract 
debate but it is actualised by the construction of an agentive linguistic 
self and a voice in the foreign language in an emic approach (the 
Participant's). Practice understood as reflective action constitutes a 
form of inquiry in plurilingual emic investigations which demand 
engagement in the cultural experience of language and changes in the 
learners' perceptions of the world and themselves. 
Threshold concepts are integrative in the sense of exposing the 
previously hidden inter-relatedness of something (Meyer et al., 2010a: 
IX). An emic plurilingual investigation integrates the object and the 
subject of knowledge since it is about constructing what the object of 
learning is, and a narrative of oneself as a learner who finds 
connections between RQH¶VRZQ experience and the object of learning. 
Identity, a crucial notion in Cultural Studies, is investigated to reveal 
multiple and simultaneous perspectives: "whatever you are looking at 
you're exploding and so seeing the tensions and contradictions", as 
quoted from a CCM student (Cousin, 2006b: 136). However, the learner 
has to define at some point what to live by and for in such a way that 
cognitive integration develops into an ontological shift reconstitutive of 
the self in relation to the subject of study, to him or herself and to the 
world.  
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Multicultural education intended to affirm cultural pluralism 
across differences in gender, ability, class, race, sexuality, and so forth 
does not necessarily involve multilingual matters, let alone their 
plurilingual side. Investigation into Otherness requires diverse levels of 
personal engagement that vary according to the students' willingness or 
capacity to engage, but under certain conditions they may even fight 
against a received notion of "engagement". For example, there are 
students typified by Cousin (2006) as resistant, hostile even, to the 
study of issues like Otherness, identity and representation and who 
have difficulty seeing why they should not just reproduce the status quo.  
Cousin quotes an interviewee: "Being of mixed race myself I 
never really paid much mind to it but coming here I've had to define 
where I belong. I always have to address that´ (first-year female 
student) (Cousin, 2006b: 136). Is her recently acquired awareness 
widening indeed the horizon of her identity? The answer is not obvious. 
Critical thinking demands the comprehension of the extent to which the 
notion of Otherness connects and integrates ideas in Cultural Studies, 
but it falls short if it does not involve critical actions leading to 
constructing identity around more diverse and inclusive axes. 
Developing a critical position towards knowledge, the self and the world 
(Barnett, 1997) QHFHVVDULO\ UHTXLUHV D SDUWLFLSDQW¶V YLHZ DFWLRQ DQG
transformation of the person. Deep learning transforms the agency and 
the identity of the self in a way that is far from linear and inevitable: it 
GRHVQRW³KDSSHQ´WRWKHOHDUQHUVEXWWKH\PXVWDLPWRdevelop a critical 
position in order to develop a personal epistemology and be engaged 
 175 
with the world, an existential notion that Barnett (1997) calls critical 
being.  
Criticality and understanding of the Other can be joined by the 
disciplined attention to two different but complementary hermeneutic 
stances: doubt and belief, and by evaluating the generativeness that a 
given worldview has for the being of those who share it. Methodological 
belief and methodological doubt are complementary routes of 
metacognition that involve systematic uses of the mind, and the 
researchers who investigate their own learning need a disciplined gaze 
in both types of thinking. These stances can be epitomized with two 
questions: 
What kind of thinking makes agree people who had originally 
disagreed? [And] How shall we describe the mental activity 
that permits us while operating alone to see that we are 
wrong and come to a new and better conclusion? (Elbow, 
1987: 255)  
Methodological doubt requires systematic attempts to find flaws 
or contradictions that might otherwise be missed, whereas 
methodological belief entails the conscious endeavour to find virtues or 
strengths even in seemingly unlikely or repellent worldviews. In order to 
attain intercultural understanding, the learner needs to develop 
strategies to keep in check his or her own taken-for-granted views that 
can easily be projected and lead to distorted interpretations of the 
foreign language and culture. Similarly, out of lack of a disciplined 
disposition to empathise with the other, the learner might easily miss 
the point by focussing on what is culturally and linguistically irrelevant in 
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a foreign context. Even if doubt and suspicion are meant to open up 
parochial closed-mindedness, they can lead to intolerance if 
unchecked. By contrast, ³the believinJJDPH´IRFXVses on experiences 
and ways of seeing ±a kind of knowledge of no less importance than 
knowledge by argument. Methodological belief makes the enquirer 
³genuinely enter into unfamiliar or threatening ideas instead of just 
arguing against them without experiencing them or feeling their force´
(Elbow, 1987: 263).  
Of the two, believing is the most basic one, of which suspicion 
(Ricoeur, 1970) is but subsidiary since we need to restore what is 
originally meant to a fuller and deeper sense before demystifying it 
(Josselson, 2004). Actually, doubt and demystification involve 
attachment to and belief in another framework or context taken as more 
UHYHDOLQJ RU ³WUXHU´ D VWDQFH LQ ZKLFK RQH EHOLHYHV DQG LQYHVWV 
emotionally.  
According to Bredella (2002), understanding involves two 
processes of negotiation: one is between the context of production 
(what is said or done) and the context of perception, and the other is 
EHWZHHQWKHLQQHUSHUFHSWLRQVHHLQJWKLQJVIRUPWKHRWKHUV¶H\HVDQG
WKH RXWHU SHUFHSWLRQ VHHLQJ IURP RQH¶V RZQ H\HV %XW VXFK
QHJRWLDWLRQVFUXFLDOO\GHSHQGRQRQH¶V³IOH[LELOLW\RIPLQd to reconstruct 
WKHFRQWH[WRISURGXFWLRQDQGDVVXPHWKHLQQHUSHUVSHFWLYH´ (Bredella, 
2002: 39). Such flexibility allows the possibility of a third position that 
transcends both perspectives. The real problem, according to him, 
begins when we evaluate what we have understood. In the same way 
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that understanding formally involves seeing something as something 
else, evaluating implies changing the framework. The difficulty is to find 
a more encompassing view that may account for a third position which 
may serve as a critical platform even of our own worldview. 
I agree in that mental-perceptual flexibility is fundamental to 
WUDQVFHQGERWKSRVLWLRQVRQH¶VRZQDQGWKHRWKHUV¶EXWZKDWLQWULJXHV
me is how to chart the journey from believing to doubt. A tentative 
answer to this apparent paradox is that deep understanding involves 
not only the negotiation between actualities but the appresentation22 of 
what virtually generates them. The axes organising different worldviews 
vary in diversity and inclusiveness, in generativeness or rigidity, and it is 
possible to assess the extent to which a given worldview favours or 
restricts the possibilities of reorganisation (which include recombination, 
replacement, synthesis, expansion, etc.), redefinition (which includes 
what is allowable to interpret digitally or analogically) and reorientation 
(for instance, whether the difference between the public and the private 
is an allowable thought, and whether private and public goals and 
purposes are assumed to be fixed or not). In other words, it is possible 
to assume a critical stance by assessing the degree of generativeness 
of a worldview.  
                                               
22
 (Ger. Appräsentation) In Husserl: The function of a presentation proper as 
motivating the experiential positing of something else as present along with the strictly 
presented object (Runes, 1951). In phenomenology, it refers to how the experience of 
the whole is given in the experience of the part. The aspects that are not actually 
seen, which are not even visible, are appresented, and it applies to abstract entities as 
well such as onomasiological representations of language, as discussed in 7.4 
Onomasiological investigations of culture 
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Generativeness is the most distinctive feature of human 
intelligence both in that allows us to be aware of generative processes 
in nature, and in that we can set in motion generative processes that 
only exist in language and culture. Moreover, it has been a constant 
factor in the development of humanity and it is fundamental in the 
realisation of humanness, according to Erickson and Fromm, among 
others (Browning, 1973). Methodological belief does not imply acritical 
acceptance since only if one understands the generative axes that 
support the worldview where specific cultural practices make sense, 
one can also understand its limitations. A thorough investigation into the 
generativeness of worldviews is necessary to set transcultural grounds 
of critical intercultural understanding.  
As an example of the journey from methodological belief to 
methodological doubt, I can attempt to understand the worldview in 
which female genital mutilation (FGM) makes sense so I push my 
mental flexibility in order to reconstruct the context in which this is 
performed and to see through the eyes of those who endorse it. Once I 
understand their assumptions, I can realise the logic of their statements 
and actions. However, the investigation continues beyond the internal 
logic of interpretation and reaches the basic contents and syntax of their 
assumptions whose richness of possibilities can be assessed in terms 
of their formal flexibility in reorganisation, redefinition, reorientation and 
the degree of integration and diversification allowable to those who 
share such assumptions. At this point, the limitations of their worldview, 
which drastically oppresses those forced to enact it, become evident. 
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Moreover, at this level of evaluation, some of the generative limitations 
of my own worldview can also be revealed. 
7.1 Cultural studies in WKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYH 
Even though HQFRXUDJLQJ ³QHZ XQGHUVWDQGLQJV [that] are assimilated 
LQWRWKHOHDUQHU¶VELRJUDSK\EHFRPLQJSDUWRIZKDWKHNQRZVZKRKHLV
DQG KRZ KH IHHOV´ (Cousin, 2006b: 135) is an acknowledged part of 
Cultural Studies teaching, such an effort is compromised to the extent 
that (a) the learner does not  necessarily reflect it on the practice of 
shaping an agency and a voice, and (b) the investigation emphasises 
the role of the observer over the participant¶V%HO]¶VGHILQLWLRQRIYRLFH
is suitable for the approach I take here. Voice, according to her, is ³the 
freedom of the individual to claim authorship in selecting how historicity 
(identity) and collectivity (role) will intersect´ (Belz, 2002: 18) 
To understand otherness and foreignness involves focussing on 
the limen between the familiar and the strange as perceived by the 
participant. A limen of foreignness, located in the (semantic, syntactic, 
pragmatic, discursive) differences between languages and cultures, 
JHQHUDWHVQHZZD\VRIVHHLQJRQH¶VRZQILUVW ODQJXDJHDQGFXOWXUHWR
the point of defamiliarising them (strangeness). Otherness and 
foreignness can be researched with an emic plurilingual approach 
characterised by the point of view of the participant (Headland, Pike, & 
Harris, 1990; Lett, 2007) that makes excursions in the diversity 
between and within the languages spoken by an individual. 
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An emic plurilingual perspective to investigate identity orients the 
project I call "cultural studies of the person" where cultural experience 
rather than culture per se is the object, along with the dynamic 
relationship between self and others. I discuss the latter below and 
reserve the analysis of the former to the next section. 
Whereas the I is investigated in dynamic relationship with the 
Other understood as what I am not (Fabian, 1983; Levinas, 1999 
[1970]), the emic plurilingual investigation I propose uses the 
methodological belief (see above) to look not for differences but for 
similarities. The I is expanded rather than constricted since it is being 
explored by inclusion of variations of the 'same theme' believed a priori 
to be actualised by the Other. This requires a disciplined effort to look 
for increasingly inclusive ways to see me in the other and the other in 
me that can yield cross-linguistic and cross-cultural findings. 
The journey from methodological belief to methodological doubt  
(Elbow, 1987) in an emic plurilingual investigation, on the other hand, 
attempts to discover the constraints in the generative patterns of 
cultural practices actualised in spoken or written language. Because in 
cultural practices associated to the same language there is diversity 
and contradiction23, an emic plurilingual investigation can uncover 
dissimilar worldviews associated to diverse degrees of generativeness 
of the language used in different contexts. This kind of internal 
plurilingualism (Mauro, 1977 cited in Orioles, 2004)  is a source of 
                                               
23
 For example, the pragmatic force of invitations in the Spanish language spoken in 
Mexico is contradictory in diastratic and diatopic varieties. 
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patterns of variation to look for in other languages, which can give way 
to transcultural realisations. 
7.2 7KHPHDQLQJRI³&XOWXUDO([SHULHQFH´ 
The investigation of the perceptual and social particularities involved in 
the cultural experience of a foreign language starts with the 
investigation of cultural experience itself. Winnicott raised the issue that 
in the topography of the mind described by Freud there was no 
indication of where the experience of culture takes place (Winnicott, 
1967: 368). Nowhere, in the Freudian labyrinth of mirrors, was there an 
indication of how a child develops a creative space where he or she is 
able to play. By contrast, the capability to play and the capability to re-
create culture and contULEXWH WR LW DUH FORVHO\ UHODWHG LQ :LQQLFRWW¶V
theory. Besides contributing to the understanding and treatment of 
neurosis (which he defined as the incapacity to play), he tackles the 
question of what life is about (Winnicott, 1967: 370) a problem beyond 
the scope of most physical and mental health scientists but relevant for 
the Humanities. 
7KRXJK:LQQLFRWW¶V LGHDVKDYHRSHQHGDQHZGLPHQVLRQ LQ WKH
understanding of the cultural construction of reality they remain 
comparatively unknown among language and literature scholars who 
employ psychoanalysis in their own interpretive work. According to 
Rudnytsky, the perspective on psychoanalysis adopted by most 
academics in the UK ³KDV EHHQ ILOWHUHG WKURXJK WKH )UHQFK
postmodernist lens of Jacques Lacan, rather than the humanist lens of 
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WKH(QJOLVK:LQQLFRWW´(Rudnytsky, 1993: xi). This gap, according to the 
same author, is especially notorious for the Arts and the Humanities 
EHFDXVH/DFDQ¶VPRGHORIWKUHHUHJLVWHUVWKH,PDJLQDU\WKH6\PEROLF
and the Real) does not appear to yield a comprehensive 
metapsychology of art. 
Winnicott is interested in the experiential roots of what is 
currently considered as qualitative thinking (Perkins, 1986) not only in 
areas such as religion, art and philosophy, but also in creative scientific 
work. Art, for him, is not reducible to sublimation. Though it can be 
traced back to infantile play, art is an autonomous human activity 
situated in a spatio-temporal dimension which Winnicott qualifies as 
transitional. According to him, the origins of the cultural experience, a 
sense of reality, self and identity are rooted in playing and he insisted 
RQ WKH XVH RI WKH IRUP ³SOD\LQJ´ UDWKHU WKDQ ³SOD\´ WR HPSKDVLVH WKH
dynamic aspect of his concept. 
The concept of transitional (as in transitional space and 
transitional objects) refers to a state of existence which is not confined 
to the subjective life of the individual in the sense in which dreams, 
fantasies or hallucinations are. Winnicott has drawn attention to the 
importance both in theory and in practice of a third area which is in 
contrast with inner psychic reality and the actual world. He investigates 
the potential space that separates and symbolically joins baby and 
mother, child and family, individual and society. According to him, in 
such space the individual experiences creative living and it depends on 
³H[SHULHQFHWKDWOHDGVWRWUXVW´(Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 139).  
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:LQQLFRWW¶V WKHRU\ FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG DV IRXQGDWLRQDO IRU D
project of cultural studies centred in personal experience in at least two 
senses: as an investigation of the experiential roots of forms of 
knowing, and as the connection between educational practices and the 
construction of a humanistic discipline, such as Modern Languages. In 
the former aspect, his theory illuminates the genesis of other-than-me 
objects interwoven into the personal pattern of the subject. In the latter, 
the conditions Winnicott discusses to re-create and to experientially 
know cultural objects are guidelines to education conceived of as 
human development. 
The degree of objectivity in terms of an individual (and also in 
terms of a collectivity) is variable because what is objectively perceived 
depends on what is subjectively conceived of. To that extent, personal 
patterns include the objectivisation of the subject, namely the idea of a 
VHOI ³DQG WKH IHHOLQJ RI UHDO WKDW VSULQJV IURP WKH VHQVH RI KDYLQJ DQ
identiW\´ (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 107). Realities then emerge from a 
creative and constructive process. 
%\ :LQQLFRWW¶V RZQ DGPLVVLRQ WKH GLIILFXOW SDUW RI KLV WKHRU\ RI
the transitional object is that a paradox is involved which needs to be 
accepted, tolerated, and not resolved (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 7). The 
paradox is that a transitional object is created but, nevertheless, it 
DOUHDG\ H[LVWV IURP DQ REVHUYHU¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ 7KH SDUDGR[ LWVHOI
unresolved, is rich with layer on layer of meanings and it is epitomized 
by Chapter 7 of Rayuela by Julio Cortázar:  
I touch your mouth, I touch the edge of your mouth with my 
finger, I am drawing it as if it were something my hand was 
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sketching, as if for the first time your mouth opened a little, 
and all I have to do is close my eyes to erase it and start all 
over again, every time I can make the mouth I want appear, 
the mouth which my hand chooses and sketches on your 
face, and which by some chance that I do not seek to 
understand coincides exactly with your mouth which smiles 
beneath the one my hand is sketching on you. (Cortázar, 
1987 [1966]) 
The transitional object is a possession that can actually be 
perceived by an observer but, for the player, it is not an external object 
which is outside his or her own control. Like many a paradox that is 
FUHDWLYH DV VXFK :LQQLFRWW¶V PLJKW EH UHVROYHG RQO\ DW WKH SULFH RI
losing its generative value. A similar situation occurs in the creative 
tension between digital and analog uses of language, as in philosophy 
and literature:  
The clash between philosophy and literature does not need 
to be resolved. On the contrary, only if we think of it as 
permanent but ever new does it guarantee us that the 
sclerosis of words will not close over us like a sheet of ice. 
(Calvino, 1987: 40)  
Creating what is already there but which nevertheless requires to 
be created anew in order to exist establishes a relationship of the 
transitional object to symbolism: the transitional object symbolically 
testifies to the separation between me and what-is-not-me but also 
symbolically bridges the gap. Generators, defined in Chapter 5 as 
heuristic forms of symbolization of objects and of oneself in relation to 
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those objects, are discovered no less than created when acquiring24 a 
language. Generators, then, are transitional phenomena at the 
experiential root of language use. They are transitional because of the 
paradoxical condition of being found and, yet, created (Winnicott, [1971] 
2002) as objectifications of language, oneself and the others. 
Winnicott's notion of creativity as the ability to play and as something 
that informs everyday life is important in order to situate the use of 
generators as part of a creative orientation to living.  
Winnicott indicates that trust and reliability are necessary 
conditions for a transitional space to exist. The capacity to trust 
precedes the capacity to be alone (Winnicott, 1958) ±which, 
paradoxically, can be attained only in the presence of trusted others. 
The capacity to be alone is the condition for the ability to play. Finally, 
the capacity to play is a condition for the cultural experience. 
The transitional space becomes ³DQ LQILQLWHDUHD RI VHSDUDWLRQ´
(Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 146) in the cultural experience to be filled 
creatively by the baby, child, adolescent or adult with playing. Infinite 
areas of separation can exist, by apperception25, between virtually any 
pair of entities that otherwise seem to be welded due to unexamined 
convention or anxiety. The trouble is (for the human growth of the 
individual) that the potential space may or may not come into 
prominence as a vital area (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 136), which 
ultimately means that it is not only possible but unfortunately common 
                                               
24
 The difference between learning and acquisition as defined by Krashen (1982) is not 
considered conclusive since conscious and unconscious processes come to play in 
both L1 and L2. For a controversy with Krashen, see Gregg (1984). 
25
 Winnicott´s use of the term apperception has the meaning of appresentation, which 
was defined above, in section 7.0 
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to live in alienation and fragmentariness. ³3OD\LQJ´ is the short answer 
WR:LQQLFRWW¶V RZQ TXHVWLRQV:KDW LV OLIH DERXW":KDW PDNHV SHRSOH
keep on living? Playing, for him, is bound to creative living, health, life 
satisfaction and a sense of self and reality. 
Potential spaces depend for their existence on living 
experiences; they are not genetically predetermined nor are they the 
mechanical effect of environmental manipulation. A baby who has 
experienced a sensitive separation from her mother is not only very 
likely to become capable of being alone, but also of having an immense 
area for play. By contrast, another baby whose separation was poorly 
PDQDJHG PD\ EH RQO\ FDSDEOH RI SHUFHLYLQJ LQ WHUPV RI ³LQ´ RU ³RXW´
and, without a relaxed self-realization, the potential space has no 
significance (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 146). 
Cultural experiences are in direct connection with play and they 
provide the continuity that transcends personal existence. When using 
the word culture, Winnicott refers to inherited tradition, to a common 
SRRO RI KXPDQLW\ WR ZKLFK ³LQGLYLGXDOV DQG JURXSV RI SHRSOH PD\
contribute, and from which we may all draw if we have somewhere to 
put what we find´ (Winnicott, 1993: 7). I have emphasised the last point 
because of its exceptional interest: we may draw from the common 
cultural pool to the extent that we count with a potential space in which 
to put what we have found and play with it.  
The existence and extent of a potential space varies from 
individual to individual, which explains the enormous variations in the 
capacity to play creatively and to experience culture which, far from 
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being a mere abstraction, involves the body and all the senses. Not that 
every sense has its dedicated cultural form, but that each cultural form 
can be appreciated with (actually and virtually) all the senses, by 
synaesthesia26. The analytical separation of the senses is an artificial 
way to describe the holistic complexity of perception. Playing involves 
the body and the ludic creative cultural experience of language is 
multimodal.27 
It is a matter of theoretical and empirical investigation to find out 
how to facilitate experiences that initiate or expand the potential space 
in which a foreign language learner can creatively play in a way that 
engages the construction of a self articulate in the new language. 
Winnicott ([1971] 2002: 75) describes three stages forming the basis for 
a sense of self: 
(a) Relaxation in conditions of trust based on experience 
(b) Creative, physical, and mental activity manifested in play 
(c) Summation or reverberation from a trusted other 
The first stage is misleadingly simple. By ³UHOD[DWLRQ´:LQQLFRWW
PHDQV WKH FRQGLWLRQ WR DWWDLQ D VWDWH RI ³IRUPOHVVQHVV´ ZKLFK LV WKH
opposite of a forced unity constrained to follow a certain shape due to 
anxiety generated by distrust. The second phase, playing, refers to a 
journey from the subjective object (that is, the transitional object) to the 
                                               
26
 ³,W LV LQ WKH UHDOP RI V\QDHVWKHVLD VHHQ VHPLRWLFDOO\ DV WUDQVGXFWLRQ >WKH VKLIW RI
'semiotic material' across modes] and transformation [the shift of 'semiotic material', 
ZLWKLQDPRGH@WKDWPXFKRIZKDWZHUHJDUGDV
FUHDWLYLW\
KDSSHQV´(Kress, 2003: 36) 
27
 For multimodality in language, see Gee (2003) and Kress (Kress, 2003; Kress et al., 
2005). For a similar concept under another label, see Harris and Wolf (1998) and 
Pennycook (2004) 
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objective subject, namely the sense of a real self, someone who has an 
identity and exists in time and space. Finally,  
Summation or reverberation depends on there being a 
certain quantity of reflecting back to the individual on the 
part of the trusted therapist (or friend [or teacher]) who has 
WDNHQWKHLQGLUHFWFRPPXQLFDWLRQ,QWKHVH>«@FRQGLWLRQV
the individual can come together and exist as a unit, not as 
a defence against anxiety but as an e[SUHVVLRQRI>«@I am 
myself. (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 75-76) 
The early unity needs to be destroyed in order to be found and 
created anew. In terms of language learning and cultural studies, this 
maxim has multiple implications. In most psychoanalytic studies of 
FUHDWLYLW\ WKH FUHDWLRQ VWDQGV EHWZHHQ WKH REVHUYHU¶V DQG WKH DUWLVW¶V
creativity (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 91) in such a way that the product 
conceals the creative process for someone who remains fixated to his 
or her role of observer. Similarly, it can be argued that what currently 
VWDQGV DV ³FRQWHQW´ QDPHO\ OLWHUDU\ RU RWKHUZLVH FXOWXUDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW
texts loaded with a tradition of forms of reading and writing about them) 
gets in the way of the creative apperception and use of language.  
Ironically, the best hints at how to recover the verbal art 
underlying the creative apperception of language can be found in the 
opponents to the use of literature in the class of composition in the 
mother tongue.  Erika Lindemann (1993), for example, argues that 
when literature is used in composition, the focus is on consuming, not 
producing, texts. Consuming, as opposed to producing, has 
connotations of privilege, which matches the pre-eminent position that 
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literature has in cultures held together by a book considered as The 
Book:  
The word "literature" [...] has a much higher standing in our 
language and culture than the word "art." The sign of this 
status is that empty place in our lexicon where we might 
expect to find the word that is to "literature" as "artist" is to 
"art." The prestige of literature is so great that we have a 
taboo against naming the one who creates it. In our culture 
literature has been positioned in much the same place as 
scripture. (Scholes, 1985: 12) 
,QRWKHUZRUGV WKHVWDWXVRI ³OLWHUDWXUH´ LVDQ\WKLQJEXW UHOD[HG
unities and identities are forced for the sake of its teaching (Barthes, 
1969) and it is being pre-formed in the public long before or even 
without reading the actual literary texts. Thus it is no wonder that the 
product (the creation, as Winnicott calls it) overwhelms the playing 
process. Destructuration is necessary to find and to create (which are 
the same in transitional phenomena) a new structure and, to the extent 
that one is not given the chance to find a state of relaxation beyond 
received rigid shapes, institutionalised literature will get in the way of 
using language literarily. 
Other arguments against literature, however, hardly contribute to 
revise the assumptions of using literature in ways productive to a 
reconsideration of how to learn language. They are usually of the 
³FRPPXQLW\ GLVFRXUVH´ W\SH RI REMections implying that the study of 
literature belongs to a specific academic ghetto well independent from 
language, which is considered as a structure actualised by verbal 
behaviour and thus ignoring any unseen processes such as the 
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perception of the content as form and the perception of form as content, 
involved in symbolization.  
The domination of the audio-lingual method (a derivation of 
structural and behavioural approaches) implied a generalised neglect of 
literature in language study that extended into the 1980s when literature 
was used as a source of interesting plots, characters and themes in the 
midst of the communicative approach to language teaching.  
Either considered as a source of stimuli or as a lab for 
grammatical transformations (Belcher & Hirvela, 2000), literary texts 
steadily came into sight in language textbooks in a sort of shallow 
reconciliation that ignored the epistemological and experiential 
connections between language and literature. 
The investigation of literary experience (Barsch, Zyngier, & Miall, 
2002; Frye, 1963; Gardner, 1982 ; Miall, 1995; Miall & Kuiken, 1998; 
Nell, 1988; Protherough, 1986; Rosenblatt, 1970) consistently notes 
WKDWOLWHUDWXUHSURYLGHVD³OLYLQJWKURXJK´QRWVLPSO\³NQRZOHGJHDERXW´
Rosenblatt (1970: 52), for example, considers that ³literary experiences 
constitute the ground for the study of literary texts, and that literary 
WUDLQLQJ >VLF@FRQVLVWV LQ WKHUHILQHPHQWRI WKHVWXGHQW¶VSRZHU WRHQWHU
such experiences and to interpret them.´ Literary texts, however, have 
been so reified that their study has been labelled as a way of knowing 
³SHFXOLDU WR WKH KXPDQLWLHV´ (Lindemann, 1993: 314).  I find that 
disturbing, both for ruling literature out of the study of language not for 
what it is but for what it has institutionally been made to become, and 
for closing the possibility that there are other and better forms of 
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knowing for the Humanities; for example, ways that are closer to 
experience. 
Full, central, immediate human experience is the yardstick both 
to identify literary texts (R. Williams, 1977a), and to use language to 
unleash voices and actualise identities. Creativity is the opposite of 
integration for Winnicott. For him, attaining creativity requires relaxing 
structures forced by anxiety and lack of trust: 
It is only here, in this unintegrated state of the personality, that 
that which we describe as creative can appear. This if reflected 
back, but only if reflected back, becomes part of the organised 
individual personality, and eventually this in summation makes 
the individual to be, to be found; and eventually enables himself 
or herself to postulate the existence of the self. (Winnicott, 
[1971] 2002: 86) [Emphasis in the original] 
The defence of literature in the language class taken from the 
humanist perspective was (and still is) popular, but it misses the point of 
/LQGHPDQQ¶V FULWLFLVP, which I want to take further to say that literary 
texts are usually constructed as products to be consumed rather than 
catalysts to explore WKHJHQHUDWRUVLQRQH¶VRZQRUDIRUHLJQODQJXDJH
WR DUWLFXODWH QHZ YRLFHV LQ RQH¶V YRLFH DQG WR WHVW RQH¶V EHOLHIV DQG
values in acts of literacy. An accepted justification of literature in 
teaching writing can be typified thus:   
I refuse to look at my students as history majors, accounting 
majors, nursing majors. I much prefer to think of them and treat 
them as people [struggling] to figure out how to vote and love 
and survive, [how to] respond to change and diversity and 
death and oppression and freedom. (Tate, 1993: 320)  
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Not only for Tate (1993), but for many others (Freeman, 2001; 
Greene, 1990, 2004; Pihlström, 1998; Ray, 1984; Sartre, 1962; 
Zembylas, 2002), literature offers a means of educating students as 
human beings and not for the narrow confines of a discourse 
community. I agree with this position to the extent that the reading of 
literary texts is not contrived and forced to fit demands that pre-date the 
actual experience of the text. Guided engagement with literary texts can 
be empowering for generating and questioning knowledge but this 
argument may get trapped in the analysis of the finished product which 
LQFUHDVLQJO\ VWUXFWXUHV WKH UHDGHU¶V EXW ORVHV WKH ZULWHU¶V DSSURDFK WR
writing. 
It is necessary to identify WKHOHDUQHU¶VEHOLHIVDQGYDOXHVthat are 
a help or a hindrance for playing; beliefs that, for example, favour 
erudition over cultural experience and object-use. According to 
Winnicott:  
There is for many a poverty of play and cultural life because, 
although the person had a place for erudition, there was a 
UHODWLYH IDLOXUH RQ WKH SDUW RI WKRVH ZKR FRQVWLWXWH WKH FKLOG¶V
world of persons to introduce cultural elements at the 
DSSURSULDWH SKDVHV RI WKH SHUVRQ¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ GHYHORSPHQW
(Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 148)  
I dare say that such poverty arises as well because of socialising 
practices in education that construct what it means to know in ways that 
scarcely help learners to create a potential space in which to relate to 
the objects brought to their attention in order eventually to re-create 
them and use them. 
 193 
 ³8VH´ LV D FRGLILHG WHUP LQ :LQQLFRWW¶V OH[LFRQ ,W XOWLPDWHO\
means that the person has placed the object in a world of shared reality 
DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\KDV³GHVWUR\HG´LW,ILWVXUYLYHVWKHQLWLVDQHQWLW\LQ
its own right (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 120). Objects, then, are 
destructible and expendable because they are real, and they are real 
because destroyed (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 121). This intriguing 
connection between reality and destruction has variously captivated 
philosophy and the arts; the examples of Being and Time by Heidegger 
and Boots by van Gogh come to mind.  
:LQQLFRWW¶VWKHRU\RISOD\LQJDQGUHDOLW\DSSOLHVDVZHOOWRDGXOWV
WKRXJKDGXOWV¶SOD\PDLQO\DSSHDUVLQWHUPVRIYHUEDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQLQ
³WKHFKRLFHRIZRUGV LQ WKH LQIOHFWLRQVRI WKHYRLFHDQG LQGHHG LQ WKH
VHQVH RI KXPRXU´ (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 54). Since the capacity to 
use (and destroy) objects depends, inter alia, on a facilitating 
environment, one can ask about the degree to which education in 
general and higher education in particular can support adults to 
experience culture and develop their verbal play.  
Educating for the cultural experience takes place in the overlap 
of two areas of play: that of the learner and that of the educator28. There 
must be between them a relationship of trust such that it helps to free 
the rigid structures with which elements of the cultural heritage are 
usually received. When learners cannot play, the educator focusses on 
how to help them to get in touch with their own perceptions and beliefs 
of themselves and of the object of study. Only on the basis of 
                                               
28
 I am paraphrasing WinnicRWW¶Vdescription of psychotherapy (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 
51). 
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connected knowledge, namely knowledge-for-me, it is possible to 
develop play. 
7KH HGXFDWRU¶V UROH LV WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH GHYHORSPHQW DQG
HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI WKH OHDUQHU¶V FDSDFLW\ WR XVH REMHFWV DV ZHOO DV WR
reflect back what happens in the playing (Winnicott, [1971] 2002: 64). 
However, the educator may not be able to play, which makes him or her 
not optimal for the work. It is because of that possibility that an 
education centred in learner autonomy is so important. The educator 
only needs to be good enough to catalyse a process that he may not be 
able to do by himself.  
Cultural objects are transitional to the extent that they need to be 
re-created, inhabited by someone to be. They do not exist by 
themselves in spite of the fact that their non transitional embodiment 
can be stored, exhibited, published, or even destroyed. The cultural 
experience reunites a transitional space (a space where the person can 
put what she or he finds) and transitional objects (objects that, like a 
dance, need a dancer to exist). Transitional objects necessarily require 
an agentive participation, because from the sheer perspective of the 
observer, they are not transitional but part of the not-me world. As 
transitional objects, they are re-created again and again every time 
anew in the cultural experience. The participative agent who inhabits 
them ±who lets them inhabit him or her²is undecidable from them and, 
yet, they are not the same. Cultural objects transitionally perceived and 
transitionally re-created involve the apprehension of their generators, 
namely the generative forms-ideas underlying them. In fact, deep 
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learning can be considered as the apprehension of the underlying 
generative metaphors of the subject matter. 
Cultural experience and the precise junction it makes between 
generality and concretion are missing in the concept of discourse 
whose ascribed role in post-structuralism is that of being the site 
where subjectivity is formed and reality is produced (Pennycook, 2004: 
10). Questions referring to the ways in which the concrete and personal 
can re-design the abstract and collective and not only be determined by 
them are yet to be answered.  
As an instance of the lack of connection between generality and 
concretion in discourse, take the notion of performativity and its 
relationship with competence or, in other contexts, with authority. 
According to Bourdieu (1991), a statement has performative authority 
only from a position of power, a stance criticised by Butler for confusing 
³EHLQJDXWKRUL]HGWRVSHDN´DQG³VSHDNLQJZLWKDXWKRULW\´(Butler, 1999: 
125) as if social power were fixed and as if the only source of authority 
were power. Elsewhere, Butler points out: 
 By claiming that performative utterances are only effective 
when they are spoken by those who are already in a 
position of social power to exercise words and deeds, 
Bourdieu inadvertently forecloses the possibility of an 
agency that emerges from the margins of power (Butler, 
1997: 156).  
Where and how do individuals reach the point of agency either to 
go along with collective trends or to resist and modify them? I am not 
suggesting a return to history as the account of deeds performed by 
Great White Males (Casey, 1993). What I seek is the re-authorization of 
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personal knowledge and experience to re-design agency and talk back 
to discourse. 
Robert Inchausti (1991) noted that however refined its analyses 
of the anthropological origins of values or however complex its 
descriptions of multi-layered mediations, the dialectics of Marx and 
/XNiFV VWLOO VHHV ³FRPPRQ HYHU\GD\ KXPDQ H[SHULHQFH DV DQ
epiphenomenon of more fundamental realities that are accessible only 
WR LWV RZQ VSHFLDO PHWKRGRORJ\´ 7KXV KH FRQFOXGHV ³0DU[LVP
continues to exclude from serious consideration commonsense appeals 
by ordinary people to alter its programs, adapt its agenda, or 
DFNQRZOHGJHDUHDOLW\RXWVLGHLWVPDWHULDOLVWNHQ´(Inchausti, 1991: 10). 
In an essay written in 1969, Lukács (1970) describes the works 
of Solzhenitsyn as representative of whDW0DU[FDOOHG³SOHEHLDQLVP´DQ
HWKLF H[SUHVVHG E\ WKH ³LJQRUDQW SHUIHFWLRQ RI RUGLQDU\ SHRSOH´
Inchausti, thus, borrows the term to describe a post-modern view of the 
world from the ground up whose main concern is with concrete events 
in all their manifHVWSDUWLFXODULW\DQGWKHDZDUHQHVVWKDW³RXUKXPDQLW\LV
QHLWKHU D ILFWLRQ QRU D ELUWKULJKW EXW DQ HWKLFDO DFFRPSOLVKPHQW´
(Inchausti, 1991: 12).  
Concreteness is essential to understand and to promote cultural 
experience. Perceptually, learning a foreign language opens a unique 
possibility of rupture. The foreignness of a language is undergirded by 
its alterity, its multivoicedness. A foreign language allows for the 
possibility of a self opened to many selves and identity as the 
construction of an agentive voice within the self-other relationship. A 
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foreign language-culture is heteroglossic in that it involves speaking in 
terms of the other; the other I become through another language.  
Foreignness slows down the immediacy of recognition and opens up a 
transitional space in which to dwell in the corporal opacity of a 
language. The extent to which the rich source of strangeness provided 
by foreign languages can facilitate the comprehension of the ways in 
which poetic texts are produced and perceived is still largely unknown. 
7.3 The problem with Cultural Studies: issues of 
disciplinarity 
Cultural Studies has contributed with new perspectives to the 
investigation of culture, and it has given momentum to the development 
of a paradigm of language studies centred in the notion of 
performativity. According to Pennycook,  
6XFKD>SHUIRUPDWLYH@YLHZRIODQJXDJHLGHQWLW\>«@KHOSVXV
to see how subjectivities are called into being and 
sedimented over time through regulated language acts. This 
further provides the ground for considering languages 
themselves from an anti-foundationalist perspective, whereby 
language use is an act of identity that calls that language into 
being. And performativity, particularly in its relationship to 
notions of performance, opens up ways to understand how 
languages, identities and futures are refashioned. 
(Pennycook, 2004: 1) 
Stressing performance instead of the underlying system in 
linguistics has not only theoretical but aesthetic and ethical interest: 
performance involves design and concomitant aesthetic considerations 
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besides being helpful to investigate how alienated identity occurs and 
how it can be opposed.  
Pointing out the existence of multiple and fluid identities has 
been a remarkable contribution of Cultural Studies to highlighting 
notions of (a) identity as DUHIHUHQFHWR³KRZDSHUVRQXQGHUVWDQGVKLV
or her relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed 
across time and space, and how the person understands possibilities 
IRU WKH IXWXUH´ (Norton-Peirce, 2000: 5), (b) voice as D ³OLQJXLVWLFDOO\
FRQVWLWXWHGVHOI´ (Lantolf, 1993: 223), (c) agency and (d) heteroglossia 
in the study of the languages of the world. These concepts, however, 
can be more extensively explored if language experience and 
performance were a matter of plurilingual emic investigation instead of 
being limited to trainable skills. Cultural Studies could be more 
concerned with the investigation and construction of culturally intelligible 
and effective identities, voices and self-directing agencies in foreign 
languages. 
According to Richard Johnson29 (1986), Cultural Studies relies 
on three main Marxist premises, the first of which is that "cultural 
processes are intimately connected with social relations, especially with 
class relations and class formations, with sexual divisions, with the 
racial structuring of social relations and with age oppressions as a form 
of dependency" (Johnson, 1986: 39). The problem is that the premise 
itself predetermines the analyses to illustrate the initial point. Oriented 
by its next premise, "culture involves power and helps to produce 
                                               
29
 R. Johnson is a former director of the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies. 
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asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups to define 
and realise their needs" (Op cit, loc cit), Cultural Studies seems to be in 
favour of the oppressed but, ironically, it contributes to a discourse of 
victimhood and desagentification in order to keep its second premise 
true.  
The third premise asserts that "culture is neither an autonomous 
nor an externally determined field, but a site of social differences and 
struggles"(Op cit, loc cit), which implies the dismissal of anything 
outside the scope of social struggle to understand culture and, perhaps 
even more important, it loads the term "autonomy" with negative 
connotations for the re-design of identities and agencies in new 
narrative spaces. Finally, Cultural Studies appears to be anchored in 
definitions of what culture is not: 
[It is necessary to free] the study of culture from its old 
inegalitarian anchorages in high-artistic connoisseurship and 
in discourses, of enormous condescension, on the not-
culture of the masses. (Johnson, 1986: 42) 
Such an intellectual and political stance can hardly construct 
anything unless it develops in practice what culture is or can be. By 
contrast, its form of politics is refractory to local and concrete practice 
by following a series of moves, the first one being from "politics" to 
"knowledge": 
The classic strategy employed by educators who wish not to 
impose their politics is the move to "knowledge." 
"Knowledge," posited as the foundation of the educational 
enterprise, erases "politics" of the sort that presupposes an 
"agenda." (Warnock, 1996: 23) 
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And it then moves from knowledge to "theory," which has mainly 
two meanings: it is either close to positive knowledge, or it is a way of 
seeing among others:  
A "theory" is a way of seeing, not the way, and this implies 
other ways of seeing, which may be not only possible but 
preferrable, depending on the situation in which we find 
ourselves. (Warnock, 1996: 25) 
As Warnock points out, "theory" nowadays is usually 
accompanied by the adjective "critical." Critical theory has become an 
aid to discern agendas of racism, sexism, and classicism in cultural 
practices, as manifested in advertising, the products of "high culture" 
and so on. Critical theory raises awareness about such agendas as a 
way to resist them, but critical theorists identify themselves as analysts 
and interpreters, not as practitioners (that is, enacters of praxial 
knowledge) even though their work with students involves a local and 
concrete form of practice: 
They write and teach with the goal of "understanding" certain 
practices, not with the goal of changing practice, their own or 
that of others, except insofar as an understanding of the 
agendas of the cultural practices under scrutiny ²which 
usually are neither personal nor local [sic]. (Warnock, 1996: 
27) 
Most critical theorists, according to Warnock's critique, do not 
see the relevance of reflecting their critical theory in their teaching and 
empirical research might show the extent to which they perceive the 
relevance of reflecting on their students' learning as an alternative and 
closer-to experience way of constructing theory. Therefore, it is no 
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surprise that Johnson had identified a disconnection bHWZHHQ ³PHUHO\
DFDGHPLFSXUSRVHV´DQG&XOWXUDO6WXGLHV¶PLVVLRQ which he defines as 
³WKH DQDO\VLV RISRZHU DQGRI VRFLDOSRVVLELOLWLHV´ (Johnson, 1986: 42) 
without mentioning the actualisation of such possibilities through 
changes in action and awareness in education; namely, in pedagogy as 
practical criticism.  
There is a difference between Modern Languages drawing from 
Cultural Studies and merging with it, particularly when Modern 
Languages is still in need of a disciplinary identity whereas Cultural 
Studies is not a discipline and does not aspire to become one:  
The formalisation and institutionalisation of knowledges as 
curricula or courses on "methodology" would go against 
some main characteristics of cultural studies. Critique 
involves stealing away the more useful elements and 
rejecting the rest [...] From this point of view cultural studies 
is a process [...] for producing useful knowledge; codify it and 
you might halt its reactions. (Johnson, 1986: 38) 
However, it is pertinent to ask: How to borrow? What to reject? 
Serious answers to these questions imply both a form of codification 
and a methodology. So, ultimately, is Cultural Studies against internal 
or external codification? If it is against internal codification, then it 
stands in the way of the creation of its own discourse. If external 
codification is the issue, rejecting codification and labelling does not 
stop being codified and labelled by others. Actually, Johnson confirms 
both the need for internal articulation and the fact that despite its 
assumed indeterminacy, Cultural Studies is externally situated in one 
way or the other: "If we do not discuss central directions of our own, we 
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will be pulled hither and thither by the demands of academic self-
reproduction and by the academic disciplines from which our subject, in 
part, grows" (Johnson, 1986: 41). 
One of the central directions of Cultural Studies has been to be 
open to exchange and dialogue with the world outside educational 
institutions, which has acted as a catalyst for constantly questioning and 
remaking itself. This way to approach the study and investigation of 
culture is turned to politics, and to the critique of other disciplines while 
claiming not to be a discipline itself. The question is though whether this 
approach to culture is either the only available or the most suitable to 
Modern Languages and Cultures. According to Forgacs, the answer is 
No: 
[...] this indeterminacy of Cultural Studies poses big 
problems for its marriage with Modern Languages. For 
what one has [...] is a meeting of two non-disciplines. 
Modern Languages is a non-discipline because of the way 
it has evolved historically and multiplied its functions. From 
a sort of carbon copy of classics in the nineteenth century, 
in which each European language had, like Greek and 
Latin, its canon of great authors, its golden and silver ages, 
and procedures of literary scholarship borrowed from 
classics, it became a more pragmatically orientated subject 
in the twentieth [century], particularly with the increased 
centrality and professionalisation of language teaching. 
Cultural Studies is a non-discipline because it has never 
had a centre, a core object or a core methodology to 
stabilise it and give it coherence and it is now, by almost 
universal admission, in crisis. If it is a marriage, it is like a 
marriage between two people who are both going through 
 203 
schizophrenic breakdowns: hardly a recipe for marital 
pleasure or harmony. (Forgacs, 2001: 62) 
The rejection of disciplinarity as a form of organisation comes 
XQGHU D ELJ ³LI´ WKH FRQGLWLRQ RI DFFHSWLQJ WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW
disciplines borrow their organisation from scientific models, which tend 
to coherence and demonstrativity (Foucault, 1992). Such an 
assumption is descriptive and contingent on historical change but it is 
not foundational to the present and future meanings of the term.   
Non-disciplinarity or anti-disciplinarity, even if necessary for the 
critical disruption of the politics of disciplinarity, cannot be achieved but 
within historically situated disciplines (both in the sense of social 
articulations of knowledge and of social institutions such as universities, 
colleges, learned societies, etc.) and, most interestingly, such criticality 
is part and parcel of the history of the disciplines. For some, Cultural 
6WXGLHV¶ ODFN RI GLVFLSOLQDU\ FRKHUHQFH LV D GHPRQVWUDWLRQ WKDW LW KDV
remained a radicalising, non-containable, non-recuperable set of 
discourses. For others, however, it is a sign of weakness and confusion 
(Forgacs, 2001: 62). In the last analysis, it is important to ask whether 
keeping a fixed position, such as maintaining itself on the outside, 
always deconstructive rather than constructive, is another version of 
fundamentalism.  
,I&XOWXUDO6WXGLHVLVDERXW³WKHKLVWRULFDOIRUPVRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV
RUVXEMHFWLYLW\RUWKHVXEMHFWLYHIRUPVZHOLYHE\´ (Johnson, 1986: 43), 
such subjectivity is lacking in concreteness when reduced to the 
subjective side of social relations, as Johnson suggests. Subjectivities 
are produced, and so are agencies which, as such, construct not only 
 204 
objects but the conditions to bring themselves into being as well. Even 
though subjectivities are not starting-points, they are not objects 
unidirectionally determined. They are not merely objects of enquiry, but 
the historical agents who enquire and the producers of the conditions to 
enquire.  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to discuss Cultural 
Studies in toto. Though I acknowledge the existence of several periods 
and types of cultural studies going from culturalism (1950s) to 
structuralism (1960s and 1970s) to postmodernity, postcolonialism and 
multiple, fluid identities during the last thirty or so years (Forgacs, 2001: 
60; Gray, 1996: 208), my main subject is not Cultural Studies per se, 
but cultural experience, which is not considered in the normative 
GHVFULSWLRQ RI &XOWXUDO 6WXGLHV DV DQ DFDGHPLF SUDFWLFH RI ³SROLWLFL]LQJ
WKHRU\DQGWKHRUL]LQJSROLWLFV´(Grossberg, 1996: 142).  
7.4 Onomasiological investigations of culture 
Authority in encoding (writing and speaking) and decoding (reading and 
listening) is controversial in the mother tongue, let alone in a foreign 
language. Every person is the µreader¶ RI VRPHERG\ HOVH¶V µtexts¶, no 
less than a µwriter¶ of meanings to be µread¶ by someone else. Author-ity 
thus and from the onset is socially distributed and individually enacted. 
The authority of the reader and the authority of the writer derive from 
different ways of meaning making, which have been respectively 
identified in semantics as semasiological and onomasiological 
directions (Baldinger, 1980).  
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In contrast with two terms extensively used in post-modernism 
(centrifugal and centripetal) which describe a variety of processes 
moving in opposite directions in reference to a centre and seen from the 
VDPH SHUVSHFWLYH WKH REVHUYHU¶V VHPDVLRORJ\ DQG RQRPDVLRORJ\
distinguish the perspective of the observer from that of the participant, 
and it is worth noting that these semantic terms have language as their 
foundation though not as their limit. 
These two directions in the investigation of meaning have 
different purposes: semasiology attempts to clarify the sense of already 
IRUPDOLVHG PHVVDJHV LWV NH\ TXHVWLRQ LV ³:KDW GRHV ; PHDQ"´ %\
contrast, onomasiology H[SORUHV ZD\V WR IRUPDOLVH FRQFHSWV LQ RQH¶V
RZQRU LQDGLIIHUHQWODQJXDJHLWVNH\TXHVWLRQEHLQJ³+RZFDQ,VD\
<"´6Hmasiology examines the range of meanings linked to a word or 
expression whereas onomasiology investigates possible formalisations 
of concepts. In what follows, I attempt to show the ways in which the 
onomasiological-semasiological distinction is useful for a project of 
cultural studies centred in the person, alternative to the current 
sociological-anthropological approach to Cultural Studies. 
Semasiology is based on the finding that language is not a single 
arrangement but a complex conglomerate of hierarchichal structures, 
none of which is lacking in gaps, though each one allows for 
ambiguities (Wandruszka, 1967).  Repetition or redundance, a widely 
spread phenomenon, is a means to indicate the same meaning at the 
same or different level of signification; however, redundance is not 
enough to fill all gaps or to disambiguate meaning. The current agenda 
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of Cultural Studies is semasiologically oriented. Hence, multiple and 
divergent readings of the same text are typical practices whose 
qualified authority is granted to the reader, an authority which leads to 
the authority of interpretive communities (Fish, 1980) and from here, to 
the authorization of that same authority. The semasiological discussion, 
left to an infinite regression of itself, becomes bogged down.  
Powerful reading involves reading like a writer; and rich writing 
requires awareness of multiple alternative readings but in making either 
one pre-eminent there is ultimately a problem of how to construct the 
OHDUQHU¶V identity: one that is heteronomous (in which the authority has 
to be located outside: in social discourse, the institution, the text, the 
teacher) or another that is autonomous (in which authority needs to be 
constructed by the learner as a mediator with external forces). 
The current LPEDODQFH EHWZHHQ µUHDGLQJ¶ DQG µZULWLQJ¶30 is 
associated with similarly lop-sided notions of agency. Not only are 
students educated for the most part as readers but most language 
teachers and language theorists think of themselves mainly as readers 
than as writers (Elbow, 1996: 273)  and part of the reason could be 
traced to semasiologically oriented theories according to which meaning 
is indeterminate and always fluid. The author is declared superfluous by 
assuming that intentions behind the text are irrelevant, which leaves the 
reader in relative control of the text.  
Who is the writer in a semasiologically-oriented theory of 
meaning? A pawn played by higher and collective forces and the 
                                               
30
 µ5HDGLQJ¶ DQG µZULWLQJ¶ DUH VKRUWKDQG WHUPV WKDW VWDQG UHVSHFWLYHO\ IRU
semasiological and onomasiological directions of meaning-making. 
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dynamics of language itself as social practices in the form of genres. 
But, who or what are those that articulate such thoughts? Are they no-
writers or meta-writers, whatever that means? And how can they have a 
grip on truth if what they preach were true? 
Onomasiological approaches, by contrast, can offset such 
excesses by assuming coordinates of space and lived time as 
experienced by concrete persons. None of those limits is predetermined 
and fixed, but they offer a framework that sharpens the focus on the self 
and its existence and, by doing so, the experiential framework itself is 
redefined. The question of authority, for example, changes from being 
an ever-elusive searching for its sources in increasingly abstract and 
FROOHFWLYH HQWLWLHV WR WKH FRQVWUXFWLRQ RI RQH¶V RZQ DXWKRULW\ EDVHG RQ
personal experience as an irreplaceable ground (nobody can 
experience anything for me). Personal experience, however, is not a 
dogma but a perfectiEOHFRQQHFWLRQWRRQH¶VRZQcoordinates. From an 
onomasiological perspective, language users have authority over the 
construction and recount of their personal experience, a practice that 
involves the design of an identity, and the linguistically constituted self it 
voices (Lantolf, 1993: 223).  
The onomasiological approach to meaning construction is the 
foundation of cultural studies centred in the person as a participant of 
his or her own experience, which does not preclude the possibility or, 
rather, the need, to shift their perspective to and from the standpoint of 
the observer. In what follows, three arenas of development that such an 
approach can have are outlined in (1) knowledge transfer, (2) linguistic 
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mapping to mental concepts, and (3) cultural studies centred in the 
person. 
7.4.1 Knowledge transfer: an onomasiological project  
Communication between experts of different fields, and between them 
and laypersons poses onomasiological questions of how to separate 
knowledge from the use of highly codified terminology (usually 
associated with one or a very few international languages) while 
maintaining a valid translation into other languages and/or more widely 
shared registers. Such difficulties are serious and complex enough to 
demand dedicated attention from scientists with a humanist formation, 
or humanists with qualifications in other fields. Knowledge transfer 
understood as the mediation between languages and language 
registers constitutes an instance of educational project whose aim is to 
facilitate the terminological communication between experts who speak 
different languages, and to make specialised knowledge more widely 
known for the layperson or for specialists in other fields.  
Knowledge transfer as an onomasiological project brings back to 
the fore the discussion initiated above31 where the social mission of the 
Humanities is debated. I suggest there that such a mission is educative: 
it is to draw out (Latin educere) the layperson in us, students and 
scholars, and to educate the laypeople around us in the experiential 
roots of ways of knowing cultural objects that depend for their existence 
on language in order to promote generativeness and autonomy in 
                                               
31
 See 3.4.2 Integrative connections with the community at large 
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society. Communication within and between different languages, 
registers and fields from hermeneutic and nomothetic traditions is a 
must for generativeness (of culture, of ourselves). The onomasiological 
project of knowledge transfer here outlined could facilitate this type of 
communication, which is transformative of the objects experienced and 
of those who experience them. 
7.4.2. Linguistic mapping to mental concepts 
Onomasiology investigates the ways in which communities and 
individuals map a linguistic form to a mental concept, a subject matter 
that is relevant for Modern Languages for involving the intercultural 
mediation of linguistic forms to mental concepts associated with 
different linguistic communities.  
Onomasiological investigation can be diachronic or synchronic, 
collective or on a case-study basis. Diachronic questions deal with how 
and why things change their names. At the collective and synchronic 
level, an important task of modern societies is information and 
knowledge management, as described above. At the individual and 
diachronic level, a contemporary onomasiological trend focusses on the 
acquisition of the mother tonJXH ZKHUH WKHFKLOG¶V WDVN LV QRW RQO\ WR
map a linguistic form to a mental concept, but to map his or her form 
DQGKLVRUKHUFRQFHSWWRWKHDGXOWV¶IRUPDQGFRQFHSW(Elsen, 2000: 2). 
In the case of foreign-language learners, the complexity of their task is 
compounded by the tendency to map the target language and culture to 
mental concepts attached to the L1 culture and language.  
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The gap between what one knows and what one can say is a 
multifaceted problem that involves tacit knowledge and emergent 
grammars. Plurilingual onomasiological investigations aim to clarify how 
language learners iteratively revise what they know (conceptual-
experiential knowledge), what they are able to say (lexical-semantic32 
knowledge) and how those kinds of knowledge interact within and 
between different languages.   
The cognitive preference for making meanings appear 
motivated33, and the differences between two kinds of knowledge: the 
lexical-semantic and the conceptual-experiential are factors in the 
construction of emergent grammars. Both types of knowledge are 
constituted by an initially flexible whole organisation about objects and 
relations (Nelson, 1974: 278) which becomes increasingly nuanced and 
differentiated through interaction with the surroundings. Nelson 
highlights the role of acting within events for the development of both 
cognition and language. Accordingly, children use the situational and 
cognitive context to interpret language and to infer relevant information 
(Nelson, 1996: 140) ,Q 1HOVRQ¶V YLHZ WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW SURFHVV LQ
the acquisition of words is to derive meaning from discourse context 
(Nelson, 1996: 143) and to take action within it. 
The foreign language learner has a conceptual-experiential 
knowledge which is already mapped on his or her mother tongue. Even 
if the mapping is not perfect (which it never is), it can be hypothesized 
                                               
32
 ,DPIROORZLQJ/HZLV¶VOH[LFDODSSURDFK(1997) in that lexis is grammaticalised. 
33
 The term motivation is used to denote the relationship existing between the 
phonemic or morphemic composition and structural pattern of the word on the one 
hand, and its meaning on the other. According to Ullmann (1973), there are three main 
types of motivation: phonetical, morphological, and semantic.  
 211 
that part of the learning process is to loosen rigid units within and 
between these two kinds of knowledge and to make the organisation of 
both more flexible in order to acquire a new language. It is a matter of 
empirical research to find out the turning points of that process.  
In what follows I propose two indicative examples of 
onomasiological investigations in the classroom. 
7.4.3 Onomasiological investigations with lexis and syntax 
The learners carry out onomasiological investigations of the target 
language and culture while the educator adopts an etic approach34 to 
facilitate and collate the findings of the group in order to project them 
beyond the level of personal reflection. I suggest taking an approach to 
syntax and lexis as close to the OHDUQHUV¶ personal experience as 
possible so they can discover overlappings and gaps between the 
different L1s in the group and the target L2. 
 
7.4.3.1 Dictionaries 
Dictionaries are more frequently used for decoding (i.e. to find the 
meaning of a given word, its spelling, usage notes, etc.) than for 
encoding (i.e. to find a word to express a meaning whose form the user 
does not know or does not remember). Dictionaries that have a 
concept-oriented approach to provide help for those users who start 
from an idea and want to find the right word have been labelled under 
different terms that include: ideological dictionary (Shcherba, 1995), 
                                               
34
 See 6.2 Emic and etic 
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semantic dictionary (Malkiel, 1975), conceptual dictionary (Rey, 1977), 
speaker-oriented lexicon (Mallinson, 1979), thematic wordbook 
(McArthur, 1986), nomenclator (Riggs, 1989)35. I will stick to the term 
³RQRPDVLRORJLFDO´ (Baldinger, 1980) since it has a clear contrastive 
FRQFHSW LQ ³VHPDVLRORJLFDO´ DV RSSRVHG WR WKH UDWKHU YDJXH ³PRUH
WUDGLWLRQDOGLFWLRQDULHV´XVHGIRUWKHGHFRGLQJSXUSRVHVLQGLFDWHGDERYH 
The macrostructure of an onomasiological dictionary is based on 
an ontology or theory of the world. Since the conceptualisations in 
which users (foreign or not) engage do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the lexicographer such an ontology can reveal mismatches 
within and across languages, but such disparities constitute a source of 
DZDUHQHVV RI WKH IRUHLJQ OHDUQHUV¶ RZQ ZRUOGYLHZ DQG FRQVHTXHQWO\
they are elements to compose their personal epistemologies. Such 
differences can pass unnoticed when using semasiological dictionaries 
because the ontology behind the word is taken for granted to different 
degrees. However, semasiological dictionaries that are machine 
readable can be used for onomasiological searches as long as they 
have the information to find a word by following semantic links36. The 
output can be an alphabetic list of words according to concepts, as in a 
thesaurus (Sierra, 2000: 227-228).  
                                               
35
 Sources originally cited by Sierra (2000). 
36
 According to Rizo-5RGUtJXH]¶V UHYLHZ (2008), the most complete onomasiological 
information in the English language is found in the &DPEULGJH $GYDQFHG /HDUQHU¶V
Dictionary on CD-ROM. (2nd Ed., version 2.0a, 2005), whose Smart Thesaurus is 
easy to use. Equally accessible is the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 
Language Activator, writing assistant edition CDROM (Updated 4th Ed., 2005). The 
2[IRUG $GYDQFHG /HDUQHU¶V &RPSDVV 'LFWLRQDU\¶V :RUGILQGHU (7th Ed., 2005) is, 
according to Rizo-Rodríguez, clearly inferior in coverage to the Activator since it 
targets intermediate learners. 
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7.4.3.2 Semantic syntax 
Bouchard (1995) argues that meaning is underdetermined by form even 
in simple cases and that it is impossible to build knowledge of the world 
into grammar and still have a describable grammar. Simple semantic 
representations and simple rules to relate linguistic levels in a semantic 
approach to syntax such as the Simpler Syntax Hypothesis/SSH 
(Culicover & Jackendoff, 2006) and computer programmes such as the 
Constructive Heuristics Induction for Language Learning/ CHILL (Zelle 
& Mooney, 1993) can offer useful models for human language learning 
that can be implemented in the curriculum.  
According to the SSH, the syntactic structure is only as complex 
as it needs to be to establish interpretation (Culicover & Jackendoff, 
2006: 414). A more elaborate structure of semantics than the syntax 
that expresses it is to be expected because some components of 
meaning such as modality, aspect, quantifier scope and discourse 
status receive relatively inconsistent syntactic encoding within and 
across languages (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2006: 416-417). However, 
the learner can bridge the gap between meaning and syntactic structure 
inductively and heuristically from extralinguistic evidence.  
According to Culicover (2006: 416), the elicited parts of the 
interpretation are supplied by semantic/pragmatic principles where the 
syntax has no role but the SSH does not make the syntactic structure 
disappear, it only makes the relation between knowledge of language 
and use of this knowledge more transparent: 
Despite the considerable reduction of complexity under 
Simpler Syntax, syntactic structure does not disappear 
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DOWRJHWKHU KHQFH WKH WHUP µVLPSOHU V\QWD[¶ UDWKHU WKDQ
µVLPSOH¶RU µQRV\QWD[¶ ,W LVQRWDPDWWHURIVHPDQWLFV WKDW
English verbs go after the subject but Japanese verbs go at 
the end of the clause ± nor that English and French tensed 
clauses require an overt subject but Spanish and Italian 
tensed clauses do not; that English has double object 
constructions (give Bill the ball) but Italian, French and 
Spanish do not; that English has do-support (Did you see 
that?) but Italian, French, German and Russian do not; that 
Italian, French, and Spanish have object clitics (French: Je 
W¶DLPH EHIRUH WKH YHUE EXW (QJOLVK GRHV QRW ,W LV QRW D
matter of semantics that some languages use case 
morphology or verbal agreement, or both, to individuate 
arguments. That is, there remains some substantial body of 
phenomena that require an account in terms of syntactic 
structure. (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2006: 414) 
The acquisition of the syntactic structure can be realised by 
means of experience-derived knowledge in a heuristics devised by the 
learner who invents37 syntactic and semantic categories38 that 
eventually may become subsumed under more general ones or refined 
into more specific ones. Learners first are guided to produce overly-
general rules of thumb that later constrain inductively until they 
generate semantic and syntactic classes of words and phrases that are 
generalisable to novel sentences. The benchmark of success is the 
degree of adjustment of novel combinations to cultural intelligibility and 
standard forms.  
                                               
37
 ³,QYHQWLRQ´ LQ WKLV FRQWH[W LPSOLHV DQ LQGXFWLYH SURFHVV WR EULQJ DERXW D FDWHJRU\
regardless of its novelty for an observer.    
38
 This is inspired in CHILL (Constructive Heuristics Induction for Language Learning), 
an Artificial Intelligence programme that makes a machine invent useful semantic and 
syntactic categories of a natural language (Zelle & Mooney, 1993). 
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7.5 Cultural Studies Centred in the Person 
Whereas semasiology investigates the plural, sometimes inconsistent 
and contradictory meanings of formalised structures, onomasiology 
constructs systems to contain and integrate the complexity of meaning. 
By taking imperfect but formalised structures as a departure point, it is 
possible to formulate ideal systems that are complete and coherent, not 
per se but for language users and for language theorists at a point of 
their history. 
The concept of language as a network of relationships in which 
the value of each element ultimately depends on the value of all the 
other elements, an inter-relationship that parses the whole it contains, 
opened a new horizon of linguistic relativity. Such was the perspective 
assumed in the famous maxim "la langue est un réseau où tout se 
tient"39 (Bally, 1951: 128). However, not only linguists are involved in 
creating ideal representations of language that are complete and 
coherent, but everybody is. The difference is in their purpose and their 
categories: whereas linguists devise a meta-language systematically to 
describe language complexity in a logical way, every language user 
creates emergent representations, which are implicit and functional, in 
order to understand and use language. Besides logic, the coherence of 
onomasiological representations is based on perception and 
experience. According to Nelson: 
The verbal contributions to the development of cultural 
categories are integrated with experientially derived 
FDWHJRULHV>«@7KHFRRUGLQDWLRQDQGLQWHJUDWLRQSURFHVVHV
                                               
39
 The origin of this phrase is controversial (see Hewson, 1990; cited in Seriot, 1994).  
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LQYROYHG LQ WKH DVVHPEOLQJ RI FXOWXUDO WD[RQRPLHV >«@
exemplify the more general problem encountered during 
the preschool years of reconfiguring individual 
experientially based representations established 
independently of linguistic input to accommodate 
knowledge systems displayed in language. This 
reconfiguration cannot be accomplished through individual 
constructive processes alone, but requires implicit and 
explicit collaboration with knowledge bearers. (Nelson, 
1996: 332) 
 The developing language of the infant, with her holophrases and 
pivot words is a whole whose elements are defined by inter- relation, 
and the same applies to emergent grammars. By definition, wholes are 
stable but the wholeness of meaning involves the continued 
amendment of the parsing and the adjustment between two kinds of 
knowledge: the lexical-semantic and the conceptual-experiential. 
The child and the adult, the beginner and the proficient foreign 
language user face a similar problem: constructing relatively stable and 
coherent representations of how the language works in order to use it. 
Even if the child is nine months old, she is actively working out a 
representation of language where meanings are inter-relatedly limited, a 
process that carries on for life. Completeness of representation, 
however, remains so until disrupted by a new concept-form or 
experience that proves to be relevant for a specific language user. The 
language user develops an onomasiological system to get hold of the 
specific language to which it is referred but, from the perspective of an 
observer, any representation is incapable of fully containing language 
polysemia and phenomenic diversity, which is the starting point of 
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semasiological analyses. It is important to notice that the semasiological 
TXHVWLRQ³:KDWGRHVWKLVPHDQ"´heralds an array of possible answers 
wider than WKHRQRPDVLRORJLFDOTXHVWLRQ³+RZGR,VD\WKLV"´EHFDXVH
the latter is already oriented by an intention and a whole way of life, 
which Williams (1961) called  ³VWUXFWXUHRIIHHOLQJ´. 
In an onomasiological system, concepts are defined by their 
position in a network of logical, perceptual, functional and experiential 
relationships independent to a certain extent of linguistic structures 
(Heger, 1964, 1969), which makes translation and language art 
possible. Language art widens the gap between the abstract concept 
and the materiality of both language and content only to reunite them in 
a new expressive form with multiple layers of meaning. 
The separation between lexical-semantic and conceptual-
experiential knowledge can be made intentionally wider by playing with 
the possible meanings of novel words, even invented by the player, 
which is a figure called jitanjáfora by the Mexican writer Alfonso Reyes, 
ZKRGHILQHGLWDV³WKHLQGHSHQGHQWDHVWKHWLFDSSUDLVDORIZRUGVE\WKH
SXUHDQGVLPSOHYDOXHRIWKHLUSKRQHWLFYLEUDWLRQV´(Reyes, 1983 [1929]: 
186). The meaning evoked by the sound of an already existing word but 
which is new to a child or a foreign language learner is an example of 
jitanjáfora at work in which the acoustic materiality of language and its 
synaesthetic associations constitute the perceptual figure.  
As described and classified by Reyes, jitanjáforas can be poetic 
when they convey with a new word of charismatic sound and form a 
meaning not yet captured by a single utterance. For example, in Ten 
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New Colours by Otto-Raúl González (2007 [1967]), the poet loosens 
FRQYHQWLRQDOO\ µSDFNHG¶ XQLWVRI PHDQLQJ DQG XQLWVRI IRUP LQ RUGHU WR
conceive of new meanings materially expressed by new and sensorially 
rich words. The foreign language user may or may not be aware that a 
word she or he coined for a purpose does not exist in the dictionary and 
the question is whether such findings should be dismissed and on what 
grounds, which is an ancient recurrent problem from Plato to Alice in 
Wonderland.  
From the onomasiological point of view, translation demands 
reflection on the way in which meaning and shared or idiosyncratic 
connotations can be encoded in linguistic expression, whereas from the 
semasiological point of view, comparing a number of culturally and 
historically located translations makes visible a diversity of 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVRIWKHRWKHUDQGRIWKHWUDQVODWRU¶VVHOIDVDPHPEHURI
a community, a generation, a gender, etc. The historical nature of 
cultural and linguistic differences has complex ideological implications 
which have translation as a unique window into oneself and the other:  
The meanings enshrined in a certain culture can be understood 
EHWWHU LI VHHQ WKURXJK µIRUHLJQ OHQVHV¶ WKDW LV E\ PHDQV RI D
careful analysis of the meanings embodied in a certain language 
vis-à-YLVWKHLUµHTXLYDOHQW¶RUDEVHQFHRILWLQDQRWKHUODQJXDJH
,W LV LQ WKH OLPLQDO VSDFH EHWZHHQ WKH µLQVLGH¶ DQG WKH µRXWVLGH¶
that a culture can be more fruitfully interpreted. (Napoli & 
Polezzi, 2000: 108) 
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Paradoxically in our globalised era,40 it is now clearer than ever that 
linguistic diversity is one of the biggest assets of humanity, a position 
endorsed by the European Union language policies (Beacco & Byram, 
2007). 
The foreign language learner experiences, by definition, a 
separation between meaning and form in the target language. If 
learning a foreign language implies striking a balance between 
communication and expressivity, the stress has to be made in 
onomasiological projects rather than in training to produce native-like 
utterances as fast as possible. The question is, how much more can we 
understand about language learning if transitional spaces were not only 
allowed but encouraged?  
In order to create the conditions to answer the previous question, 
I suggest that the emphasis of language learning could be on how to 
convey meanings (the more formless, the better) by reaching a balance 
between novel words and phrases and a shared body of linguistic and 
cultural knowledge, rather than restricting what one wants to say to the 
meaning of lexicalised chunks learned by rote$VRSSRVHGWR³FXOWXUDO
LQIRUPDWLRQ´ Ddded to linguistic structures and functions, culture is 
intrinsic to onomasiological projects centred in the construction of 
meaning from experience, which is necessarily personal. Cultural 
studies centred in the person emphasise three distinctive aspects: (1) 
                                               
40
 The term Globish, a term coined in 1995 by Jean-Paul Nerrière, refers to a 
simplified form of the English language as used throughout the world by (non-
proficient) non-native speakers to accomplish basic communicative tasks (see 
McCrum, 2010). The common practice of using words and phrases in Globish instead 
of their local equivalents has been considered by some as a factor of impoverishment 
of language diversity. Pennycook (2004) GHVFULEHVWKH
FRQIOLFWLQJGLVFRXUVHV¶GHULYHG
form the existing tension between English seen as a neutral, pragmatic language, and 
as tied to imperialist practices that threaten local languages and cultural values. 
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the autonomy of the learner, (2) the aesthetic involvement of the learner 
with the materiality of meaning and form in the target language, and (3) 
the narrative nature of the process.   
7.5.1 Language learner autonomy 
Cultural studies centred in the person look into the ways in which the 
language user develops a culturally intelligible and socially effective 
voice. The construction of a voice in a foreign language constitutes an 
emic plurilingual onomasiological investigation conducive to the 
development of an agency and, consequently, to the autonomy of the 
language learner.  
As pointed out before, , XVH WKH ZRUG µUHDGLQJ¶ DV D VKRUWKDQG
term to refer to the semasiological construction of meaningDQGµZULWLQJ¶
as an abbreviation of the onomasiological construction of meaning. In a 
tendency that permeates most common notions of learning and learning 
assessment, reading and writing are not usually regarded as equally 
important. I suggest that, to the extent that learner autonomy becomes 
an educational priority, a balanced combination of both orientations of 
meaning construction benefits the discipline and the learner as a 
person. 
Learning has been conceived of as a form of input (Sharwood-
Smith, 1999; J. K. Swaffar, 1989). Accordingly, activities in education 
that are considered as substantive are reading and listening, and in 
order to confirm that what was read and heard was taken in, speaking 
and writing follow ±±usually in that sequence. However, rather than 
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³WDNe LQ´ ³UHDFK RXW´ LV D EHWWHU URRW PHWDSKRU IRU OHDUQLQJ DQG E\
extension, for learning a language. Since learning implies the creation 
of transitional spaces where to put and make new connections with 
what is found, actively reaching out is both a condition and an 
actualisation of learning.  
Reading as a semasiological investigation offers a very wide 
range of levels of difficulty which can be probed by questions whose 
complexity is in inverse proportion to the ease with which their answers 
are readily found in the text. In other words, the more easy-to-check an 
answer, the lower calibre its corresponding question might be (Sockett, 
2000; Stenhouse, 1975: 95)41 Nevertheless, low-quality questions are 
more common in teaching and in institutional evaluations because of 
WKHLU µREMHFWLYLW\¶ DQG UHODWLYH HDVLQHVV ZLWK ZKLFK WKH\ can be posed 
and marked. 
Writing suffers from a similar simplification for the sake of 
predictability and speediness. Though it could be used as a spearhead 
to investigate language in order to articulate hard-to-think thoughts, 
complex experiences, feelings42 and, in parallel, to construct an agency 
voiced in a foreign or local language, writing is usually neglected by 
putting it in the service of simplified forms of reading. Reading and 
writing are obviously interconnected, but their imbalance as the 
                                               
41
 6RFNHWW  HODERUDWHV RQ 6WHQKRXVH¶V VWDWHPHQW 7KH PRUH REMHFWLYH DQ
examination" (or assessment pattern) "the more it fails to reveal the quality of good 
teaching and good learning" (Stenhouse, 1975: 95)  
42
 )HHOLQJ DFFRUGLQJ WR 0LDOO DQG .XLNHQ ³acts as a taproot into experience and 
memory that is independent of the standard conceptual domains; it provides a 
framework for evaluating the appropriateness of interpretive ideas; and, above all, it is 
the matrix in which ideas about the self are embodied and negotiated´(D. Miall & D. 
Kuiken, 2001) [electronic paper without number pages provided]. 
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perceptual figure or background and the quality of the questions or 
problems that trigger either forms of meaning construction are the 
issues.  
For a kind of education in the service of learning, not only do the 
quality of the questions matter, regardless of the ease to formulate them 
and assess them. The identity of the person who asks the questions is 
critical as well. Reading starts typically as a semasiological activity 
³:KDW GRHV WKLV PHDQ"´ DQG WKH HQVXLQJ SURFHVV LV DVJRRG DV WKH
questions that guide it. Initially, they are likely to be WKH WHDFKHU¶V
questions in order to offer indicative models but eventually they have to 
give way to genuine OHDUQHU¶VTuestions.  
Firstly, a question is genuine to the extent that, while being 
significative for what the learner knows, it probes into the unknown, 
even into the formless. Secondly, a genuine question is already a 
creation which has in itself the seeds of and the way to its answer and, 
as such, it is a guideline of the learning process. Finally, giving form to 
the as yet formless engages the whole person (judgement, willingness, 
action, creative apperception, feelings and imagination) and therefore 
the learners design themselves by asking and pursuing their own 
questions. If learning has a crucial condition, it is that the learner is able 
to ask a genuine question and pursue it. 
Creating the conditions for the learners to ask their own genuine 
questions to onomasiologically construct texts from meaning and to 
semasiologically go beyond a given text constitutes an important part of 
language and culture education in the service of learning. A curriculum 
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on language learner autonomy has as a main problem how to elicit 
genuine questions from the learners, questions that can guide their own 
learning. Writing, understood as an onomasiological practice, is 
fundamental for the development of the self in terms of agency, voice 
and textual identity43, which ultimately implies a process of language 
learning autonomy.  
7.5.2 Knowledge as design 
The term design as a process "refers to the human endeavor of shaping 
objects to a purpose" (Perkins, 1986: 1) while, as a noun, means "a 
structure adapted to a purpose" (Perkins, 1986: 2). The prototype of a 
design is a tool, which is devised for a purpose or purposes, it has a 
structure, a model case, and arguments that explain and evaluate it 
(Perkins, 1986: 5). Designs can be invented by individuals, or refined by 
different people over time; but they can also, as language, come about 
through social evolution. 
According to David Perkins, "to think of knowledge as design is 
to think of it as an implement one constructs and wields rather than a 
given one discovers and beholds. The kinesthetic imagery implicit in 
knowledge as design fosters an active view of understanding worthy of 
emphasis in teaching and learning" (Perkins, 1986: 132) Theories, 
models and abstract structures like arguments are tools for thinking that 
can be redesigned to better fulfill their intended function. 
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As a vehicle of ideas and references to refine our hold on the 
world and as an instrument for conviviality, theories, models, rhetorical 
figures and pragmatic formulas are instances of designs whose purpose 
is to a certain extent detachable of language itself (i.e. they have 
different possible actualisations within the same language depending on 
purpose and context).  
However, natural languages are not mere vehicles for something 
else. Much of their complexity and opaqueness is due to their social 
and sensorial materiality, wich is a matter of design in itself. Whereas 
theories and models are timeless in their referred world, language 
materiality brings attention back to the present time in terms of the 
actual conditions of social exchange and the non verbal messages 
conveyed by the physicality of speech and the written word.  
Involvement with the materiality of language is aesthetic but not 
necessarily artistic. It engages the experience of form and meaning 
conveyed in verbal and non verbal ways in context and the language 
user can structure language materiality for a purpose according to 
which the effectiveness of the design is necessarily variable from 
person to person and even for the same individual from one task to the 
other.  
Design of language materiality promotes human development for 
it brings a creative attitude (Fromm, 1959) to the fore, but it is not easy 
to refer to the language user as a designer of language materiality. To 
read literary texts and write about them are clearer concepts than 
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reading and writing literarily --and yet this is what the language 
materiality designer does.  
/LWHUDU\ZULWLQJLVFDOOHG³FUHDWLYHZULWLQJ´ in educational contexts 
for the ideological reasons analysed by Horner (1983) and even though 
reading and discussing literary texts occupy modern linguists to 
different degrees, the actual experience of writing literarily is not 
acknowledged to be professionally and epistemologically relevant to 
what they do. According to Bérubé: 
The fields of creative writing and criticism [...] are currently 
segregated and often in rhetorical and even institutional 
conflict. The result [...] is that this separation of fields has 
created two distinct arenas of literary criticism, two distinct 
prestige systems, neither of which is professionally 
relevant to the other. (Bérubé, 1992: 49)  
 
I argue that language materiality design, to which I will refer as creative 
or literary writing, is a practice characteristic of cultural studies centred 
in the person that embodies knowledge of a form irreducible to its 
theoretical articulation (Pakes, 2004) but, nevertheless, 
epistemologically relevant44.  
Creative writing in a foreign language situates the learner as the 
agent of his or her individual project of experience articulation. 
5D\PRQG :LOOLDPV VDZ OLWHUDWXUH DV ERWK ³WKH SUDFWLFH RI D FROOHFWLYH
mode and the practice of what are in effect innumerable individual 
SURMHFWV´ (R. Williams, 1977a: 36). The practice of writing as the 
articulation of a felt sense (Gendlin, 1978) as opposed to responding in 
                                               
44
 See Chapter 9 Learning for understanding: nexus of social and personal 
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an abstract, collective mode is a way to recognise the individual without 
reducing it to the collective. Awareness of the collectivity is 
retrospective, whereas awareness of the individual experience is in the 
present time. 
 
5HDGLQJ DQG ZULWLQJ OLWHUDULO\ LQYROYH ³WKHPDWL]DWLRQ´ RU
³DOOHJRUL]DWLRQ´ ZKLFK FRQVWLWXWH D WZR-way journey: from assigning 
abstract meanings to texts and events, to ascribing concrete and 
tangible expression to abstract notions. According to Graff (1992: 82), 
DOOHJRUL]DWLRQ LV ³WKH IXQGDPHQWDO RSHUDWLRQ RI LQWHOOHFWXDO FXOWXUH
cutting across the divisions between the humanities, the social 
VFLHQFHV DQG SHUKDSV HYHQ WKH SK\VLFDO VFLHQFHV´ ,W LV a matter of 
investigation for cultural studies centred in the person to find out how 
(from the perspective of the observer) to make happen (from the 
perspective of the participant) processes of thematization45 that 
contribute to emergent grammars46 and agentive voices. 
Though I agree with Noland (1997) that Cultural Studies has 
tended to neglect poetic texts (which illustrate the thematizing journey 
from abstract notions to concrete expression), her reasons fall short of 
what literary reading and writing can offer to the investigation of culture. 
In her opinion, poetry is a useful tool with which to explore how 
symbolic value is institutionally and ideologically constituted. Her 
DQDO\VLV DSSURDFKHV SRHWU\ DQG DGYHUWLVLQJ LQ VXFK D ZD\ WKDW ³RQO\
close texWXDO DQDO\VLV FDQ KLJKOLJKW WKH VHPLRWLF GLVWLQFWLRQV >«@ WKDW
                                               
45
 See 8.2.3 Literariness and language acquisition 
46
 See 6.4.1 Grammaticalisation of linguistic agency  
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LQVWLWXWLRQDOERXQGDULHVHQJHQGHU´ (Noland, 1997: 40). In other words, in 
hers and in similar approximations the artful concreteness of poetic 
texts disappears. By contrast, literary reading or writing in a foreign 
language (or in a language made strange, for that matter) implies 
widening the space in which to play with the illusion of transparency and 
opaqueness conveyed by concrete forms. 
The combination of semantic direction (onomasiological-
semasiological) and subjective involvement (observer-participant) do 
not receive similar attention socially and educationally. The 
semasiological approach of the observer connotes mastery of 
information and objectivity, whereas the onomasiological approach of 
the participant can be stigmatised as a mere peculiarity. The 
semasiological observer sees experience as the constructed effect of 
specific cultural texts and practices. The critical analysis begins with the 
LQYHVWLJDWRU¶VRZQ LQVHUWLRQ LQWRDKLVWRULFDOO\DQG LGHRORJLFDOO\VSHcific 
moment, and subjectivity is retrospectively placed at a historical 
juncture. Important as this direction of cultural investigation is, if left 
unchecked, the biographical and corporal singularity of the individual 
subject vanishes. 
On the other hand, for the onomasiological investigator of culture 
WKH³SHUVRQDO´LVQHYHUVLPSOHQRUDPHFKDQLFDOHIIHFWRIODUJHUIRUFHV
³0H´DQGWKH³NQRZOHGJHIRUPH´DUHLQWKHPDNLQJLQWKHSHUVRQDOUH-
creation and re-HQDFWPHQWRIFXOWXUH6LPLODUO\ WR:LQQLFRWW¶VYLew that 
the creation usually stands in the way of the creative process, for 
Raymond Williams the strongest barrier to the recognition of human 
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cultural activity is the regular conversion of experience into formed 
wholes rather than forming and formative prRFHVVHV +HQFH:LOOLDPV¶
approach to meaning making of culture is onomasiological:  
If the social is always past, in the sense that it is always 
formed, we have indeed to find new terms for the undeniable 
experience of the present: not only the temporal present, the 
realization of this and this instant, but the specificity of the 
present being, the inalienably physical, within which we may 
discern and acknowledge institutions, formations, positions, 
EXW QRW DOZD\V DV IL[HG SURGXFWV GHILQLQJ SURGXFWV >«@ DOl 
that escapes from the fixed and explicit and the known, is 
grasped and defined as the personal. (R. Williams, 1977b: 
128) 
Consequently, the semasiologically oriented criticisms of his work are 
missing Williams¶V RQRPDVLRORJLFDO SRLQW. For example, Robert Con 
Davis criticises Williams for making of culture an outgrowth of 
H[SHULHQFH ,Q 'DYLV¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI :LOOLDPV H[SHrience is an 
essence, ³WKH DEVROXWH JURXQG RI DOO FXOWXUDO HODERUDWLRQV DQG
IRUPDWLRQV´(Davis, 1991) which is contrary to the historical and praxial 
existence that makes of experience the epistemological foundation of 
culture though not its chronological antecedent. 
By contrast with semasiological projects where the cultural 
VWXGLHVFULWLFLVFRPPLWWHGWRWKH³LQWHUHVWHG´WDVNRIPHGLDWLQJSRZHULQ
relation to knowledge (Davis, 1991: 33), onomasiological projects of 
cultural studies of the person place the emphasis on empowering the 
participants through a pedagogy of exchange (Bleich, 2001). The 
investigation of cultural experience is pedagogic in its widest sense for 
being inductive rather than introductory to the subject. It is a dialogue 
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involving the scrutiny of the act of knowing and its actors, their 
experience, their agency and the re-design of their identities. 
An anthropological approach to culture leaves out this vision and 
practice. Culture is seen as a way of life that one learns without being 
aware of it, but awareness is the proper subject of history. Not just the 
transformation of awareness as the product of any number of factors, 
but the mutation from reactive to proactive, from being a product to 
becoming an agent of oneself. $OOHQFRPSDVVLQJDVLWVHHPV³WKH IXOO
range of practices and representations in which meanings and personal 
and group identities are formed´(Frow, 1992: 25, emphasis added), the 
anthropological approach skips what identities form agentively. 
Social and economic aspects do not disappear but are in the 
background of an onomasiological project of cultural studies centred in 
the person, which follows a different direction of meaning making to 
)RXFDXOW¶V WKHRU\ RI SRZHUNQRZOHGJH describing the political and 
philosophical forces at play within cultural artefacts. However, 
)RXFDXOW¶VLGHDVFKDQJHGRYHUKLVOLIHWLPHKHVKLIWHGKLVREMHFWRIVWXG\
from discourse, to power, to the different modes by which human 
beings are made subjects (Peters, 1999: 5). While subjection is the 
UHGXFWLRQRIWKHSHUVRQHXSKHPLVWLFDOO\FDOOHG³SDUWLFLSDQW´WREHLQJD
mere subject of analysis outside his or her own agency, subjectification 
is the process of becoming an agentive subject. Only to the extent that 
in the selfing process (McAdams, 1996, 1997) people make themselves 
subjects, power/knowledge theories can benefit an onomasiological 
project, which is a plausible development according to Foucault: 
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Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous 
and making human consciousness the original subject of 
all historical development and action are two sides of the 
same system of thought. (Foucault, 1992: 12) 
Onomasiological approaches to cultural studies focus on the 
construction of human agency through the dynamics of the signifying 
system, which is seen as historically enacted and re-created collectively 
and individually by human agents. The arguments for the play of 
language as such within the forces of a discourse already-in-being 
(Peters, 1999) make only part of an interpretation of culture that has 
been kept unbalanced, which is no wonder since culture is a 
multifaceted  concept:  
within this single term [culture], questions of freedom and 
determinism, agency and endurance, change and identity, 
the given and the creatHGFRPHGLPO\LQWRIRFXV>«@,WLVDQ
HSLVWHPRORJLFDO³UHDOLVW´QRWLRQVLQFHLWLPSOLHVWKDWWKHUHLVD
QDWXUHRU UDZ PDWHULDOEH\RQGRXUVHOYHVEXW LWDOVRKDV ³D
FRQVWUXFWLYLVW´ GLPHQVLRQ VLQFH WKLV UDZ PDWHULDO PXVW EH
worked up into humanly significant shape. (Eagleton, 2000: 
1) 
Of the two dimensions pointed out by Eagleton, the constructivist 
one is the most apposite to cultural studies centred in the person, which 
brings to the fore the speech-mediated condition of identity, agency and 
narratives of life.  
7.5.3 Self-narratives 
Cultural studies centred in the person acknowledge the interconnection 
of individual and collective narratives but focus on individually 
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constructed narratives. Such an emphasis is intended to encourage the 
task of creating coherence as the responsibility of the individual person 
(Kraus, 2005: 268). Even though social and cultural constraints are 
acknowledged, any given set of stories and rules for their construction 
involve as well a margin of freedom in the selection, recombination and 
projection of patterns to generate new entities.  
Whereas semasiological approaches to identity emphasise the 
contradictory aspects of narratives, onomasiological approximations 
aim at the creation of coherent projects and relatively stable meanings. 
Maintaining complexity and heterogeneity allows for more diverse and 
QXDQFHGDQVZHUVWRWKHTXHVWLRQµZKDWGRHVWKDWQDUUDWLYHPHDQ"¶EXW
WKRVH VDPH DVSHFWV PDNH WKH SXUVXLW µKRZ GR , QDUUDWH WKLV"¶
increasingly difficult, and the consequences of a lack of emplotment to 
make sense of experience are more significant than a mere intellectual 
exercise when the telling of a self-narrative means constructing a 
coherent life (Kraus, 2005: 273). Such a quest, however, is not 
necessary in most social and educational settings. As Kerby points out, 
³ZHWHQGWRQDUUDWHRXUVHOYHVRQO\ZKHQWKHVLWXDWLRQFDOOVIRULW´DQGLW
LVGRXEWIXO³WKDWthe majority of people have too great a desire or need 
to know who they are´ (Kerby, 1997: 129). Not that all self-narratives 
are agentively constructed, but for the emergence of an agentive voice 
with a certain degree of coherence, self-narratives are essential. Like 
maps of the self, onomasiological projects imply the simplification of two 
territories: lived experience and the simultaneous and contradictory 
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possibilities of language. They are meant to construct relatively stable 
meanings that, while being communicative, are no less personal.47 
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Chapter 8 A design approach to literacy 
8.1 Literacy and its avatars 
The relationship between language and knowledge reaches a further 
level of complexity with the learning of a second or foreign language 
ZKLFK LV EXLOW RQ WKH OHDUQHUV¶ H[LVWLQJ /-based knowledge and their 
emerging multiple literacies (Byrnes & Kord, 2002: 36). However, 
before discussing the relatively recent use of the term in the plural, the 
concept of literacy needs clarification.   
The connection between literacy and knowledge has been 
distorted in two ways: on the one hand, it has been oversimplified by 
making it appear as some form of technical training in neutral encoding 
and decoding skills separable from any but the most featureless 
content. On the other,  literacy has been inflated to the status of 
independent variable that through a critical mass of literate people can 
enable the financial advancement of developing countries (Levett & 
Lankshear, 1994).  
The term literacy can be regarded as a catchphrase with diverse 
connotations, including functional and cultural as well as critical ones, 
through a wide range of subdivisions ranging from basic to higher order 
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abilities. It is also a term which can mean mastery in any subject as, for 
example, technological literacy or literacy in foreign languages.  
A purely descriptive definition of literacy can produce numerous 
and disparate categories. In the same way that intelligence was at 
some point defined as what intelligence tests measure, literacy studies 
are what institutional settings (departments, journals, research centres) 
concerned with literacy education do. Thus, the term can range:  
>«@ IURP WKHRULHV DERXW DQG PHWKRGRORJLHV IRU WHDFKLQJ
children's literature to ethnographic analyses of computer-
mediated communication practices via approaches to 
teaching and learning the mechanics of encoding and 
decoding print and surveys of literacy "levels" (Lankshear, 
1999: 207) 
It is suggested that three factors intervene in such conceptual 
heterogeneity. Firstly, there is an ontological bias that reifies language 
learning as if it were a context-free product. Second is that the 
dialectical interaction between encoding and decoding skills on the one 
hand and their respective symbolic code on the other is ignored and 
hence the code supposedly remains constant. The third and last factor 
is that such skills are not conceived of as historically constructing the 
³HQFRGHU´ QDPHO\ WKH PHQ DQG ZRPHQ ZKR WUDQVIRUP WKHLU RZQ
identities and subjectivities through acts of literacy.  
In a reified view of literacy as a set of encoding and decoding 
skills, once someone is presumed to be literate, he or she can get on 
with learning content in a way that is reminiscent of the abstract 
separation between the dancer and the dance. Hence, a reified vision 
of literacy in a foreign language compartmentalises encoding and 
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decoding verbal skills from the whole that constitutes cultural and 
communicative competence in the first and other languages. By 
contrast, an integrative definition of literacy as the theory and 
methodology of language education accounts for an acquired mastery 
of language to articulate agency in narrating a storied world DQGRQH¶V
own handle in it. In the case of foreign language education, such an 
agency necessarily modifies and is modified by existing forms of 
literacy attached to L1. 
Though literacy needs be investigated in detail, if the overall 
picture is lost (namely, the larger cultural and social practices enacted 
by literacy acts) literacy studies multiply into ever increasing and 
fragmentary specialities as pointed out above. A concept of literacy that 
is sensitive to the historical nature of socialising practices mediated 
through texts has as a corollary not one but a plurality of literacies 
derived from the diversity of possible semiotic textual forms and 
modalities.  
Multiple literacies involve how to engage with culture, with its 
forms of knowledge and communication and its various publics. 
Accordingly, cultural literacies are defined as ³V\VWHPV RI VRFLDO
behaviour and knowledge that reveal culture-VSHFLILF IXQFWLRQV´ (J. 
Swaffar & Arens, 2005: 40). In order to be literate in a foreign language 
and culture, learners need to understand how situations refer to one 
another across time, space, and user groups in culture-specific 
functions and to be able to refine their grip on the language through 
them. Though multiple literacies necessarily constitute a complex web 
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of mutual reference, they serve language learning goDOV ³E\DIIRUGLQJ
repetition and elaboration of key concepts in different frameworks to 
HQKDQFH ODQJXDJHDFTXLVLWLRQDWDOO OHYHOV´ (J. Swaffar & Arens, 2005: 
50).  
Literacy studies have relied on psychological paradigms called 
³QRQ VRFLDO´ by the representatives of the social turn in literacy or 
socioliteracy (Baynham, 2000; Gee, 1998, 2003; Heath, 1982; Heath & 
Wolf, 2005; Lankshear, 1999; Levett & Lankshear, 1994). 
Psychological theories were criticised for reducing learning to individual 
mental capacity/activity and thus for blaming marginalised people for 
being marginal (Lave, 1996). Such theories were criticised for 
beginning and ending with individuals and for trying to explain social 
differences in terms of groups of individuals.  
Subsequently, with the study of larger social and cultural periods 
and processes, the concept of literacy was defined quantitatively and 
treated as unproblematic, a tendency that changed after the mid 1980s, 
when literacy studies were increasingly grounded in a socio-cultural 
framework. However, it lacked the experiential aspect of concrete 
literacy acts. Besides being socially rooted, literacy also constitutes an 
existential stance for articulating life experience and the agentification 
of the self. Both aspects: one micro-embedded in the history of 
personal experience, and the other macro-embedded in social living 
necessarily complement each other. Critique should be not an end in 
itself, but a means to the agentification of concrete people. How to 
agentify is, I believe, the bottom line of literacy education. 
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8.1.1 The social turn in literacy studies 
Within adult and continuing education, literacy has had a remedial 
connotation, particularly associated with migrant populations and 
educationally disadvantaged individuals in countries like the United 
States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (Lankshear, 1999: 
205) where "functional literacy" has been a defined area of research 
and pedagogical interest since the Second World War.  
Literacy, as social praxis to move beyond functionality and 
towards the re-design of individuals and communities was not only 
marginal but virtually unknown until the late 1970s with Paulo Freire's 
work in Brazil (Freire, 1970, 1974, 1985; Freire & Macedo, 1987). Even 
now, literacy studies, understood as a generic name for diverse 
scholarly activities concerned with understanding and enhancing the 
production, reception and transmission of texts are more involved with 
the objectification of those who enact literacy acts (namely, an 
observer's perspective) rather than with the re-design of subjectivities 
in the perspective of the participant. 
Initial criticisms of the psychologistic-technicist reductions of 
literacy insisted on the dialectical link between word and the world. 
)UHLUH¶VPDLQSRLQWZDVWKDWHGXFDWLRQPXVWEHFRPHSUD[LVRIOLEHUDWLRQ 
(Freire & Macedo, 1987). The present discussion connects with such a 
stance about literacy, which is situated within the processes of re-
creating and sustaining social worlds through language-mediated 
practices and the historical option facing education of serving as either 
an instrument of liberation or of oppression. In this work, education is 
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viewed as praxis of agentification which cannot be but in the first 
person ±singular and plural. 
Brian Street (1984) contrasted two models of literacy: the 
autonomous model (in which literacy was seen as an independent 
variable) and the ideological model (based on the sociocultural view). 
Autonomy for him is reduced to a hypothetical existence independent 
of material enactments of language in social practice. According to 
Street, literacy consists in the forms textual engagement takes within 
specific material contexts of human practice, but it is not clear the 
extent to which those specific material contexts actually constitute the 
independent variable of the ideological or politically committed models 
of literacy.  
In highly complex relationships subject to historical change such 
as human societies, independent variables are mere abstractions that 
nevertheless function as conceptual tools imposed by the analysts in 
order to keep their thinking within limits of commensurability and to 
shape their arguments. For example, authors like Havelock (1963), 
Goody (Goody, 1977; Goody & Watt, 1963 ) and Ong (Ong, 1977, 
1982) stressed literacy as an independent variable when they 
promoted it as instrumental in the move from primitiveness to advanced 
states of development. 
 By contrast, authors representative of the social turn (Baynham, 
2000; Castell, Luke, & Luke, 1989; Cazden, 1988; Cook-Gumperz, 
1986; Edelsky, 1991; Hodge & Kress, 1988; Lankshear & Lawler, 1987; 
K. Levine, 1986; Luke, 1988; Michaels, 1981; Scollon & Scollon, 1981; 
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Stubbs, 1980) made explicit a socio-cultural paradigm of literacy 
studies according to which conceptions and practices of reading and 
writing (including practices of imagination, foregrounding, world 
viewing, etc.) evolve and are enacted in context-dependent relations 
and structures of power, values, beliefs, goals, purposes and interests. 
According to Gee (1996: Chapter 3), the social turn in literacy moved 
away from focussing on individuals and their 'private' minds and 
towards interaction and social practice. However, a socio-cultural 
approach limited to the perspective of the observer (namely, an etic 
approach) is not aimed to empower individual agency. 
Literacy considered as the result of the conjoint operation of text-
related components and the social factors integral to the practices in 
question (Street, 1984) leaves in the middle a gap: the concrete 
individuals who believe, intend and act. Whereas "the myriad literacies 
that play out in social life should be seen as integral components of 
larger practices" (Lankshear, 1999: 205), they must be seen as well as 
actively intended and co-created by concrete men and women. Literacy 
is not an independent variable which produces effects in "its own right," 
but social practices are not independent of concrete enactments either.  
Meaning in literacy is relative to individual and collective 
experience of the world. A reified conception of literacy 
decontextualizes "literacy bits" from their larger embedded practices, 
which renders them experientially meaningless. Socio-cultural theories 
investigate the macro- embeddedness of human practices and they do 
so from the perspective of a critical observer. However, there also 
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needs to be acknowledgement of a micro-embeddedness in the history 
of concrete men and women who are agents, to different degrees, of 
their own narratives of life, the history (understood as the 
transformation of awareness through action) of which constitutes their 
own agency. 
The epistemological and ethical need to interrelate the socio-
cultural with the personal derives from the double perspective of social 
facts and social actions: whereas social facts involve an objective intent 
from the perspective of the observer (following Emile Durkheim's 
definition of social facts), social actions imply a participative stance 
where the awareness and beliefs of the agents play a decisive role in 
understanding society (following Max Weber's definition of social 
action).  
8.1.2 The concept of literacy practices 
The notion of literacy practice involves the two dimensions of what is 
being done and how participants understand, value and construct 
ideologies around what is being done (Baynham, 2000: 100). In this 
section, I discuss the double condition of literacy as objective events 
and subjective actions and experiences IURPWKHLQVLGHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ. 
According to Heath (1983: cited by Baynham 2000), literacy 
practices occur on empirically observable occasions where participants 
make use of written language to achieve social purposes. 
Consequently, literacy events are empirical, observable activities 
related to written texts. However, though some form of objectification is 
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fundamental in order to manipulate language and reflect on it, writing is 
not the only way to objectify language. Moreover, literacy involves overt 
and covert behaviours, which can be indirectly studied and interpreted 
only with the collaboration of the subjects of investigation. 
Screening out literacy practices as only those which are 
empirically observable and where participants make use of written 
language to achieve social purposes compromises the subjective 
component of literacy acts. Whereas reflecting on language use in 
order to clarify feelings, for example, is a literacy act to the extent that 
language is being objectified, it is not obvious in what way such an 
action, rather than its possible consequences, is achieving a social 
purpose.  
While a literacy event (similarly to a social fact) needs to be 
empirically observable, a literacy action or literacy experience is 
subjective and thus not directly observable but mediated through the 
interpretation of narrative actions and narrated events. An illustration of 
how these two ways of situating literacy practices can be concealed by 
one of them is to be found in the key concept of µcontext¶ in the New 
Literacy which emphasizes the interaction of text and practice in 
understanding literacy in use. Context is understood dynamically as the 
ways in which the broader socio-cultural categories impinge on and 
shape literacy practices played out in individual life histories (Baynham, 
2000). Larger social practices such as power relations and the impact 
RI LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG LGHRORJLHV DSSHDU DV WKH ³WH[W´ WKH FRGH LQ ZKLFK
OLWHUDF\ SUDFWLFHV DUH HQFU\SWHG +RZHYHU WKH ³VXE-WH[W´ LV LJQRUHG
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namely the underlying experiences, bodily or otherwise, that construct 
lived experience and can be brought into focus through literacy 
practices; apparently, there is no place left by the over-encompassing 
³WH[W´ 
According to Lankshear (1999) how we frame literacy amounts to 
taking up a stance for or against particular discursive practices, a 
decision that ultimately affects the quality of education. Decisions about 
how to conceptualise literacy come down to "moral choices about what 
theories one wants to hold based on the sort of social worlds these 
theories underwrite in the present or make possible in the future" (Gee, 
1996: cited by Lankshear 1999). Such a connection between literacy 
practices and their subscribed possible worlds has been highlighted as 
well from the opposite direction, originating in theories of persuasion 
that have been applied to literacy practices: 
Any theory of persuasion [...] implies a theory of motive [...] 
every theory of motive implies a theory of individual identity 
and social reality [...] every theory of self and society implies 
a conception of language and language teaching. (Lanham, 
1983: 15) 
A socio-cultural approach to literacy reviews the meaning of 
pedagogy to move it beyond technical and psychological 
interpretations. Within this framework, the study of literacy is a practice 
whose aim is to build on its own understanding not only to advance 
itself conceptually and theoretically, but also to engage people ethically 
and politically in desirable futures.  
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Even though, according to Lankshear, the socio-cultural approach 
is an improvement in explanatory power over traditional models of 
literacy centred in encoding and decoding skills, the yardstick of 
meaning and transformation is experience which ultimately is individual 
though collectively co-created. In what follows, I will argue that the 
socio-cultural approach to literacy needs to be in dialectic relationship 
with personal experience as constructed by concrete men and women 
during their lifetime. 
Meaning, practice and agentivity actualise each other. Human 
practice has an intrinsic relationship with the creation, discovery, 
reproduction, distribution, exchange, refinement and contestation of 
meanings (Lankshear, 1999: 211). However, through practice and the 
decisions it implies, the individual also discovers, contests, refines, and 
challenges his or her own agentivity and consequently his or her own 
identity. Meaning, practice and agentivity converge in experience, 
which is historical. The orientation of the socio-cultural approach is 
integrative to the extent that it aims at the social experience of literacy, 
as opposed to the increasing fissiparity of the traditional model of 
literacy limited to encoding and decoding print relying on skills 
describable in psychological terms.  
Socioliteracy studies highlight literacies integral to social practices 
wider than those taught at school and document the extent to which 
some social groups fit better than others within the context of school 
learning. But not only at macro level are there mismatches: at micro 
level, burgeoning work in cognitive studies has pointed out the gulf 
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between how people learn and how schools teach (Gardner, 1993b). 
Imaginative, empathetic, affective and aesthetic modes of 
understanding are underused in mainstream school literacies (Eisner, 
1991; Winter, 1999). In both respects, larger social practices (macro) 
and personal ways of making sense of experience  (micro) are typically 
a long way removed from the routines so prevalent in school discourse 
(Crème, 2000; Crème & Hunt, 2002; Crème & Lea, 2003; Gee, 2003). 
However, foreign language programmes could conjoin them by 
promoting agentification and autonomy, which are inherent in high-
quality learning (Benson, 1997; Bereiter & Scardamalia, 1987).  
Literacy practices, as Baynham (2000) notes, cannot be taken as 
a given, as if they were a known technology transferrable from context 
to context. They need to be discovered and investigated in their varied 
ways of knowing for each discipline. Below, I argue that narrative is 
both a source of evidence of literacy research (Baynham, 2000) and a 
method of (self) investigation in foreign language literacy. 
History can be regarded as playing a double and interlocked role: 
one, involving what people do in the form of a sequence of events to 
account for by means of interpretation and documentation, the other 
being the subjective dimension of what people make of what they do in 
the form of values placed on their actions. The interlock between them 
LV WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK SHRSOH¶V VXEMHFWLYLWLHV DUH WUDQVIRUPHG E\ WKHLU
actions and how their actions transform their subjectivities. *UDII¶V
sketch of historical literacy studies (H. J. Graff, 1991) is but marginally 
applicable to literacy in foreign languages, since foreign speakers do 
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not necessarily follow the same patterns of literacy practices linked to 
class, gender, age, etc. enacted by native speakers. Moreover, the shift 
from literacy in history to history in literacy needs further adjustments 
since foreign speakers do not necessarily constitute communities with 
a common history. Although the historical literacy practices of foreign 
speakers are macro-embedded, their acquired agency in L2 is micro-
embedded; WKH ODQJXDJH OHDUQHU¶V DFTXLUHG DJHQF\ LQ / HPHUJHV
through his or her personal experience of the foreign language and 
culture.  
History, understood as the dialectical relationship between action 
and subjectivity, is both collective and personal. Historical studies of 
literacy practices that construct the stories that NHHS D SHUVRQ¶V OLIH
going constitute what I distinguish as a narrative experience-centred 
approach. Narrative provides a rich source of information about how 
participants engage in the design of their own identity and agency, and 
how they articulate their life stories and values in which they use and 
reflect about the literacies current in their social worlds. In the practice 
of using narrative as evidence (e.g. Baynham, 2000), however, the 
participants are objects of the investigation belonging to someone else. 
The agency of the research and the interpretation of the findings do not 
FRUUHVSRQG WR WKHP EXW WR VRPHRQH ZKRVH LGHQWLW\ LV ³QHXWUDO´ DQG
supposedly beyond the drama of participation. The researcher is an 
expert whose account is thought to be not a subjective narrative itself. 
However, the appointed identity of the researcher (namely, the person 
who asks the questions and interprets the answers) is crucial in 
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deciding on methodological, ethical and epistemological issues such as 
WKH DSSOLFDEOH SHUVSHFWLYH HLWKHU WKH REVHUYHU¶V RU WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V
and the consequent empowerment of being the agent of the enquiry 
and the interpreter of the findings. 
It has been pointed out that narrative is our mode of imposing a 
moral structure on experience (Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001; Bruner, 
2005, 2008). Narrative provides a form for recognizing departures from 
ordinariness, categorizing possible variations in the world as ordinarily 
encountered, and the means of recognizing who and what is needed to 
UHVWRUHQRUPDOF\1DUUDWLYH³LVRIWHQVDLGWREHYDOXH-laden in contrast 
WRORJLF¶VYDOXH-IUHHGRP´(Bruner, 1985: 100). 
 The fact that narrative does not just report events but also 
evaluates them has been used by Baynham (2000) as evidence of the 
ideologies and values that drive it and, by extension, of the self-
representation or identity work being accomplished by the narrating 
subject. Baynham studied how two speakers (the interviewer and the 
interviewee) use the resources of narrative in exploring the 
LQWHUYLHZHH¶V OLWHUDF\ SUDFWLFHV +H GUDZV RQ WKH WUDQVFULSW RI WKH
interview with the Mass Observation Archive48 correspondent W632 
and his research questions were: 
+RZGR WKHSDUWLFLSDQWV LQWHUYLHZHUDQG LQWHUYLHZHHXVH
QDUUDWLYH >«@ DV D OLQJXLVWLF UHVRXUFH WR FRQVWUXFW
presentations of self in the interview? 
                                               
48
 The Mass Observation Archive (MOA) is a social research project, based at Sussex 
University, UK, which, since its foundation in the 1930s, has carried out a range of 
social research, drawing on data provided by its respondents, volunteers who agree to 
provide data in response to MOA Directives. (Baynham, 2000) 
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 :KDW GR WKHVH QDUUDWLYHV WHOO XV DERXW WKH GLVFXUVLYH
construction of literacy practices/identities? (Baynham, 
2000: 101). 
It is iPSRUWDQWWRQRWHDFRXSOHRIGLVWLQFWLYHIHDWXUHVLQ%D\KDP¶V
method. Firstly, he applied his research questions to analyze what had 
been elicited by independent directives. Secondly, the identity work is a 
retrospective reflection for the interviewee and also a postfacto re-
construction for the researcher (namely, Baynham) but not a scaffold of 
self-agentification of the narrator. 
By contrast, in the present proposal for using narrative to study 
and to encourage foreign language literacy, my emphasis is not on how 
narrative enters into discourse (as done by Baynham) but on the ways 
that narrative is fundamental to articulate experience for emerging 
identities and agencies. Since my aim is to promote literacy through 
enquiry and reflection, there are no fixed roles for agents and patients 
as in most common designs of social research and of language 
learning. The subject in the role of facilitator models the roles of 
enquirer and respondent whereas the participants reflect on the ways 
in which narratives construct an agentive self in emerging grammars of 
the target language. The central assumption is that language and 
identity are constructed narratively.  
8.2 The ontological bias of language studies 
I use this ancient term, ontological, to refer to a shift from virtuality into 
substance and from abstraction to concretion in language study. I am 
not favouring any particular doctrine of reality such that I dismiss all the 
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RWKHUVDV³ELDVHG´VLQFH,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVDSULYLOHJHGYLHZ
that happens to be unbiased, but I am using the term as a synonym of 
load (as with loaded dice) to mean the tendency to reify abstractions. 
Language studies (and language itself for that matter) are loaded 
with a tendency to reification; in other words, with an ontological bias. It 
is a limiting tendency which consists in abstracting away a 
SKHQRPHQRQ¶VGLYHUVLW\DQGKLVWRULFLW\%\ WKLQNLQJRf something as a 
thing what we are actually thinking of is our own construct ±simplified 
for a purpose and shaped to fit our cultural categories. If reification is 
an in-built tendency of language, it may follow that there is nothing to 
do about it, as if it were a congenital disease (for those who dislike 
biases of any kind). However, even if reification certainly sets 
constraints, freedom is child to constraints. If unheeded, a constraint is 
simply a limitation, an invisible wall. If observed, the limits may become 
the frame of a window.  
I distinguish between two kinds of ontological biases in language 
studies: in language representation and in the shaping of entities ±
including humans. A reified representation of language makes it appear 
ahistorical, ideologically neutral and as a self-contained rule-bound 
stable entity. On the other hand, the ontological bias is a prime source 
for language users to become the agents of their own open-ended 
identity.  
The first kind of ontological bias (reification) is mainly unintended: 
despite bona fide efforts to describe and explain language, the fact of 
stripping it of its materiality and density of shared and idiosyncratic 
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connotations has created concepts of compromised validity (Harris & 
Wolf, 1998; Makoni & Pennycook, 2005; Pennycook, 2001, 2004; 
Reagan, 2002, 2004, 2006; Reagan & Osborn, 2004). Language is 
material as a human construct, and it inevitably reifies itself, its objects 
as well as anybody who uses it.  
The second kind of ontological bias (subjectification), by contrast, 
is facultative: language users may or may not be the agents of their 
own reality. While the first kind of reification has had as a byproduct the 
divorce between certain aspects of scholarship and practice in 
language studies, the second kind involves the possibility of reframing 
scholarship to enable a disciplinary practice centred in the language 
XVHUV¶ DJHQF\ LQ UHODWLRQ ERWK WR DFTXLULQJ WKH ODQJXDJH DQG WR
reshaping their own linguistic and cultural identity.  
8.2.1 The object of language studies 
,W LV SURSRVHG WKDW OLWHUDF\ UDWKHU WKDQ ³ODQJXDJH´ LV WKH REMHFW RI
language studies. Literacy, understood as the objectification of 
language in order to reflect on it and shape it for a purpose, engages a 
nexus of symbolic forms grounded in the social and physical materiality 
of language. Under this light, literariness (understood as object and 
construct of the aesthetic perception of language) is a parent to literacy 
since the apperception and use of the generative patterns of language 
relies on sensorial and relational structurers not limited to the linguistic 
code but instrumental to reflect on it, objectify it and refine its use. 
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The elaboration and documentation of this statement starts with 
a discussion of literacy (8.2.2) and literariness (8.2.3) that leads to a 
developmental-cognitive section on the symbolic streams of language 
DFTXLVLWLRQ %DVHGRQ +RZDUG *DUGQHU¶V ILQGLQJV  ,DUJXH WKDW
the apperception of language materiality (8.3.1 to 8.3.3) is fundamental 
to attain proficiency in language. 
The last part of the chapter (8.4.1 to 8.4.3) resumes the initial 
elucidation of the object of language studies, elaborating on an 
extended notion of literacy that includes the design of an agentive voice 
and, consequently, the design of an identity of the language user.  
8.2.2 Literacy¶VFHQWUHV 
Literacy is conceived of as text-centric inasmuch as being considered 
as a property of the text (Kern, 2000): once the learner has mastered 
WKH WH[W¶V OLQJXLVWLF HOHPHQWV, reading follows. Such a perspective 
involves at least two reifications: literacy becomes the measurable end 
product of instruction and it is reduced to knowledge of the code so it is 
unproblematic. More advanced conceptions of reading and writing, 
however, have made the point that there is a plurality of literacies 
(reader-centric and writer-centric) to acknowledge the diversity of 
codes converging in the comprehension and production of texts. 
Literacy, according to Kern (2000), includes particular ways of 
thinking, valuing and behaving that are essential to becoming 
communicatively competent in a variety of linguistic and cultural norms. 
Such an expanded definition allows for ways of knowing that are partly 
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articulate and partly tacit ±something unthinkable in a concept of 
literacy limited to reading and writing verbal texts: 
µ/LWHUDF\¶FRQYH\VDEURDGHUVFRSHWKDQWKH WHUPV 
UHDGLQJ
 
and 'writing' and thus permits a more unified discussion of 
relationships between readers, writers, texts, culture, and 
language learning. (Kern, 2000: 2)  
This more inclusive point of view, plus the experiential process of 
encoding and decoding texts is the direction we take in order to 
elaborate on literacy as design.  
8.2.3 Literariness and language acquisition 
Literariness is not exclusive to literature by any means, as the Russian 
structuralists noted (Shklovsky, 1965) but an intrinsic feature of the 
human mind and language with the caveat that language studies are 
not to be reduced to footnotes of cognitive sciences (as implied by                       
Simon, 1995).  
Bridging the gap between the study of literacy and literariness in 
foreign language acquisition can open new fields such as the non-
native symbolic construction of identities. So far, the identity of subjects 
(people) has been virtually irrelevant in the understanding of an object 
of study, as have been the transformations they go through in the 
process of acculturation. Thus, Hispanic and Latin American studies 
may not be substantially different as practised in England or in China 
because the object is the same (namely, the language and the culture 
of Iberic and Latin American peoples) and the identity of the subjects 
who perform such studies is similarly abstracted away; which is 
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understandable since it provides a certain degree of commensurability. 
However, that common element is based on unshared ground. 
*UDQWHGZHDOOVWXG\%RUJHV5XOIR&HOD%XxXHO«but who "we" are 
introduces a dramatically different basis, not only from the general 
perspective of different nations and cultures, but also from the view 
point of becoming the concrete user of another language through which 
to experience texts, oneself and others. 
So far, the study of Modern Languages does not deal with "the 
way language students become aware of [...] the poetics of language 
use, and the role that they themselves play as non-native readers in 
the symbolic construction of foreign literary texts" (Kramsch & 
Kramsch, 2000: 570). Moreover, MLs study does not encompass how 
students engage as readers, writers and performers of poetic texts, 
theirs and WKHLUSHHUV¶.  
Such shortcomings firstly derive from the reduction of language-
learning to the training of abilities (mainly through habit formation). 
Secondly, it has resulted in the reduction of literary comprehension to 
critical discussion about the text, in a manner of writing that often 
FRQVWUXFWV DFFRUGLQJ WR ,YDQLþ DQG 6LPSVRQ ³IDOVH LGHQWLWLHV WKDW
distract, distort or bury what students want to say, creating an image of 
themselves as persons with which they do noW QHFHVVDULO\ LGHQWLI\´
,YDQLþ	6LPSVRQ.  
Literariness and its related poetic expressions are intrinsic to 
language itself (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Turner, 1996) but, even if 
we have been using literariness all the time, that does not dispense us 
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with the reflexivity and craftsmanship necessary for effective 
metaphors, parables or narratives. Does the refinement of language 
analog use in ways helpful to design a personal voice matter for the 
scholarly study of language? I think it does, both for the discipline itself 
and for the human development of those engaged in the discipline. 
The production of autobiographies is a way to construct both 
language and identity (Linde, 1993; Pavlenko & Lantolf, 2000). The 
stories of language learners give an insight into the role language plays 
in the process of continual reinvention and improvisation required for 
composing a contemporary life (Bateson, 1989). The crucial point is in 
what language are those autobiographies to be written and at what 
stage of learning. I describe below three available options. 
One possible way of investigating language and identity is to 
examine literary autobiographies produced by bilingual authors not 
writing in their first language. That is what Pavlenko and Lantolf (2000) 
do in their study of several writers who learned their second language 
as adults. Another possibility is to interview foreign language 
assistants, lecturers or professors who share a common language with 
the researcher. In both cases, narratives account for previous 
experiences (narrated events) but the actual use of language (narrative 
actions) is not the object of investigation, which is not meant to create 
an educative experience for the subjects because its ownership and 
purpose lies outside them. 
A third option, which is the one I propose, involves the teacher 
guiding the learners to explore their own language-learning experience. 
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Reflection on experience and experimentation with literariness bring 
about texts which are the object of investigations that belong, in the first 
place, to the learner as a means of reflection and self-direction. From 
the perspective of the scholarship of the discipline, they also belong to 
the teacher in the role of researcher and as a facilitator working with 
the learner. Learning in this way engages two kinds of narratives: an 
account of events and their interpretation (mainly written in the first 
language but including findings in the second language) and 
experiments with the language (narrative actions taken in the foreign 
language but allowing for gaps filled in the first language as markers to 
direct ensuing learning). Such narratives are meant to capture and 
transform an on-going process, and the educative experience is a 
matter of scholarly reflexion.  
/HDUQHUV¶QDUUDWLYHVFDQEHDQREMHFWRI LQYHVWLJDWLRQof the non-
native symbolic construction of identities and poetic texts. Play and 
artistry have been long documented as interrelated (Huizinga, [1938] 
1980 ; Winnicott, [1971] 2002). In particular, the role of play in writing 
(Bénabou et al., 2001; Heath & Wolf, 2005) and in foreign language 
learning (Belz, 2002; Carter, 2004; Carter & McRae, 1996; G. Cook, 
1997; Heath & Wolf, 2005) shows the importance of playfulness in 
meaningful language experiences and in the poetic features of foreign 
language conversations (Kramsch, 1997, 1998).  
Language use contains discursive, cognitive and poetic means of 
representation of both the language itself and the language-mediated 
reference to the world. This also applies to foreign language users¶ 
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written and oral productions which constitute a window to investigate 
cognitive and discursive tools for coping with otherness. The 
investigation of non-native language use in different genres suggests 
foregrounding how discourse operates and the means, linguistic or 
otherwise, of attaining different rhetorical purposes. The use of a 
foreign language gives extra opportunities to investigate the shift of 
perception between looking at language (as when detecting something 
odd in the form, vocabulary choice, word order, etc.) and looking 
through language (as when attending to the referent) and how both 
perspectives shape the production of form and content, as when writing 
or speaking.49 
The shifts of attention between looking at and through the target 
language, applicable from think-aloud protocols and reported 
conversations to a diversity of stories, are articulated in a mixture of L1 
and L2 though aiming at gaining increasingly more control over the 
latter 7KH OHDUQHU¶V XVHV RI ODQJXDJH EHFRPH WH[WV RI VWXG\ IRU
multiple users: for the teacher both as a facilitator and researcher, for 
WKHOHDUQHU¶VSHHUVDQGIRUWKHOHDUQHUKHUKLPVHOI.  
An aesthetic experience of language involves looking at it in ways 
that convey deeper layers of the meaning seen through it. An aesthetic 
experience implies continuous interaction between the perceiver and 
the object being perceived engaging cognitive and affective 
participation, DFRQGLWLRQWKDW'HZH\FDOOV³IXOOH[SHULHQFH´ZKLFKLVQRW
exclusive to the arts. An aesthetic experience, then, is dynamic and 
                                               
49
 Lanham (1983) LQWURGXFHGWKHWHUPV³ORRNLQJDW´DQG³ORRNLQJWKURXJK´ODQJXDJHWR
develop his theory of rhetoric and visual art.  
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participative: it is productive and not passively receptive (Dewey, 
1934). Learning to perceive aesthetically enlarges the capabilities of 
both impression and expression (Moran, 1990; Read, 1970), reception 
and production. In the same way that aesthetic experiences are not 
restricted to the arts, the aesthetic experience of language is not limited 
to literature. Distinguishing between literature and non-literature is not 
imperative for making of literariness a fundamental aspect of linguistic 
production and reception. In this sense, literariness is more general 
than literature. In another sense, however, ³OLWHUDWXUH´ LV PRUH
encompassing because it involves history, collective and individual 
transformation and a complex of symbolic systems which the term 
³literariness´lacks. 
Literacy and literariness have been linked in language learning 
mainly in two not necessarily exclusive but sometimes clashing 
directions: language through literature and literature through language 
(Friedman, 1992). As an example of the first, linguistically oriented 
perspective, Ronald Carter and Deidre Burton suggest language 
learners engage in sW\OLVWLF DQDO\VHV RI OLWHUDU\ WH[WV ZKLFK ³FDQ VHW
interesting language problems to solve" (Carter & Burton, 1982: 7) in 
order to understand deeper layers of syntactic and semantic properties 
of the target language.  
My elaboration of the counterpart, literature through language, 
derives from the synthesis between the previous one and its antagonist: 
the opposition to the use of literary texts in the composition classroom 
(Lindemann, 1993, 1995a, 1995b) for teaching ³WKLQJV WR NQRZ QRW
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ZKDW ZULWHUV GR´ (Lindemann, 1993: 292)50. The practices traditionally 
attached to the study of literary texts show historically situated ways to 
identify literature and how to understand it, but they generally fail to 
harness the language connection with other forms of symbolic 
expression in order to facilitate the use of literariness to design voices 
that for novel are no less personal. Literariness and literacy, grounded 
in the materiality of language, are in the confluence of different symbolic 
systems whose developmental and cognitive investigation must have a 
place in the theory of language acquisiton.  
8.2.4 Symbolic waves of language acquisition 
According to Howard Gardner (1993b), the development of language as 
a distinctive symbolic stream shares traits with other symbolic streams. 
A stream is an aspect that seems inherently tied to a specific symbol 
system and that exhibits no apparent link to any other symbol system 
with which it differs syntactically: "The syntactic aspect of symbolic 
development is severely constrained within each domain (perhaps for 
genetic reasons) and one syntactic trajectory has no close relation to 
other syntactic trajectories." (Gardner, 1993b: 74) 
Seven streams of symbolic development were investigated by 
Gardner and his colleagues: language, pretense play, two-dimensional 
depiction (drawing), three-dimensional depiction (modelling with clay and 
building with blocks), bodily expression, music and numbers. They were 
IRXQGWRLQWHUEUHHGLQZKDW*DUGQHUFDOOV³GHYHORSPHQWDO ZDYHV´ 
                                               
50
 For a historical account of this controversy, see Belcher (2000). 
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At year-long intervals, beginning at about the age of two, 
children pass through a series of developmental crests that 
we have termed waves. While streams adhere within the 
boundaries of a symbol system, waves are less readily 
regulated; by their nature they are inclined to spill over the 
banks that purportedly define their domain. Thus our waves 
of symbolization, which are basically semantic in nature, 
characteristically begin within a single symbol system but 
then extend to other symbol systems, even ones in which 
they are not considered to be appropriate. (Gardner, 1993b: 
74) 
Gardner distinguishes four waves of developmental 
symbolization. I sketch them in and around the language symbolic 
stream without details such as the approximate age of onset because I 
am using them as references. The point I want to raise here is the 
richness of the symbolic avenues to the objectification and shaping of 
language. 
7KHILUVWZDYHRIGHYHORSPHQWDOV\PEROL]DWLRQ³UROH-VWUXFWXULQJ´
consists in the capability of capturing in language the knowledge that 
there are events, that these involve agents, actions, and objects, and 
that these events have consequences. Two- and three-dimensional 
depictions, pretence play and bodily expression structure experience to 
VKDSH³OLWWOHVWRULHV´(Turner, 1996). 
In the second wave of developmental symbolization, called 
³WRSRORJLFDO PDSSLQJ´ UHODWLRQV RI VL]H RU VKDSH DUH V\PEROLFDOO\
captured. Though the main symbolic current here is spatial depiction, it 
overlaps with the language symbolic stream when its materiality is 
heard, seen or perceived in relational patterns. Because of symbolic 
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interbreeding, there are language rhythmic patterns in sound, sight and 
meaning (Frye, 1957). The ability to appreciate spatial or topological 
relations is mirrored in other forms of symbol use: 
Asked to create an ending for a story that has a number of 
characters, the child will collapse the characters into two 
contrasting roles (such as a good mother and a naughty 
daughter), thus preserving an overall topological 
relationship but not the explicit details and nuances. Or, 
seeking to master a song with an elaborate pitch contour, 
the child will simply observe when the contour undergoes a 
large shift in pitch direction and convert the song into a 
series of sharply rising and falling melodic contours. 
(Gardner, 1993b: 76) 
The third wave of symbolisation, ³GLJLWDO PDSSLQJ´, captures 
precise numerical quantities and relations as its main symbolic current 
is numeracy. However, inbred with the language symbolic stream, it 
involves a tendency of disambiguation to find precise and literal 
meanings.  
7KH IRXUWK DQG ILQDO ZDYH LQYROYHV D ³QRWDWLRQDO´ RU ³VHFRQG-
RUGHU´V\PEROLVDWLRQ,WVEDVLFFKDUDFWHULVWLFLVWRGHILQHWKDWVRPHWKLQJ
symbolically stands for something else and it involves the realisation 
WKDW WKH³VDPH´VLJQFDQEHUHDGRUZULWWHQ LQGLfferent codes to mean 
something else. This final wave builds on the previous ones to project 
them in patterns of inifinite possibilities of meaning and form. In a 
sense, this is the most important one in education given the abundance 
of notational instruments: literacy, numeracy, interpretation of formulas, 
graphs and statistics, musical scores, and so forth. However, in another 
sense, its tremendous power is underused to the extent that receptive 
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skills are overemphasised: students are taught to read and to write to a 
certain degree in the codes provided, but they are not encouraged to 
interbreed or create codes though Gardner gives numerous examples 
of notations and symbolizations of second order invented by children in 
their play which proves their capability.  
Later waves do not replace or displace the earlier ones but 
coexist with them, each one contributing to the experiential and 
symbolic richness of language. However, the study of foreign languages 
is usually constrained to the penultimate symbolic development (digital 
mapping). The previous two symbolic waves (role-structuring and 
topological mapping) are virtually unheard of, and the use of language 
in a second order of symbolisation by the design, for example, of 
playing on words, effective metaphors and stories ciphered within other 
stories (parables) are, if at all, isolated instances but not an integral part 
of a curriculum aimed at taking a generative stance (metalinguistic and 
metacognitive) which deprives the learners of a deeper and potentially 
transformative language learning experience. A scholarship of learning 
languages then can inquire into the waves of symbolisation spilling over 
language from the other symbolic streams in order to account for 
different ways of making sense of and producing language which, in 
turn, involve different paths of learning and performance.  
In its traditional meaning, literacy is considered as more basic 
than literariness. However, from a developmentally cognitive point of 
view, the opposite is the case: language materiality engages diverse 
symbolic streams for the apperception and use of language generative 
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patterns. The aesthetic perception and manipulation of language 
(aesthetic for involving the physicality of speech and a sense for the 
actual context in present time) precedes (and eventually steers) its 
digital and atemporal representation, which is just one symbolic wave 
that overlaps and interbreeds language as a distinctive symbolic stream 
with other symbolic streams.  
Meaning making relies on perception in order to be rich and 
multivocal. While recognition constrains perception (we tend not even to 
perceive what we cannot recognise), imagination sharpens perception 
and perception feeds imagination. Thus by learning to perceive, as 
opposed to merely recognising the other language and culture, the 
construction of an intercultural identity becomes, inter alia, an aesthetic 
process that works with perceptual patterns.  
Perceptual sensibility is developed by artistic cultivation (Eisner, 
1985, 1991). Art has an important epistemic function in that the forms it 
presents can be known only through the way they have been actually 
shaped. We recognise a man in virtually any human or non-human 
form; however, we perceive a particular man when two conditions are 
met: firstly, the source is rich and round, meaning not everything is in 
full sight; secondly, the viewer is open to perceive and able to do so. If 
both conditions are met, the source educates the viewer on how to 
perceive it, namely it enables the viewer to perceive this specific man, 
and such an education will add up to enrich the next experience.  
The learner focusses on specific facets and overall compositions 
of the way in which this man, that child, those aging friends and so forth 
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use verbal and non verbal means to communicate. In the process of 
revealing what is individual, a general figure emerges through which, 
nevertheless, concrete voices, faces and bodies reverberate. Such 
images are canonical, and literary texts are extraordinarily rich sources 
QRWRQO\RIVXFKLPDJHVEXWRIZD\VWRHGXFDWHSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI
language and culture to produce them. In this respect, To the extent 
WKDW³VW\OHVFDOOXSRQGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIRXUVHOYHV>DQG@GLIIHUHQWIRUPV
RIDUWSXW>XV@LQWKHZRUOGLQGLIIHUHQWZD\V´ (Eisner, 1991: 43), literary 
texts can help the non-native speaker to explore and experiment with 
possible selves partly articulated and partly left tacit through the 
language. One of the problems of language models presented in 
textbooks is their artificial explicitness. In real interactions, what is left 
tacit can be as or more important than what is said.  
In the construction of an intercultural identity, premature 
typification halts the perception of the other. Instead, the person needs 
to remain open to the particular and overall features of individuals, 
which is not a simple demand: in order to draw a tree, one needs to 
bracket out everything one knows about trees and about drawing. For 
that purpose, it is a common technique to use the non-dominant hand 
and to see the object from an odd angle, say, upside down. Non-native 
speakers can make a privilege of their own condition (Kramsch, 1997, 
1998) since, from the outset, they are not in their familiar cultural 
surroundings (an odd angle of perception), and they are not using their 
dominant language. These are ideal conditions to perceive rather than 
recognise but the tendency to terminate perception for the sake of 
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recognition is socially reinforced in order to attain efficiency, thus most 
IRUPV RI VFKRROLQJ UHZDUG LW DQG VKDSH WKHLU FDSWLYH DXGLHQFH¶V
behaviour and mind accordingly.  
Languages and cultures have plenty of situations with multiple and 
simultaneous sides and possible courses of action to take. Through the 
refinement of sensibility, the learner can attain more complex and 
nuanced pictures of how the symbolic systems in a culture work, 
including of course its language. Verbal and other forms of art do not 
simply produce objects that afford pleasure, but perceptual forms that 
enlarge understanding and pluralise ways of knowing (Cassirer, 1944).  
Cultural products are like holograms of their cultural matrix: in 
order to read one symbolic system, the learner needs to know other 
systems in different sensory modalities which support each other 
synchronically and diachronically. Therefore, literary texts in and of 
themselves may not lead to a successful construction of an intercultural 
identity. However, without an education of sensibility through artistic 
cultivation, an enlarged and enriched perception of the other language 
and culture is unlikely to occur.  
8.3 Language materiality 
The materiality of signifying practice (Gose, 1988) is an anthropological 
theory meant to reconcile pragmatic and symbolic approaches to 
culture. According to it, attempts to separate meaning from practice 
definitively could only be realized by abolishing both. In language 
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education, an eminent advocate of materiality is David Bleich (Bleich, 
1978, 1988, 1989, 2001). 
The materiality of language is a paradigm that converts language 
from a transparent medium to a palpable aspect of social relations. 
³0DWHULDOLW\´ LV XQGHUVWRRG LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH LGHD RI ODQJXDJH DV DQ
inactive conduit to something beyond it, a reference or content. It refers 
to the condition of historical uniqueness of language use in 
interpersonal situations (Bleich, 2001: 121). To adopt the principle of 
materiality means to view language as meaningful only within the 
interpersonal and collective contexts of its use, from which it cannot be 
UHPRYHG LQRUGHU WRVWXG\³ODQJXDJH´DORQH/LNH:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶V LGHDV
about language as a form of life and his theory of language-games 
(Wittgenstein, 1968: Section 19), language materiality is embedded in 
non-linguistic behaviour, in the lives of groups of active human agents.  
Bleich SURSRVHV ZKDW KH FDOOV WKH ³SHGDJRJ\ RI H[FKDQJH´ LQ
order to make language-related socialising practices consistent with 
language materiality. For him, the pedagogy of exchange is part of 
language materiality in the sense that it not only raises language 
awareness (Fairclough, 1992; Hawkins, 1981, 1984, 1992; C. James & 
Garrett, 1992), but also contributes to change the construction of such 
PDWHULDOLW\WKURXJKODQJXDJHXVH0DWHULDOLW\LVQRWDWHFKQLTXHEXW³D
XQLYHUVDO IHDWXUH RI ODQJXDJH´ (Bleich, 2001: 135) that sustains 
socialising practices of language awareness and transformation.  
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8.3.1 The materiality of language representation 
Corporal materiality refers to the breath, the sound, and other sensorial 
(and sensorial-like) features of speech and writing (Kristeva, 1989). 
The apperception and use of social and corporal materiality engage 
different symbolic streams that interbreed and build on each other by 
second-order symbolisations.    
Besides written language, there are other forms of objectification 
to reflect on and refine a hold on the world. These are sensorial and 
corporal means which include language in its opaqueness as a 
physical embodiment. It is not yet clear how babies objectify language 
in the process of acquiring it in complex contexts and, obviously, 
without the conventional objectifications provided by the written 
language. It is also not fully understood how illiterate people and adults 
coming from languages lacking a written form objectify the target 
language in non-formal education conditions; since they already have 
the cognitive shaping of a previous language, the presumption is that 
they use it as a gate or filter to isolate and highlight some features 
while others remain unnoticed or irrelevant for them, just as their 
literate counterparts do but without the benefit of counting with the 
cognitive precedent of the written word.  
The social construction of knowledge is partly implicit and partly 
articulated through acts involving texts and their encompassing 
discourses (Kern, 1995). However, the difference that makes for adult 
learners the fact of being literate or not in their mother tongue and then 
attempting to learn a foreign language can easily be overlooked when 
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DVVXPLQJ WKDW µHYHU\WKLQJ¶ LV D WH[W DQG WKDW OLWHUDF\ LQYROYHV RQO\
transferrable linguistic skills like those needed to read and write texts. 
Such an DVVXPSWLRQ ³HYHU\WKLQJ LVD WH[W´ LVERWKDQXQGHU- and an 
over-generalisation. It is an undergeneralisation of the ways to 
construct and objectify knowledge in that it bypasses tacit, non-verbal 
knowledge embodied in the arts which are present in but not restricted 
to verbal forms of objectification. It is an overgeneralisation as well in 
that it derives from a metaphor which is fairly restricted in history and in 
the political geography of the world. TKHFRQFHSWRIµWH[W¶DSSOLHGWRDQ\
FXOWXUDO µGRFXPHQW¶ QRWLFH WKH OH[LFDOFKRLFHRI WKHPHWDSKRUV ³ZRUOG-
as-a-ERRN´ DQG ³FXOWXUH-as-GRFXPHQWV´ KDV LWV RULJLQ LQ OLWHUDOLsed 
societies like ours which use the textual part of the objectification of 
knowledge to elaborate on the non-articulated part, and not the other 
way round.  
The relationship between tacit and articulated forms of 
objectification of knowledge has been an area of investigation of 
Michael Polanyi, for whom the tacit knowledge in the body precedes 
and proceedes to other forms of objectification, including the written 
language. For Polanyi, the body is the ultimate yardstick to make sense 
of the world: 
Every time we make sense of the world, we rely on our tacit 
knowledge of impacts made by the world on our body and 
the complex responses of our body to these impacts. Such 
is the exceptional position of our body in the universe. 
(Polanyi, 1969: 147-148) 
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In highly literalised societies, attempts to translate non-verbal 
symbols into verbal texts are common, for example in the analytical-
critical reviews of musical or visual works but little is known about the 
way in which articulated verbal forms are transformed into tacit 
knowledge, and it is even less understood how a foreign language 
becomes tacit knowledge in the body and through the senses in such a 
way that the learner can use it in imaginative and sensorially blended 
forms.  
Tacit knowledge is not mechanical, but experiential. Thus, what I 
call sensorial assimilation is not reducible to behavioural habits that 
have become automatic. The commonplace observation that some 
SHRSOH³DXWRPDWLFDOO\´XVHWKHLUVHFRQGODQJXDJHUHLILHVERWKODQJXDJH
and knowledge in that it makes their connection appear as a reflex or a 
conditioned response. On the other hand, by viewing language as 
experientially grounded, tacit knowledge becomes a lever in learning a 
new language as well as a heuristic guide to finding and constructing 
RQH¶VZD\LQLWDQGQRWMXVWDE\SURGXFWRIKDELWIRUPDWLRQ 
Tacit knowledge is fundamental to the perception of the poetic 
function of language and basic for the sensory assimilation of a foreign 
language. Objectifications using image, sound, movement, feelings and 
symbols are gateways into a new language and fLQGLQJRQH¶VRZQZD\
and voice in a new language requires a poetics. However, poetics and 
stylistics have been limited in their application to texts as products and 
to the perspective of the observer and so, in their traditional form, they 
fall short of giving language learners clues to acquire a language as an 
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expressive medium. Nonetheless, authors like McRae (Carter & 
McRae, 1996; McRae, 1991; McRae & Boardman, 1984; McRae & 
Pantaleoni, 1990; McRae & Vethamani, 1999), Carter (Carter, 2004; 
Carter & Burton, 1982; Carter & Long, 1991; Carter et al., 1989), Duff 
and Maley (Duff & Maley, 1990; Maley & Duff, 1989) have made 
important contributions to counterbalance this tendency. 
In close analysis, the gap (in theory and practice) between 
language as a code and its materiality, in the two meanings here 
described, affects not only the learners but also the opportunities for 
epistemological enrichment of language-centred disciplines such as 
Modern Languages. As a discipline, Modern Languages must take 
better advantage of the way language students become aware of the 
representational nature of language, what could be called the poetics of 
language use.  
Poetic and stylistic awareness of a language, foreign or not, 
involves distinctive symbolic waves as described above and the 
awareness of the poetic and stylistic features of the target language 
can be used for the creation of acts of literacy produced in order to 
VKDSHWKHOHDUQHUV¶RZQHPHUJHQWJUDPPDUVDQGOLWHUDFLHV$VWXG\RI
this nature constitutes an investigation froP WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V
perspective into plurilingual processes.  
8.3.2 The narrative mimetic paradigm 
While there is a tendency that began with Sartre (1962) and continued 
with Foucault (1981) Hayden White (1981) and Clifford Geertz (1995) 
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among others WR WKLQN RI QDUUDWLYH DV D NLQG RI ³ILFWLYH´ LPSRVLWLRQ RQ
reality, there are strong reasons to consider it as the mimetic paradigm 
of language, experience, action and, in the final analysis, human reality. 
In this discussion, I am associating narrativity as ingrained in human 
language, cognition and experience with literariness as the aesthetic 
perception of language and the more general notion of design. 
In spite of being an intrinsic dimension of language, literariness 
cannot be simply defined as a characteristic set of linguistic and textual 
properties but it is linked with experiential phenomena (Miall & Kuiken, 
1999: 122-123) triggered by similarity at any level (phonetic, 
grammatical, discursive or ideational). According to Polkinghorne,  
The notion of similarity is expressed linguistically as a trope or 
metaphor. This capacity to note and express to another person 
that one thing is like another thing is basic to human 
communication and the growth of language systems [Added 
emphasis] (Polkinghorne, 1988: 5) 
Narrative has been found linguistically and ideationally productive 
through devices that provide, for example, shifts in point of view, 
deformations of the temporal framework, or insights into character 
perspective through free indirect discourse. In a synthesis of story and 
projection, Mark Turner (1996) took metaphor and narrative to a new 
level by introducing parable as a fundamental mechanism of language 
and thought. According to him,  
Story is a basic principle of mind. Most of our experience, our 
knowledge, and our thinking are organized as stories. The 
mental scope of story is magnified by projection ±one story 
helps us make sense of another. The projection of one story 
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onto another is parable, a basic cognitive principle that shows 
up everywhere, from simple actions like telling time to complex 
literary creations. (Turner, 1996: v)  
)XUWKHUPRUH 7XUQHU H[SORUHV WKH SRVVLELOLW\ WKDW ³ODQJXDJH LV QRW WKH
VRXUFHRISDUDEOHEXWLQVWHDGLWVFRPSOH[SURGXFW´ (Op cit, loc cit) and 
has suggested that daily experience, being built up of tiny stories of 
agency and causality, makes grammar narratively motivated. Sentence 
VWUXFWXUHLQ7XUQHU¶VYLHZLVPRWLYDWHGE\WKHQDWXUHRIRXUFRQFHSWXDO
systems, which also led the evolution of the genre of parable (Turner, 
1996: 5). He considers the motivations for parable being as strong as 
the motivations for colour vision, which could explain the pervasive 
presence of stories and the wide use of parable in the world and in the 
course of history. 
The way in which narrative provides a mimetic paradigm to 
interpret the field of human action was elaborated by Ricoeur in three 
stages: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration (Ricoeur, 1988). 
0DUN 7XUQHU¶V DUJXPHQWV constitute an application of the first stage 
(prefiguration of the field of action) to the extent that the semantics of 
action (expressed in the ability to raise questions of who, how, why, 
with whom, against whom, etc.) prefigures grammar and that parable 
prefigures the ability to grasp one thing as standing for something else. 
In what follows, I will apply the other two stages, respectively mimesis2 
(configuration of the field of action) and mimesis3 (refiguration of the 
field of action), to elaborate further on narrative as a mimetic paradigm 
of experience and action.  
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Mimesis2 concerns the imaginative configuration of the elements 
given in the field of action at the level of mimesis1. Though stories are 
essential and necessary, they have to be invented: a story is not an 
agent-OHVV E\SURGXFW µVHFUHWHG¶ E\ D KXPDQ EUDLQ 2Q WKH FRQWUDU\
emplotment embodies praxial knowledge (Fisher, 1994) and skilfullness 
in order to unite three spatio-temporal conditions: that of the medium 
(oral or written, but also plastic or musical), that of the representation 
(what the story is about), and the relationships that are established 
between them in their transmission and reception (Kreiswirth, 2000: 
303). Ricoeur described them as the time of narrating, the narrated 
WLPH DQG WKH ILFWLYH H[SHULHQFH RI WLPH SURGXFHG WKURXJK ³WKH
FRQMXQFWLRQGLVMXQFWLRQRIWKHWLPHLWWDNHVWRQDUUDWHDQGQDUUDWHGWLPH´
(Ricoeur, 1986: 77). 
There is an order that stories introduce to human life, to the same 
extent to which living a human life involves the construction of devices 
of self-understanding such as narratives that sustain identity and a 
sense of causality. From the structure of one thing after another arises 
the conceptual relation of one thing because of another. It is this 
FRQYHUVLRQWKDWVRZHOO³LPLWDWHV´WKHFRQWLQXLW\GHPDQGHGE\DOLIHDQG
makes it the ideal model for personal identity and self-understanding, 
as noted by Ricoeur. However, the isomorphism between perceptual, 
cognitive, and expressive activities does not account for a transparent 
relationship between the narrative way of knowing and the known. The 
actual form that such means take implies learning cultural forms which, 
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nevertheless, are bound to be transformed by repetition51 and 
experience, both social and personal. According to Deborah Tannen 
(cited by Carter, 2004: 7-8)³UHSHWLWLRQLVthe central linguistic meaning-
making strategy, a limitless resource for individual creativity and 
interpersonal involvement´ 
The objections to narrative as an imposition on reality can be 
refuted on the basis that narrative is not an object with a paradoxical 
relation with reality, treated as if it were another object (as in the 
chicken or the egg causality dilemma). Narrative is not a substance but 
an activity (Polkinghorne, 1988: 5) and an historical activity for that 
matter which transforms the actor and the DFWRU¶V DZDUHQHVV WKURXJK
her or his own action. The products of narrative activity are connected 
entities that transform each other. 
Though narrative is hard-wired in language, experience and the 
meaning of human actions, the learning and the practice of culture 
provide the devices to make increasingly distinctive (and yet 
interrelated) the temporal strands of the telling (the actual discursive 
performance) and the told. Both strands, however, are constituted by 
more than time and sequence transformed into causality. By means of 
similarity (Polkinghorne) and projection (Turner), the telling and the told 
propel ways to say something and ways of knowing something to say 
that dialectically build on each other. 
Whereas narrative as a cognitive process is not available to direct 
observation and transformation, stories are. This circumstance makes 
                                               
51
 ,Q3RONLQJKRUQ¶V WHUPV ³UHSHWLWLRQ´VWDQGV IRU ³VLPLODULW\´DPRUHDFFXUDWHFRQFHSW
to explain the transformation it engenders. 
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of stories a two-fold work: reflection on the language of the telling and 
reflection on the meaning of the experiences told.  By creating an 
internal coherence in the telling, intelligibility and credibility of the told 
are constructed. 
The mimetic relationship between narrative, language and 
experience is clearly stated LQ5LFRHXU¶VWKHVLV

,WDNHWHPSRUDOLW\WREH
that structure of existence that reaches language in narrativity and 
narrativity to be the language structure that has temporality as its 
ultimate referent'' (Ricoeur, 1981: 161). Experience is made temporally 
and causally meaningful by narrative and, in spite of the fact that 
Bruner identified two apparently irreducible cognitive modes, the 
narrative and the paradigmatic,52 it is plausible that the narrative way of 
thinking is not only the historical antecedent of the paradigmatic but 
also its reference of evaluation. According to Fisher (1994), 
"knowledge of that" and "knowledge of how" leave out whether or not 
some things are desirable to do beyond what is instrumentally feasible 
DQG SURILWDEOH ³.QRZOHGJH RI ZKHWKHU´ LV DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI QDUUDWLYH
rationality and an evaluation of the two previous instances that 
engages with questions of justice, happiness, and humanity (Fisher, 
1994: 25-26).  
The primary principles organising the meaning of human 
ODQJXDJHDQGH[SHULHQFHDUH³PRUHDNLQWRWKRVH that construct poetic 
                                               
52
 ³There are two irreducible modes of cognitive functioning [...] each of the ways of 
knowing has operating principles of its own and its own criteria of well-formedness. 
But they differ radically in their procedures for establishing truth. One verifies by 
appeal to formal verification procedures and empirical proof. The other establishes not 
truth but truth-likeness or verisimilitude. [...] there is no direct way in which a statement 
derived from one mode can contradict or even corroborate a statement derived from 
the other.´(Bruner, 1985: 99) 
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PHDQLQJ WKDQ WKRVH WKDW FRQVWUXFW WKH SURRIV RI IRUPDO ORJLF´
(Polkinghorne, 1988: 16). Meaning systems are enlarged and 
developed by metaphoric processes and narrative activity by 
establishing connections between items purported to be similar, noting 
their causal relationship and evaluating them according to the role they 
play as part of some whole whose meaning can also be developed 
metaphorically. 
In this argument on narrative as a mimetic paradigm, action 
remains to be discussed. Actions are incomprehensible without 
intentions, and the special subject matter of narrative is, precisely, the 
³YLFLVVLWXGHVRIKXPDQLQWHQWLRQV´%UXQHUFLWHGE\3RONLQJKRUQH
18). Actions and intentions are interrelated in at least two ways: in that 
SHRSOH¶V DFWLRQV DUH RULHQWHG E\ WKHLU RZQ LQWHQWLRQV DQG WKDW WKHLr 
DFWLRQV DUH LQIRUPHG E\ ZKDW WKH\ DVVXPH DV WKH RWKHUV¶ LQWHQWLRQV
which is a form of mind reading fundamental for the pragmatic 
interaction between normal non-autistic persons.53 The understanding 
of human actions seems to develop in early childhood: normal children 
are able to attribute mental states (such as beliefs, desires, and 
intentions) to themselves and to other people as a way of making 
sense of and predicting actions (McAdams, 2001: 104).  
%DVHG RQ %UXQHU¶V ILQGLQJV WKDW DXWLVWLF children are generally 
unable to formulate and convey sensible narratives of themselves 
(Bruner, 1994), McAdams (2001) suggests that understanding action 
as performed by intentional agents is basic to develop and reconfigure 
                                               
53
 McAdams (2001) cites Baron-Cohen (1995), who describes autistic children as 
mindblind for not being able to understand people as intentional agents or for doing so 
to a limited degree. 
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D VHQVH RI WKH ³,´  7KH IDFW WKDW QDUUDWLYH RU PRUH SUHFLVHO\ WKH
subjective response to the interpretation of narrative involves the self in 
lived time, even to the point of reconfiguring conventional concepts or 
IHHOLQJVDERXWLWFRQILUPV3RONLQJKRUQH¶VLGHDWKDWWKHEDVLFSULQFLSOHV
of human meaning are poetic rather than formal logic: they generate 
(poiesis) connected entities in relation to a human project instead of 
demonstrating their existence and connection.  
Though it was originally proposed as a phenomenological theory 
of literary reading, Mimesis3 5LFRHXU¶V PRGHO LV DSSOLFDEOH WR WKe 
interpretation of human action in general, particularly to the extent that 
action prompts the reconfiguration of concepts and feelings related to 
WKH VHOI FRQWULEXWLQJ WR WKH LQWHJUDWLRQ RI RQH¶V LGHQWLW\ DQG VHOI-
understanding, which is a key characteristic for making of narrative 
enquiry a well fitted method for autonomous learning and self-study, 
from mathematics (Smith, 2006)  to intercultural knowledge (Schrader 
& Ardemagni, 2004): 
[The outcome of narrative enquiry] does not provide information 
for the prediction and control of behavior; instead, it provides a 
kind of knowledge that individuals and groups can use to 
increase the power and control they have over their own actions. 
(Polkinghorne, 1988: 10) 
8.3.3 Narrative materiality 
From the fields of neuroscience and psychology, Mark Turner and 
Jerome Bruner agree in that narrative meaning making is the 
constitutive quality of human experience, language and language forms, 
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which is the same conclusion that Ursula Le Guin (1989), novelist and 
essayist, put in this way: 
Narrative is a central function of language. Not, in origin, 
an artifact of culture, an art, but a fundamental operation of 
the normal mind functioning in society. To learn to speak is 
to learn to tell a story. (LeGuin, 1989: 39) 
 ³/LWWOHVWRULHV´(Turner, 1996) are not only intrinsic to language itself but 
it is what the person does in order to acquire a language. Drawing on 
his research in child psychology and language development, Bruner 
(1990) suggests that children show a predisposition to organise 
experience into a narrative form, prior to language development. This 
condition and the fact that individual and cultural narratives are 
interrelated make of narrative an integral aspect of language materiality. 
Prior and independently of adopting a linguistic-cognitive interest, 
we have a connection to the narrative structure of language and human 
experience as ordinary persons. The stories we tell are conditioned by 
our language and the narrative genres inherited from our traditions 
which constitute a collective source through which human action and 
intent are interpreted, explained, and understood (Bruner, 1986, 1990). 
In this sense, narrative is prediscursive (Brockmeier & Carbaugh, 2001; 
Turner, 1995) or pre-thematic (D. Carr, 1986; Kerby, 1991).  
Narrative constitutes as well discursive achievements in sciences 
DQGKXPDQLWLHVDQGDKHULWDJHRIDUWLVWLFDFFRPSOLVKPHQWVLQWKHZRUOG¶V
literatures. The difference between prediscursive and discursive 
narrative is significant for the perspective one takes regarding language 
materiality. While as an observer one can attest of the diverse symbolic 
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streams that converge in the representational nature of story telling, as 
a practitioner of the discursive or artistic craft of narrating one 
participates of another kind of materiality in the making: oneself.  
The narrator grows to adjust to the demands posed by the task, 
which concern the intellectual leverage to objectify the matter of the 
telling. However, human intelligence is not only brain-based, but 
presupposes the rest of the human condition. Functions usually thought 
RI DV ³RWKHU WKDQ LQWHOOHFWXDO´ VXFK DV IHHOLQJV DQG ERG\ DZDUHQHVV
make part of human intelligence too. Narrative brings together a variety 
of symbolic streams conveyed by language in second order 
symbolisations; the narrator grows to be aware of knowledge that is 
originally tacit and then pushes his or her limits to verbally objectify it. 
Such efforts transform the agency and identity of a narrator of his or her 
own experience in the world. 
Though a language community influences the meanings 
assigned to a text, a writer and a reader are individuals that do not 
dissolve in any collective entity. Their identity is re-read and re-written 
indefinitely in their efforts to design narratives of their own materiality. 
8.4 Three stages of literacy studies 
8.4.1 Literacy reified 
Before the more recent descriptive tendencies, literacy approaches 
were traditionally prescriptive, a trend that continued in pedagogic 
settings. At the lower levels of most language curricula, literacy is 
focussed on correctness and convention (knowledge of standard norms 
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of grammar, spelling, usage, and mechanics) and conceived of as the 
product of instruction. 
Socialising practices for teaching and learning to read and write 
derived from (and reinforced) reifying notions of language as a set of 
skills commensurate with a prescriptive, normative standard. The most 
commonly extended notions of grammar and spelling are reified: 
grammar becomes what is contained in a reference book and the 
lexicon becomes synonymous with what is in the dictionary (Reagan, 
2004). This phenomenon is an instance of the bidirectionality between 
socialising practices and theory in ways that make one wonder whether 
the conceptual separation between a basic system of lexis, grammar 
and pronunciation, on the one hand, and literacy understood as reading 
and writing on the other is the educational enactment of a theory of 
language or rather the post facto theorisation of an educational practice 
that eventually shaped the way of thinking the discipline itself.  
Reified notions of learning as the successful effect of 
transmission can be found in the lexical choice, which is associated 
with the computer metaphor of teaching (viewed as input) and learning 
(seen as output). Literacy is represented as a conduit constituted by 
merely linguistic skills transferrable from one medium to another (for 
example, from oral to written). The problem with this reifying approach 
to literacy is that the objective existence of subjectivity is ignored, a 
reification that involves the neglect of subject-bound matters such as 
meaning, intention and agency.  
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In context, objectification is the vehicle into emergent grammars 
constructed by the learner as the way into a language. Yet, the division 
between basic system (pronunciation, lexis and grammar) and literacy 
(reading and writing) is endemic to most foreign language courses 
because it is practical for courses designed as skill training, it fits with a 
structure of courses and staff to teach them, and with a hierarchy of 
staff when it comes to separate language and content elements. The 
lack of theorisation that ultimately underlies it jeopardizes the 
attainment of a more academically ambitious project that involves 
making language integral to the scholarship of language-centred 
disciplines like Modern Languages. Though the target language should 
be its obvious axis, it is not, according to a number of authors 
(Coleman, 2004; Evans, 1988; McBride, 2000; Seago, 2000) and in 
Georgetown University (Byrnes, 1990, 2000, 2001; Byrnes & Kord, 
2002), the integration of content courses and target language courses 
has implied the restructuration of the curriculum and of the whole 
German department. 
8.4.2 Literacy objectified 
In opposition to monolithic notions of literacy, scholars in disciplines 
such as rhetoric, composition, educational psychology, linguistics, 
sociology, and cultural theory (Baynham et al., 2007; Brandt, 2001; 
Cope & Kalantzis, 2000; Gee, 1998; Kress, 2003; Slevin, 2000; Street, 
1984; Street & Lefstein, 2007) have contributed to a new, socially-
based conceptualization. They question the notion of a generalizable 
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concept of literacy, and favour the idea of multiple literacies which have 
beHQGHILQHGDV³G\QDPLFFXOWXUDOO\DQGKLVWRULFDOO\VLWXDWHGSUDFWLFHV
of using and interpreting diverse written and spoken texts to fulfil 
SDUWLFXODU VRFLDO SXUSRVHV´ (Kern, 2000: 6). In our interpretation of 
multiple literacies, they are as well culturally and historically situated 
practices but for us the fundamental element of literacy is 
objectification, implying thus a multiplicity of expressive media from the 
beginning instead of adding it to the written language, which itself is far 
IURPVLPSOHDQGZKRVHVWDWXVQDPHO\ WREHUHFRJQLVHGDV³ZULWWHQ´
depends on a number of factors.  
The objectification of language in order to reflect on it and refine 
one's own use of it is a basic characteristic that opens different 
possibilities of reading what is not necessarily written. Some form of 
objectification is necessary in order to isolate or make something 
salient and reflect on it. Objectification means to make distinctive, 
OLWHUDOO\WRSXWVRPHWKLQJLQIURQWRIRQH¶VH\HVZKLFKLVGLIIHUHQWIURP
reification.  
Learning of any kind involves some form of objectification in the 
sense of making distinctive what otherwise would pass unnoticed. 
Since a toddler speaks fluently and understands when spoken to 
without having learned to read or write, then writing cannot be the only 
way to make distinctive the diverse language features that initially may 
have seemed like a blurr to her. The fact that writing is a relatively 
recent human invention shows that it is not the only form of  language 
objectification though the invention of writing increased enormously 
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what by other more limited means existed before, and most likely still 
exists.  
When literacy is understood as language objectification, besides 
oral and written language, it includes any form (pictorial, musical, 
performative54) that raises the awareness both of language itself, and of 
the fact that an agent is using it and reflecting on it. Objectification as a 
condition for literacy can explain why children get quicker 
understanding and control of verbal texts through µwriting¶ (using some 
form of objectification devised by themselves) than through reading 
(Elbow, 1996: 290).  
Literacy is usually reified as a transferrable commodity, which is a 
notion reinforced by the conditions surrounding the act of 
³WUDQVPLVVLRQ´LQVSHFLILFHQYLURQPHQWVVXFKDVVFKRROVLQYROYLQJWDFLW
beliefs about knowledge legitimacy. However, the concept of 
objectification can be instrumental to understand how literacy is 
constructed in a variety of conditions outside the school environment. 
Literacy in a foreign language (L2) is as or more intriguing because the 
learner has a previous language (L1) which acts as the gate keeper for 
L2 in variable ways depending on learning styles and the cognitive 
stage at which the learning of a second language takes place. Learning 
an L2 is more strategic than unconscious (Kellerman & Sharwood-
Smith, 1986) perhaps not so much as a matter of choice but due to the 
                                               
54
 Three examples come to mind of non-verbal objectifications of language: the 
embroidery of kexkemetl (a traditional tunic worn by indigenous women in southern 
Mexico) with mnemonic motives to tell the biography of the owner. The second 
example is the stylized motives painted on pre-Hispanic pottery from New Mexico to 
Peru that turned out to be ideograms of recorded stories. The third one is provided by 
David Attenborough¶V DFFRXQW of the stories told by the Aborigines, integrated with 
music made by singing accompanied by didgeridoo and paintings depicting the same 
instrument next to a design accurately repeated for ages: the Barramundi fish. 
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cognitive shaping that already using a language implies. By limiting 
literacy to an end product of reading and writing instruction, we fail to 
grasp the connection between objectifications of language, on the one 
hand, and the social and individual construction of knowledge, on the 
other.  
Language awareness is both the cause and the effect of 
language's objectification: we become aware of language when we 
focus on it, an action which is possible with a gradient of awareness. 
Research on the area now has a long history spanning several decades 
(Hawkins, 1981, 1984, 1992; C. James & Garrett, 1992) and in the 
website of the Association for Language Awareness it is defined as the 
³H[SOLFLW NQRZOHGJH DERXW ODQJXDJH DQG FRQVFLRXV SHUFHSWLRQ Dnd 
VHQVLWLYLW\ LQ ODQJXDJH OHDUQLQJ ODQJXDJH WHDFKLQJDQG ODQJXDJHXVH´
(Finkbeiner, 2012). In this dissertation, the term has a more general 
sense to refer to ways of objectifying language, in order both to make 
distinctive what could otherwise be ignored or concealed, and to 
establish a reflective distance from language to shape it for a purpose. 
 
8.4.3 Literacy subjectified 
Any form of study involves an agent (a subject) who studies and an 
object of study (a subject too) and I intend to take advantage of this 
polysemia. I propose people are the two-fold subject of literacy: the 
agent and the matter of investigation: not only in the third person but in 
the first person singular or plural as well. Emic and etic perspectives 
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are complementary but at present there is an imbalance that favours 
etic approaches, as if the subjects who study did not exist or did not go 
through changes during their investigations and as if those changes did 
not modify their object of study. Assuming that people who speak more 
than one language re-shape their identities and voices in different 
linguistic and cultural codes, emic and etic approaches to the 
transformation that plurilingual subjects experiment through acts of 
literacy in different languages is a distinctive object of study of Modern 
Languages and Cultures. 
A number of epistemological problems posed by the study of 
languages and cultures depend on subjective aspects such as 
relevance, experience, identity, agency, and their transformations 
through learning.  The interrelation between subject-bound and object-
bound aspects of knowledge determines conceptual differences of key 
concepts such as literacy as well as differences in the socialising 
practices that reproduce the discipline, the most reifying of which are 
those that separate language from content and isolate language as 
skill-training.   
A further step in the objectification of language is the 
objectification of oneself as a reader/writer/interpreter of texts, which is 
a subject-bound literacy. In reading, identity is constructed through the 
positing of the reader that is implicit in the text (the reader becomes to 
some extent the kind of reader for which the text is intended), and by 
reflecting on and responding to being thus posited.  
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In writing, identity is constructed through the design of a voice.  
Voice DFWXDOLVHV LGHQWLW\ RU FRQFHDOV LW DV VKRZQ ZLWK VWXGHQWV¶
composition of academic texts ,YDQLþ,YDQLþ	6LPSVRQ. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR ,YDQLþ (1998), students are not necessarily aware of the 
possibility of taking responsibility of the transformations of their own 
identity and, in consequence, of their own voice; this difficulty is 
perhaps even more acute when speaking and writing in a foreign 
language. Learning a language goes through imitation in the first place; 
however, trying to imitate the language involves imitating the sort of 
people who write/speak like that. AOORZLQJWKHµ,¶WKURXJKWKHWH[W,YDQLþ
& Simpson, 1993: 151) in a foreign language implies a re-design of 
subjectivities rather than a mere translation of deictics. Discourses and 
practices in a foreign language support identities that may differ from 
those that students bring with them, a situation that needs to be 
considered in the actualisation of the curriculum.  
$ FXUULFXOXP WDLORUHG WR HDFK RQH¶V LGHQWLW\ LV SRVVLEOH WR WKH
H[WHQW WKDW LWVVXEMHFW PDWWHU LV WKH OHDUQHU¶VGHVLJQRIKLVRUKHURZQ
voice to make it personally expressive, culturally intelligible and socially 
effective in the target language and culture. Literacy in this type of 
curriculum is subjectified since its leading themes (language materiality 
awareness in its social, physical and narrative aspects; symbolic 
streams of meaning making; tacit and speech-mediated knowledge) are 
centred in the learQHU¶V FXOWXUDO H[SHULHQFHRI ODQJXDJH &KDSWHU RI
this dissertation).  
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The awareness transformations brought about by literacy 
practices have the narrative quality of lived time, which allows for 
projections and retrospections among past, present and future (as 
opposed to paradigmatic time that is unidirectional, context- and value- 
free). According to Carr (1986), one of the most important features of 
lived time, narrative, and history itself is that only from the perspective 
of the end do the beginning and the middle make sense (D. Carr, 1986: 
7). Though the past as such cannot be changed, its representation is 
modified through life; similarly, the ends are re-designed iteratively to 
DFFRUGWKHWHOOHU¶Vcurrent values and beliefs.  
Development can be viewed as the process of reconstructing or 
rewriting ends, as a never-ending retrospective story of transformation 
(Freeman, 1984). The ends of lived time are projected from the present 
and assessed retrospectively as seen from an intended future. A 
narrative of life constitutes then an intricate design in which time is 
anything but unidirectional, value- or context- free. 
The self-narrative is the form through which the self as narrator 
depicts and makes meaning of the self as protagonist (Bruner, 1990). 
The objectification of the language to design its materiality both reveals 
and creates the self which makes of literacy an instrument of 
agentification and autonomy. 
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Chapter 9 Learning for understanding: nexus of 
social and personal epistemologies 
9.0 The meaning of understanding ML&Cs 
Understanding is both condition and result of structuring knowledge into 
a coherent personal account and it is difficult to overestimate the 
importance of elucidating the meaning of understanding a disciplinary 
object since it joins collective and individual epistemologies by means of 
socialising practices that construct (or not) a disciplinary identity.  
$FFRUGLQJ WR %RRWK ³KRZ HGXFDWRUV think of understanding in 
their subject determines what happens in and around class, which 
provides students with their most direct insight into what is really valued 
DVRSSRVHGWRZKDWLVGHFODUHGWREHLPSRUWDQW´(Booth, 2003: 87). The 
meaning of understanding adopted decides the kind of learning 
practiced which basically, as already discussed55, can follow one of two 
routes: integration between social and personal epistemologies, or 
fragmentariness in knowledge and being. 
From what has been argued so far, understanding in our 
discipline depends on three aspects: a perspective of knowledge 
                                               
55
 See 3.0.1 Surface learning and 3.0.2 Deep learning 
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formation which is at once generative and self-directing (chapters 5 and 
6), the cultural experience of language materiality (chapters 7 and 8), 
and the construction of an agentive voice scaffolded by the discretional 
shift of languages in narratives of learning (Chapter 8). Generativeness 
and transformation express understanding in our discipline, whose 
distinctive though not exclusive way of knowing is narrative. 
The crucial question of the meaning of understanding in our 
discipline, however, requires not only theoretical investigations (from 
which the conclusions above derive) but empirical research too --open-
ended endeavours that have to be revised now and again by the 
community of practitioners for they are bound to change given their 
historical nature. Our disciplinary identity depends on agreeing about 
our object of study, the social and individual meaning of understanding 
it and the distinctive ways of knowing to achieve such understanding. 
The lack of agreement on these questions may imply, as Booth (2003: 
15) warned in the study of History, that ours is not a discipline at all, but 
a loose collection of dissimilar, if not methodologically contending 
disciplines. 
9.1 Educational practices to advance a shared body of 
knowledge 
Modern Languages and Cultures could prioritise principled educational 
practices capable of articulating novel forms of knowledge that 
contribute to the advancement of the discipline56. In what follows, I 
                                               
56See 1.1 Disciplines and disciplinarity. 
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indicate the chapters of this dissertation where I discuss each one of 
the six characteristics proposed for such practices: 
(a) They recognise learning as encompassing teaching and research 
(chapters 1, 2 and 3). 
(b) They investigate and facilitate the experiential roots generative of 
different objects of learning (chapters 3, 4 and 5) 
(c) They have autonomy as their backbone both cognitively through 
the discovery and use of generators, and existentially as 
fundamental for human development (chapters 5 and 7) 
(d) They integrate the personal and the social aspects of human 
development (chapters 6 and 8). 
(e) They construct agency as the enhancement of autonomy 
(chapters 7 and 8) 
(f) They establish connections with other disciplines (3.4.1) and with 
the community at large (3.4.2), on the former of which I will 
elaborate in this chapter. 
By focussing on acts of knowledge formation rather than on their 
products, not only is it possible but necessary to establish 
crossdisciplinary connections and a perspective not limited to any 
discipline. According to Bowden and Marton: 
The acts of knowledge formation ±at least some of them²
are generalizable across disciplinary or professional 
boundaries as well as across widely differing levels of 
sophistication, even if the actual knowledge formed varies 
vastly. Being aware of and focusing on the acts of 
knowledge formation have the potential to link people 
across those boundaries (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 24) 
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9.2 Social epistemologies 
The construction of a discipline grounded on acts of knowledge involves 
connecting it with other disciplines in the light of what is common, and 
not limited, to any discipline in particular; that is to say, crossdisciplinary 
connections with transdisciplinDU\SHUVSHFWLYHV³6HHLQJWKDW´UHIHUVWRD
VKDUHGERG\RINQRZOHGJHZKLOH³VHHLQJDV´ (Bowden & Marton, 2003: 
15) refers to the ways of re-creating it, using it and expand it. Cross-
disciplinary connections are important sources of variation57 in the 
learning of what to see and how to see it.  
Cross-disciplinarity needs to reach a transdisciplinary 
perspective so as to avoid producing any number of parallel universes 
which, unable to communicate, can only impose on each other on an 
opportunistic basis. Language is a transdisciplinary matter of interest, 
and so is learning, but foreign language learning experience is a cross-
disciplinary object of investigation whose findings can be transferred 
from Modern Languages and Cultures to other fields in order attain a 
transdisciplinary level of reflection regarding, for example, the clues that  
intercultural understanding can offer to bridge the communication gap 
between academic tribes and territories (Becher & Trowler, 2001) and 
KRZ WKH IRUHLJQHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH ZLGHQV WKH DUHD RI FRQFHUQ RI D
discipline to address the layperson, that is, someone who is in 
unfamiliar grounds of some kind which is tantamount to say the 
community at large. 
                                               
57
 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation about the significance of variation in learning. 
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Understanding the underpinnings of foreign language learning 
constitutes a nexus of crossdisciplinary connections and 
transdisciplinary perspectives illustrated in the following examples that 
are not exhaustive by any means: 
9.2.1 Crossdisciplinary connections 
1. Research on the theoretical and experimental aspects of language 
representation in the multilingual brain58 (Fabbro, 2001), the ways 
in which learning another language engages different brain areas 
and how these vary transversally and longitudinally in diffferent 
learning stages according to what the focus of attention is: the 
abstract system or the physicality of speech. 
2. Ethnographic and laboratory research of how plurilingualism (of 
which bilingualism is but an instance) contributes to understanding 
the nature of divergent thinking and creativity (Kharkhurin, 2007) 
and the role these cognitive and affective traits have in foreign and 
second language learning. 
3. Physicality of speech and mental states 
The investigation of the effects of training the voice in control and 
expressiveness on neurological activity aims at elucidating how 
³Whe physicality of speech [connects] with the whole of our being, 
mind and body, reason and feeling´ (Shattuck, 1980: 44). The 
almost axiomatic assumption in performing arts that controlling the 
                                               
58
 As a matter of terminological consistency, ³SOXULOLQJXDO´ LV PRUH DFFXUDWH WR WKH
extent that the brain belongs to an individual and not to a community, but Fabbro uses 
WKHWHUP³PXOWLOLQJXDO brain´LQKLVZRUN 
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voice enlarges experience (Stanislavski, 1988) has proved to be 
useful and productive, but the actual leap from the articulation of 
µVWUDQJH¶ sounds to using them to achieve a communicative, 
expressive or aesthetic purpose and how that interacts with the 
VSHDNHU¶V brain and the body is not clear. Obvious subjects of 
study here are foreign language learners. 
4.     If, as Deacon (1997 ) suggests, language and the brain co-evolve 
DV SDUW RI D PRUH HQFRPSDVVLQJ HIIRUW WR ³LQWHJUDWH WKH 
unconnected bits of information in a more comprehensive and 
coherent account of being-in-the-ZRUOG´ (Wells, 2000: 121), 
language is not only evolutionarily and developmentally pivotal but 
also a powerful factor of self-regulation and self-integration. More 
research in this direction will give firmer grounds to make of 
language learner autonomy associated with the self-integration of 
the learner a major goal in the language education curriculum.  
5. Modifications of cognitive structures associated with new 
representational systems 
It is debatable whether newer representational systems displace 
the older ones or whether they remain embedded when a new 
representational system is learned. MHUOLQ'RQDOG¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLV
the course of the evolutionary trajectory of human cognition and 
his conclusion, "each successive new representational system has 
remained intact within our current mental architecture, so that the 
modern mind is a mosaic structure of cognitive vestiges from 
earlier stages of human emergence" (Donald, 1991 : 2-3), is 
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remarkably similar to that of developmental psychologist Howard 
*DUGQHU¶VZKRDUJXHV 
&KLOGUHQ¶V HDUOLHVW FRQFHSWLRQV DQG PLVFRQFHSWLRQV HQGXUH
throughout the school era. And once the youth has left a 
scholastic setting, these earlier views of the world may well 
emerge (or reemerge) in full-blown form. Rather than being 
eradicated or transformed, they simply travel underground; 
like repressed memories of early childhood, they reassert 
themselves in settings where they seem to be appropriate. 
(Gardner, 1993b: 29) 
Besides embedding and displacement, there is a third possibility 
documented in SLA which is the cognitive and perhaps also 
neurological reconfiguration in multicompetent individuals (V. J. 
Cook, 1991, 1992, 1999, 2003). Though the two previous 
disciplinary approaches suggest looking for evidence of embedded 
cognitive structures associated with a variety of representational 
systems occurring in multilingual societies and plurilingual 
individuals, it is possible that SLA introduces new factors not 
considered in those fields or that embedding coexists with the 
reconfiguration predicted by the multicompetence hypothesis. 
9.2.2 Transdisciplinary perspectives 
1. Continuation and renewal 
   The investigation of how individuals devise a heuristics to language 
learning and bring about novel combinations can contribute to the 
understanding of how learning enables creation and invention in 
culture in general: 
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[...] while what individuals can mean depends on both their 
personal experiences and the opportunities they have had 
to appropriate the mediational means that are utilized within 
the culture, the continuation and renewal of the culture itself 
depends, in turn, on the unique meanings that its individual 
members contribute to the local activities in which they 
participate. Each occasion of activity therefore both 
reproduces cultural practices and modes of knowing and 
also to some degree transforms them. There is thus an 
inevitable but creative tension between homogeneity and 
diversity, and between convention and invention. (Wells, 
2000: 129-130) 
2.  The education of experience 
     Crossdisciplinary connections between nomothetic and hermeneutic 
fields are involved in the study of symbolic systems interbred in 
language acquisition59 which widen the panorama of meaning 
making beyond the digital properties of language to the symbolic 
density of language materiality.  
     Symbolic density or repleteness links to the languages of art 
(Goodman, 1976) and the interface of language materiality with the 
(musical, visual, performing) arts gives both a wider and a sharper 
scope to the study and appropriation of language as a kind of 
learning that requires being intensively and extensively present at 
RQH¶VRZQH[SHULHQce: 
People (old or young) must be personally present in what 
they are doing or what they are attending to; they must lend 
what is before them some of their lives. Only conscious, 
active moves toward the work at hand can lead to the 
                                               
59
 This topic was introduced in 8.2.4 Symbolic waves of language acquisition. 
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opening of new perspectives or the breaking through of 
crusts of conformity. (Greene, 2004: 17) [Emphasis in the 
original] 
My insistence on highlighting the aesthetic aspect of language 
materiality is because it is situated at thresholds of orders of 
meaning, as well as straddling symbolic sytems. Awareness of the 
symbolic systems concurring therein is basic to have access to the 
multiple literacies (Byrnes & Kord, 2002; Kern, 2000; J. Swaffar & 
Arens, 2005) involved in learning another language and culture.  
9.3 Personal epistemologies 
9.3.1 The design of self-narratives 
As opposed to the unidirectional relationship of causes and effects, 
narrative includes reasons and hypothetical consequences, which 
allows for multidirectional connections between past, present and a 
projected future that are simultaneously visualised as a design. On-
going autobiographical accounts go beyond the 'facts' of their socio-
cultural milieu. Learners selectively appropriate aspects of their 
experience and imaginatively project past and future events in order to 
construct stories that integrate their experience within and without the 
academic context and make it more meaningful as a whole. 
In the design of a life story, meaning is edited and symbolically 
distributed across the protagonist, co-participants and the environment in 
D ZD\ DNLQ WR *HH¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI ³WKH GLVWULEXWHG PHDQLQJ SULQFLSOH´
underlying good video games (Gee, 2003). Life stories, in spite of their 
attempted thematic unity, join multiple lives and overlapping narratives 
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DQG IURP WKH REVHUYHU¶V SHUVSHFWLYH their authorship is never simple: 
³OLIH VWRULHV DUH SV\FKRVRFLDO FRQVWUXFWLRQV FRDXWKRUHG [sic] by the 
person himself or herself and the cultural context within which that 
SHUVRQ
V OLIH LV HPEHGGHG DQG JLYHQ PHDQLQJ´ (McAdams, 2001: 101). 
+RZHYHU IURP WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ WKH\ shape an object (a 
WH[WDQGWKHGHVLJQHU¶VRZQYRLFHDJHQF\DQGLGHQWLW\ 
Narratives as designs with which to enquire into language and 
culture give access to verbal and non-verbal dimensions evoked by 
language. Multiple sources of the mind and corporal experience are 
interwoven in the design of narratives that aim at the presentation of 
embodied knowledge as opposed to confirming or disconfirming 
statements of truth. When approaching life as dramatists who construct 
self-defining scenes and arrange them into storied patterns, the actual 
design of life stories and the enquiry into the ways in which different 
imagoes60 are culturally driven and linguistically actualised are actions 
relevant to the study and investigation of languages and cultures. 
However, the status of the knowledge involved in such an enquiry can 
be controversial for the most conservative ways to understand 
³VFKRODUVKLS´ WR WKH H[WHQW WKDW LW PD\ QRW DOZD\V EH SRVVLEOH WR
establish its truth by falsification61 (the possibility that an assertion can 
be shown false by an observation or by a physical experiment). Then, 
                                               
60
 According to McAdams (1984), an imago is an idealised personification of the self 
that functions as a protagonist in the narrative, a concept analogous to what Markus 
and Nurius (1986) FDOOHG³SRVVLEOHVHOYHV´. Imagoes personify important motivational 
trends in the life story, such as strong needs for power, achievement, or intimacy to 
integrate a life by bringing into the same narrative format different personifications of 
the me (McAdams, 2001).  
61
 The concept of falsifiability was made popular by Karl Popper (1963) who concluded 
WKDWDK\SRWKHVLVSURSRVLWLRQRUWKHRU\LV³VFLHQWLILF´RQO\LI LWLVIDOVLILDEOH+RZHYHU
Popper admitted that unfalsifiable statements can be significant without being 
scientific. 
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either unfalsifiable forms of knowledge are ignored or the meaning of 
scholarship is opened to the possibility of including them. As shown 
below, the latter is reasonable with concepts such as knowledge-in-
practice and action research. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR0F$GDPV¶V OLIHVWRU\PRGHORI LGHQWLW\, people living 
in modern societies provide their lives with unity and purpose by 
constructing internalized and evolving narratives of the self. In 
0F$GDPV¶V words: 
People select and interpret certain memories as self-
defining, providing them with privileged status in the life 
story. Other potential candidates for such status are 
downgraded; relegated [...] or forgotten altogether. To a 
certain degree, then, identity is a product of choice. We 
choose the events that we consider most important for 
defining who we are and providing our lives with some 
semblance of unity and purpose. And we endow them with 
symbolic messages, lessons learned, integrative themes, 
and other personal meanings that make sense to use in the 
present as we survey the past and anticipate the future. 
(McAdams, 2001: 110) 
The designs of identity narratives are generally sensitive to the 
point in which the designer is in her or his own life.  For example, in late 
adolescence and young adulthood (which is approximately the age 
range of undergraduates) people living in modern societies begin to 
anticipate the future in terms of an internalised and evolving self-story, 
while in early adulthood, they appear to focus their identity work on 
articulating, expanding, and refining the story's main characters, or 
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personal imagoes.62 Mid and late life years can bring to the fore long-
supressed tendencies and concerns of loss and mortality. According to 
McAdams, in two different but related senses generativity is 
increasingly important in life-story making during the mid and late-life 
years: 
First, as men and women move into and through midlife, 
themes of caring for the next generation, of leaving a positive 
legacy for the future, of giving something back to society for 
the benefits one has received, and other generative motifs 
become increasingly salient in life stories [...] Second, >«@, 
they may become more and more concerned with the 
"endings" of their life stories. (McAdams, 2001: 107) 
Such a connection between life stories and the meaning of what 
goes on in life makes the development of language use intimately inter-
related with the growth of the self. The reflection on how to linguistically 
express subjective modalities by distinguishing, for example, nuances 
of duty, desire and certainty leads not only to reflect on and probably 
UHYLVH RQH¶V RZQ EHOLHI V\VWHPV EXW DOVR WR FURVV-linguistic 
appreciations when learning another language. The identification of a 
belief system is inseparable from its construction, and a life story may 
never happen to be thematically coherent if a clear and compelling 
EHOLHIV\VWHPWKDWRUJDQLVHVDSHUVRQ¶VOLIHLVQRWDFWXDOO\FRQVWUXFWHG 
6LQFH³ZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIODQJXDJHWKHVHOI-as-object grows 
rapidly to encompass a wide range of things "about me" that can be 
YHUEDOO\GHVFULEHG´(McAdams, 2001: 105), a plausible line of enquiry is 
                                               
62
 An imago is an idealized personification of the self that functions as a protagonist in 
the narrative (McAdams, 2001: 112). Imagoes personify important motivational trends 
in the life story, such as strong needs for power, achievement, or intimacy. 
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WR ILQG RXW ZD\V WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI DQ DJHQFLDO ³,´ who 
reflects on and shapes the self-as-object in the learning of another 
language, and the varying expressions that agency has between and 
within cultures. 
 Because the selfing process is differently actualised according to 
manifold conditions, the meaning RIDQ³DJHQFLDO,´GRHVQRWQHFHVVDULO\
LPSO\³SRZHUVHOI-PDVWHU\VWDWXVDQGYLFWRU\´ (McAdams, 2001: 112). 
Two main forms of agency actualisation have been related to gender 
roles in modern societies: protagonism and communion. Their 
difference depends on their respectively attached imagoes which can 
EHDVSRZHUIXODV WRLPSLQJHRQSHRSOH¶VFRJQLWLYHVW\OHVGLVSOD\HGLQ
narrating autobiographical events: 
People with strong power motivation tend to use an analytic 
and differentiated style when describing agentic events, 
perceiving more differences, separations, and oppositions in 
the significant scenes of their life stories. By contrast, people 
with strong intimacy motivation tend to use a synthetic and 
integrated style when describing communal events, detecting 
similarities, connections, and congruence among different 
elements in significant life story scenes. (McAdams, 2001: 
112) 
Knowledge embodied in dramas, stories and skillful design in 
general is not just verbal and conscious but tacit (Polanyi, 1964, 1969; 
Schön, 1983, 1995) and intuitive (Gee, 2003; Hatton & Smith, 1995). 
Though rarely honoured, let alone rewarded, in formal education, tacit 
and intuitive knowledge is a learning principle (Gee, 2003) and a 
standard resource of knowing-in-action, which  constitutes most of what 
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we know how to do in everyday and in professional life. Real-life 
actions, decisions and interactions demand tacit and intuitive 
knowledge to take place in lived time, usually in situations of 
indeterminacy (Reddy, 2001), characterised by their instability, 
uniqueness and value conflict: 
The actor reflects "in action" in the sense that his thinking 
occurs in an action-present ±a stretch of time within which it 
is still possible to make a difference to the outcomes of 
action. (Schön, 1995: 30) [Emphasis added] 
To talk about something as opposed to making it present 
constitutes two different forms of knowledge: the former is abstract and 
in the third person, whereas the latter is concrete, pragmatic (it 
performatively creates its own object), tied to the situation, and 
engaging. Participants are situated as locutors and interlocutors in the 
first (I, we) and in the second person (you). Knowledge-in-action is 
constructed on the fly, interactively. 
Thinking in action (Schön, 1983) demands more than explicit 
knowledge of the language and culture. Learners face a message that 
may not understand at some level (as said, as what it implies, or as 
ZKDW LWDFKLHYHVLQ WHUPVRIVRPHERG\¶VDFWLRQV+HQFH they need to 
shape the situation in order to find a new frame to understand and 
respond appropriately. The reframing becomes the experimental 
guideline to make connections and adaptive moves. Learners find 
themselves making moves that involve ³intended and unintended 
changes´ which, again, pose the need of more reframing (Schön, 1983: 
131-132). According to Schön,   
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In this reflective conversation, the practitioner's effort to solve 
the reframed problem yields new discoveries which call for 
new reflection-in-action. The process spirals through stages of 
appreciation, action, and reappreciation. The unique and 
uncertain situation comes to be understood through the 
attempt to change it, and changed through the attempt to 
understand it. (Schön, 1983: 132) 
 
The enquiry process described above implies a good deal of 
discovery, which is another learning principle (Gee, 2003: 138). 
Learners have to experiment with language, with metalinguistic and 
metacognitive frames in order to advance. The main problem for the 
educator, then, is not how to teach content (about which it is possible to 
tell too much) but how to induce, inspire, provoke, etc. an attitude of 
enquiry. The curriculum, in this view, is not constituted by the 
dosification of standard contents but by increasingly refined ways in 
which the learner can find problems (Arlin, 1995), ask questions and 
pursue possible projects to answer them. If the curriculum is conceived 
of as a practice in the art of asking questions, learners are given explicit 
information on demand ³at the point where it is meaningful and can best 
be used in practice´ZKLFKDJUHHVZLWK*HH¶V(2003: 211) ³2Q-Demand 
and Just-in-7LPH´OHDUQLQJSULQFLSOH 
Language learning actions like those here described are meant to 
shape products (such as life stories), situations (to make them, for 
example, more conducive to learn), and people (in the first place, the 
learner as his or her own designer). Given that thinking-in-action seeks 
to shape people and things to intentions, reflective practice is adequate 
to education; and that is why analysis for its own sake is not enough in 
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the Humanities: RQH FDQQRW µXQGHUVWDQG¶ KXPDQ EHLQJV ZLWKRXW
affecting others and being transformed in the process. 
The learQHU¶V SDVWH[SHULHQFH SURYLGHV JHQHUDWRUV LQ WKH IRUP RI
examples, images, understandings and actions rather than generalised 
theories, methods or techniques. Past experiences are thus 
transformed as knowledge embodied in stories to be projected onto 
new stories. Linguistic and other types of difficulties and goals related to 
story making are likely to change and be given different emphasis as 
the narrative projects evolve. 
9.3.2 Textual identity 
The performance of a textual identity differs according to the medium 
chosen. There are identities enacted by voices which are strictly 
dependent on the written medium, such as academic writing ,YDQLþ
 ,YDQLþ 	 6LPSVRQ  and writing in a foreign language in 
search of a novel voice and a textual identity, as described by Kramsch 
and Lam: 
 7KLV µPH¶ >HPHUJLQJ IURPWKHZULWLQJLQD IRUHLJQODQJXDJH@
is quite different from that of a familiar user of the language, 
unless that user has consciously defamiliarized his or her 
own language, as poets are wont to do. (Kramsch & Lam, 
1999: 62) 
According to the same authors ³Whe building of textual homes is not 
given with the mastery of the English syntax; it is a subversive art, to be 
DFTXLUHGDQGGHYHORSHG´ (Kramsch & Lam, 1999: 61). Subversion is a 
source of self-assertion for emergent identities, from children to 
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foreigners, to readers and listeners, to speakers and writers but 
academic writing rarely makes the point of using the foreign language 
as a way  to design a voice to express subjectively a textual self, a point 
in which I definitely agree with Kramsch and Lam. 
Written texts undo and reorganise, narrow down, help to focus with 
the clarity of hindsight and, even if used to articulate a current 
experience, are known to facilitate the visualisation or objectification of 
abstract thought and muddled feelings. A voice orally articulated is 
significatively different: time and space factors (inter alia) play according 
to different rules in the written and in the oral. Dissimilar as they are, 
however, they can boost each other. For example, Norton Peirce (2000) 
describes the case of a Czech immigrant who, by creating a textual 
identity for herself, developed the successful personal and social 
identity necessary to survive in Canada. 
6HFRQGDU\OLWHUDWXUHDQGFULWLFLVP³KDYHQRWEHHQZLOOLQJRUDEOHWR
UHFRJQL]H´63 that writers who articulate their experience in a foreign 
language help to create another identity not just for themselves but for 
the language itself. And even if such a contribution is to some extent 
acknowledged, it has hardly had any effect on the educational practices 
of Modern Languages and Cultures, as documented by Coleman (2004) 
in British universities where, on the contrary, a split between content 
and language has persisted (Seago, 2000).   
Textual identity involves a design that articulates experience in 
forms that have been visually shaped and reverberate in the linear 
                                               
63
 Gino Chiellino, an Italian author writing in German in Germany, cited by Kramsch 
and Lam (1999: 61). 
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development of the text. The construction of a textual identity is part of 
the literacy competence of the language user, and the design itself of 
such an identity is a practice in literariness, namely, an auto-referral to 
content as form (and to form as content) that guides the process. 
In the construction of a textual identity and voice, language play 
opens a potential gap between and within form and content allowing 
thus for philosophical, metalinguistic and poetic excursions. 
Multicompetent language users have indeed a wide range of potential 
spaces to open: besides the semasiological explorations regarding the 
meaning of texts in the foreign language and the potential spaces 
between different meanings attributed in different contexts, there is an 
onomasiological project in progress aimed at constructing transparency 
in a language that, when unknown, was the more opaque in form and 
content the more removed from WKH OHDUQHU¶V PRWKHU ODQJXDJH DQG
culture. As linguistic complexity increases, the language user can play 
by rendering opaque what previously had become transparent by sheer 
use (for example, reflecting on dead metaphors deeply ensconced in 
language) and, if only idiosyncratically or poetically, making it 
transparent again. The question may rise about the validity of "mere" 
poetic or idiosyncratic meanings. As Lantolf (cited by Belz, 2002: 34) 
observed,  
For language to convey meaning for all members of a particular 
JURXS>«@LWPXVWKDYHDQLQYDULDQWFRGH%XWDWWKHVDPHWLPH
there has to be a way to break the code if language is to serve 
the particular communicative goals of individual members of the 
group. (Lantolf, 1993: 224) 
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Poetic and idiosyncratic meanings, thus, constitute an important 
and expected part of language use since any form of creativity such 
as language play necessarily involves a relationship with convention 
and shared ground.  Public rules can suggest as many 
crossfertilizations that can go from lexemes, to phonemes, to 
semantic units and genres leading eventually to fictional ways to see 
and describe inner and outer reality.  
The construction of a textual identity and voice involves a 
transitional space64 that can potentially widen in proportion with the 
individual's capacity to play in the crossroads of academic and creative 
writing. As an outstanding example of such cross-fertilization is Phyllis 
&UqPH¶VDQG&HOLD+XQW¶VDFWLRQUHVHDUFKZKHUHWKH\H[SORUHGZKHWKHU
³WHFKQLTXHV IRU finding a voice for creative writing might be useful in 
finding a voice for academic writing, particularly amongst university 
VWXGHQWVZULWLQJHVVD\VDQGGLVVHUWDWLRQV´&UqPH	+XQW
They basically offered their participants the possibility of constructing 
differently their knowledge, their audience and their textual identities. 
Winnicott found that play is doing that takes time and place 
(Winnicott, 2002[1971]: 55). Such finding is relevant to investigate 
DJHQF\ LQHPHUJHQW WH[WXDOYRLFHVDQG LGHQWLWLHV6WXGHQWV LQ&UqPH¶V
DQG +XQW¶V VWXG\ H[SORUHG DQG SOD\HG ZLWK WKHLU DFDGHPLF ZULWLQJ LQ
ways that helped them to achieve greater cognitive flexibility.  By taking 
on different writing identities and voices, they were encouraged to 
                                               
64
 Crème and Hunt (2002) point out that even WKRXJK:LQQLFRWW¶VZRUNZDVRULJLQDOO\
based in the study of babies and young children, later on he and his commentators 
applied his theories to adult cultural expressions (Rudnytsky, 1993) and in reader 
response theory (Schwarz, 1978) with the idea that the text in process comes into 
being in the transitional space between the reader and the work. 
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construct their writing self and reader in more varied and nuanced 
ways. The increased depth and complexity of the writing subject as 
rational knower would have been unattainable without the writer as 
fiction-maker and image-maker. Students fictionalized their relationship 
with themselves as writers, with their topic and with the reader of their 
writing. In other words, they designed stories of possible worlds where 
they could construct those connections otherwise, specifically in ways 
that would help them better to understand and manage them in their 
current ordinary circumstances. In short, they used fiction to investigate 
reality. 
9.3.3 Action and awareness in personal knowledge 
Most languages have three different semantic modalities variously 
encoded in linguistic and nonlinguistic forms: deontic, boulomaic and 
epistemic. The deontic engages people's sense of duty or obligation in 
connection with who they believe they should be. The boulomaic 
expresses what is possible or necessary given what someone desires 
(including, of course, wishes and desires of being and becoming) and 
the epistemic refers to the confidence that they have in the truth of their 
beliefs. Each modality involves beliefs about the world, others and 
oneself that overlap and transform reciprocally. None of them is purely 
objective or subjective but the three represent a negotiation between 
shared assumptions, the world and "knowledge for me" 
Simply stating that identity and agency are delusions only 
acknowledges the epistemic dimension in a view restricted to 
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hypothetical observers who, ironically, have no doubts in their denial of 
the constitutive role of what people believe as necessary and desirable 
in the construction of what they take as true. Such hypothetical 
observers lack all but one subjectivity-constructing dimension, and even 
in this one they do not doubt that identity may be more complex than a 
question of certainty.  
From the perspective of the participant, actions have feared 
consequences and hoped for effects, which introduce a moral 
dimension to making sense of experience. They are not just a chain of 
events linked as causes and effects, but actions interwoven with 
evaluative interpretations regarding purposes and consequences. 
9DOXHVIRUDQREVHUYHULIUHOHYDQWDWDOODUHRQO\WKHRWKHUV¶YDOXHVQRW
his or hers. For a participant, by contrast, there is an interrelation 
between actions and awareness which endorse and up-date values. 
$FWLRQWKHQLVDNH\FRQFHSWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VUROH 
Action and awareness have a dialogic relation because each one 
realises or actualises the other; hence Bruner (1985) called them the 
two landscapes of the narrative way of knowing. From the participant 
view, actions are more than merely hypotheses: they involve picking an 
interpretation and acting by it, which then becomes the way to see 
things in an on-going narrative with deontic, boulomaic and epistemic 
implications: the pair constituted E\ WKH GHRQWLF ³, PXVW´ DQG WKH
ERXORPDLF³,ZDQW´PRGDOLWLHVPDLQWDLQDQDUUDWLYHWHQVLRQ affected by 
certainty or lack thereof. The moral dimension of narrative has been 
considered as a contrastive feature (Rorty, 1980) when compared with 
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the paradigmatic way of knowing, and it is a fundamental condition to 
DWWDLQZLVGRPLQ)LVKHU¶VWKHRU\RIQDUUDWLYHUDWLRQDOLW\(Fisher, 1994). 
Ethnographic and linguistic expertises in the relevant specialities 
have provided important strands of what nowadays occupies modern 
linguists, but the question is whether their model of knowledge and of 
the expert who masters it is neglecting an important dimension, namely, 
the experience of acquiring an identity which, to the extent that it is 
encoded in another language and culture, is new. Experience 
investigation is on the threshold of subjectivity, which is taboo for those 
who can only understand knowledge as objective statements about a 
supposedly non subjective world.  
Modern Languages scholars interested in the construction of 
voice and agency in a foreign language need alternative modes of 
research and study that involve reflection on subjective processes in the 
whole range of semantic modalities and the acquisition of their linguistic 
and cultural actualisation. Investigation involving personal experience 
can do that and inform decisions regarding objects of research and 
socialising practices in the language studies field.  
The quality of personal involves a life-long series of transactions 
with tacit and explicit beliefs and choices which, if repeatedly 
performed, shape identities. Experience refers not to a private ineffable 
world or to an independent object but to a transaction between the self, 
the other and the world. The term personal PHDQV ³UHODWLYH WR D
SHUVRQD´DVRSSRVHGWRDQDQRQ\PRXVDEVWUDFWHQWLW\6LQFH³SHUVRQD´
is a relational concept within the context of social roles and scripts, 
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³SHUVRQDO´ PXVW QRW EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV LI LW ZHUH OLPLWHG WR ³LQGLYLGXDO´
because individualisation is part of the socialisation needed to form a 
persona. IntroducinJ RU ILQLVKLQJ D VWDWHPHQW ZLWK WKH SKUDVH ³LQ P\
SHUVRQDO H[SHULHQFH´ XVXDOO\ LPSOLHV D OLPLWDWLRQ WKDW ZRXOG UHTXLUH
more authoritative sources to gain in validity. Now the question is 
whether such a seemingly humble source can be disciplinarily relevant. 
Personal experience does not need to justify itself to fit with 
other, supposedly worthier kinds of knowledge. On the contrary, the 
latter have derived from the former and they must find their way back to 
refine and deepen personal experience for the social and individual 
benefit.  Focussing on personal experience gives origin to a critical, 
reflective and aesthetic effort that conjoins the investigation of 
languages and cultures with its educational practices and which does 
not lose the historical and existential condition of those who make 
knowledge possible as a human enterprise. 
Personal experience and practical knowledge are dialogically 
and developmentally related, which makes of personal experience a 
parent to practical knowledge. Practical knowledgH LQ $ULVWRWOH¶V
formulations emerges as an awareness of how best to act, a form of 
insight embodied in what we do in the world, and not ±like theoretical 
knowledge² primarily a form of insight about or representation of the 
world (Bostock, 2000). Whereas practical knowledge is the capacity to 
respond to the particularities of experience, and to evolving 
relationships with others, personal knowledge grounds experience in 
 309 
narratives of life structured through scripts and roles linking  purposes 
and circumstances.   
Languages and cultures shape HYHU\ERG\¶V identity and, as a 
matter of consistency, the investigation of languages and cultures 
should include the people who study them and how they are 
subjectively transformed. Subjectivity, however, has been nominally 
excluded and most researchers have limited their interest to just one of 
the three modalities previously described: the epistemic. As a 
consequence, they have tied themselves to the perspective of a body-
less subjective-less observer. It is no wonder then that most of 
language complexity escapes their gaze. 
Knowledge of language is not objectively guaranteed by a 
method, or by grammatically perfect production.65 Instead, it becomes 
knowledge through the agency of a subject; it is made knowledge by 
performance in culturally, socially and personally situated practice. 
There is an intrinsic connection between truth by performance and the 
agency of the performer, and to ignore it compromises the possibility of 
meeting social and personal needs.  
Personal knowledge presupposes a foundational link between 
the person who knows and the object known. Studying languages and 
cultures from a personal experience approach is subjective, but 
subjectivity is an actual condition of social and individual life. Two 
                                               
65
 Errors, rather than implying a failure in learning, indicate that cognitive processes 
are taking place in order to generate language instead of merely reproducing received 
models. The research with European migrant workers outlined in Klein and Perdue 
(1992) established a set of five common principles operating at the base stage of L2 
acquisition in four different L2s involving five L1s by adopting an Error Analysis style 
approach to looking at learners' productions in their own terms rather than in native-
biased obligatory contexts. 
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outwardly different stances coincide in their stressing objectivity while 
minimizing the value of its presumed opposite. One of them prescribes 
the elimination of uncontrollable factors that cannot be objectified, 
whereas the other stance champions the impossibility of objectivity to 
the point of being defined by what it rejects. In one or the other case, 
the subjects are non-personal and the ever-present subjectivity is 
acknowledged in general but not investigated in particular, in the first 
person singular or plural. A personal experience approach could fill this 
lack. 
When practical knowledge and personal experience are pivotal, 
the researcher is not a detached, objective observer. The researcher is 
both subject and object: the one who observes and the one observed. 
Any generalisations drawn from there are relative to a process in 
progress where the enquirer has binding interests like making sense of 
his or her cultural experience with, through and about a different 
language. The interest in highlighting the role of the participant in the 
study of languages and cultures is that the notion of knowledge widens 
its meaning to embrace issues of identity and agency, not just that of 
others, in the form of roles and scripts in society or in texts, but also the 
identity and agency of the self through a process of revision of who one 
is in the light of a different language and a different culture.  
Conclusion: Higher education & human development 
Though I am not designing a curriculum for Modern Languages and 
Cultures, by discussing the points of contact between the field 
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construction of the discipline and its educational practices, I aim at 
convincing other modern linguists that the investigation of how the 
discipline is taught and learned is a matter deserving serious attention 
for its relevance to the discipline itself. If I succeed to inspire them to 
use learning and knowledge-formation processes as a way to advance 
the discipline, as a community we can do scholarly work for which 
human development is an integral part of a shared body of knowledge.  
The vision underlying such a purpose is that education, rather 
than an applied field among others is an encompassing condition of our 
humanness and that the investigation of the learning experience 
benefits the comprehension of the object of knowledge and is an 
opportunity of transformation for the adult learner. Adult learning does 
not have here the connotation of a handicap that requires some 
remedial intervention, as if there were canonical and non canonical 
forms of learning, the former taking place in the developmental stages 
of childhood and adolescence and the latter in other, less than ideal, 
conditions. On the contrary, adult learning stands for the most 
sophisticated expression of awareness of the self as a learner and of 
knowledge formation as a metaphor of life, a commitment to construct 
knowledge located in the last position of a journey of cognitive and 
ethical growth captured with these descriptors: being wholehearted 
ZKLOH WHQWDWLYH WR ILJKW IRU RQH¶V RZQ YDOXHV \HW UHVSHFW RWKHUV WR
EHOLHYHLQRQH¶VRZQGHHSHVWYDOXHV\HWEHUHDG\WROHDUQDQG to retrace 
the whole journey over and over in the hope of making it more wisely 
(Perry, 1981). 
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 Higher education has the responsibility of developing not only 
instrumental forms of learning but mainly the criticality, the humanness 
DQG WKH VHOI RI WKH SHUVRQV LQYROYHG ³OHDUQHUV KDYH WR FRPH LQWR WKH
VHOYHV WKDW WKH\ FRQVWUXFW IRU WKHPVHOYHV´ (Barnett, 1997: 34). Social 
epistemologies alone are not enough to reach personal and subjective 
dispositions whereas personal epistemologies by themselves would 
render a shared body of knowledge impracticable. In order to fulfill its 
responsibility, Higher Education has to facilitate the reunion of the 
intersubjective and the personal in ways of knowing that acknowledge 
both. 
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